This article examines the implications of abolishing the so-called purely internal rule, an “invisible wall” introduced by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 1979, which limits the application of the EU’s internal market freedoms and, accordingly, of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to situations involving cross-border elements. The purely internal rule has long been criticized for causing reverse discrimination, undermining EU citizenship, and contradicting the internal market’s promise of a “space without internal frontiers.” Drawing on historical developments, the article traces the origins, evolution, and “codification” of the purely internal rule in the ECJ ruling in Ullens de Schooten, highlighting its substantive and procedural exceptions as well as its challenges, including inconsistent jurisprudence and legal uncertainty.

The article subsequently analyzes recent treaty reform proposals by the European Parliament advocating the extension of the Charter to purely internal situations and a redefinition of the internal market’s scope. It evaluates the potential consequences of abolishing the purely internal rule, such as increased harmonization of fundamental rights protection, the eradication of reverse discrimination, and deeper economic integration among national markets. However, it also explores the risks, including a significant rise in the ECJ’s workload, prolonged judicial proceedings, reduced national regulatory autonomy, and heightened tensions between national courts and the ECJ. The article concludes that while abolishing the purely internal rule could enhance uniformity and strengthen EU citizenship, its success hinges on accompanying institutional reforms to safeguard the principles of subsidiarity, proportionality, and effective judicial protection.