Wojciech Sadurski

Wojciech Sadurski is Challis Professor of Jurisprudence at the University of Sydney and Professor of the University of Warsaw, Centre for Europe. He has previously held a professorship at the European University Institute in Florence from 1999 to 2009 (where he served as head of the Department of Law from 2003 to 2006), and he has taught most recently at University of Pennsylvania’s Penn-Carey School of Law, Princeton University, NYU, Yale Law School, etc. Member of the Venice Commission (the European Commission for Democracy Through Law), Global Commission on the Rule of Law, and of various boards of international and Polish scholarly associations, editorial boards, think-tanks and NGOs. His areas of research include comparative constitutional law and philosophy of law. His most recent books are La minaccia populista alla democrazia (Il Mulino, Bologna 2025), A Pandemic of Populists (Cambridge 2022), Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown (Oxford 2019) and Constitutionalism and the Enlargement of Europe (Oxford 2012).

Contact: ws53@nyu.edu

Research Project

“Post-populism: Constitutional and Political Dilemmas.” What happens when post-populists – leaders and parties who defeat authoritarian populist incumbents in elections – are unable to restore (or fully restore) the rule of law and democratic institutions, and face the dilemma of either surrendering their electoral promises or resorting to breaches of conventionally understood rule-of-law principles? My main case studies to address this question will be Poland post-2023 and Hungary post-2026, but I intend to draw more general conclusions that will apply to a “post-populist predicament” more universally. I will examine, first, strategies for consolidating post-authoritarian governance to create resilience against a populist return to power. I will analyze both coercive strategies—including militant democracy and cordon sanitaire—and persuasive and communicative approaches. While acknowledging a general distaste for coercive measures and their potential for abuse, I will test the hypothesis that cordon sanitaire—placing populist authoritarians ‘beyond the pale’ of day-to-day democratic politics—may be justified and effective despite the inherent risks of social backlash. Second, I wish to challenge the conventional wisdom that political depolarization is necessary to overcome populism and prevent its return. The central argument I intend to propose is that, while depolarization per se may be seen as a laudable goal, in some contexts, namely in the demolished democratic infrastructure, aiming at depolarization at all costs leads to an inevitable paralysis of democratic reforms. Third, and most controversially, I will address the fundamental question: Can the rule of law be restored while breaching it?  I will propose realizing what is at stake and urge rethinking of the meaning of the rule of law, acknowledging that under certain circumstances, a direct appeal to ‘higher’ supra-statutory law—the Constitution, European law (when it applies), and international standards—while disregarding other statutory provisions—including institutions rendered unconstitutional by populist predecessors—can offer a way forward.