Presidential Immunity and Liberal Democracy. A Qualified Defense of Trump v. United States My project examines the relationship between presidential criminal immunity and the stability of liberal democracy. Taking the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. United States as its point of departure, it advances a counterintuitive argument: although the decision has been widely criticized for placing presidents above the law, presidential immunity may also serve an important democratic function by reducing the personal costs of electoral defeat and thereby weakening an incumbent’s incentive to resist leaving office. Drawing on comparative democratic theory, political science research on term-limit compliance, and scholarship on transitional justice, the project argues that peaceful transfers of power depend partly on keeping the stakes of losing within tolerable bounds. The prospect of prosecution or imprisonment after leaving office can transform electoral defeat into an existential threat, particularly in increasingly personalized political systems. Comparative and contemporary case studies – including the United States, Israel, South Korea, Brazil, and historical democratic transitions – illustrate how fear of post-office legal jeopardy may contribute to entrenchment, electoral subversion, or other forms of democratic backsliding. They also show how immunity, amnesty, and credible exit guarantees have sometimes facilitated peaceful transitions. The project does not offer an unqualified defense of presidential immunity. Removing criminal accountability may embolden presidents to abuse their powers while in office. I therefore distinguish between two institutional problems: the “exit” problem and the “tenure” problem. Post-office immunity can lower the stakes of leaving power, while Congress, courts, inspectors general, independent agencies, and liability for subordinate officials can constrain presidential misconduct during officeholding. The project thus proposes relocating, rather than eliminating, accountability: reducing the concentrated personal threat facing a defeated incumbent while strengthening continuous structural checks on the sitting president. This framework offers a qualified defense of Trump v. United States and a broader account of how constitutional design can reconcile executive accountability with the peaceful transfer of power more effectively.