



*The Jean Monnet Center for
International and Regional
Economic Law & Justice*

THE NYU INSTITUTES ON THE PARK

THE JEAN MONNET PROGRAM

*J.H.H. Weiler, Director
Gráinne de Burca, Director*

Jean Monnet Working Paper 14/20

Symposium: Football Feminism – Global Governance Perspectives

Moya Dodd & Catherine Ordway

FIFA Governance:

How Crisis Opened the Door for Gender Equality Reforms

NYU School of Law • New York, NY 10011
The Jean Monnet Working Paper Series can be found at
www.JeanMonnetProgram.org

**All rights reserved.
No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form
without permission of the author.**

**ISSN 2161-0320 (online)
Copy Editor: Danielle Leeds Kim
© Moya Dodd & Catherine Ordway 2020
New York University School of Law
New York, NY 10011
USA**

**Publications in the Series should be cited as:
AUTHOR, TITLE, JEAN MONNET WORKING PAPER NO./YEAR [URL]**

FIFA Governance:
How Crisis Opened the Door for Gender Equality Reforms

Moya Dodd* & Catherine Ordway**

Abstract: Football, the world’s most popular sport, carries a legacy of gender exclusion. Women were banned from playing in many jurisdictions and remain largely absent from its leadership. Implicit and/or conscious biases perpetuate the under-development and under-resourcing of the women’s game, and the under-representation of women in decision-making roles. As FIFA acknowledges, “years of institutional neglect and a lack of investment have prevented girls and women from playing the game and from assuming roles in technical, administrative and governance functions. The long-standing lack of women in positions of responsibility in the football community means there have been limited voices to advocate for change” (FIFA Women’s Football Strategy 2018 p4).

In parallel, allegations of corruption have accompanied football, its officials, and its governing bodies (including the international federation, FIFA) for many years, with limited progress or accountability. In May 2015, the raids and arrest of senior FIFA officials triggered a corruption crisis, which provided the impetus for structural change.

In the ensuing chaos, FIFA faced an overwhelming imperative for reform. At FIFA’s Congress in February 2016, a number of Statute amendments were approved, reflecting a growing acknowledgement and commitment to women in football. At the governance level, the amendment specified that members’ legislative bodies: “must be constituted in accordance with the principles of representative democracy and taking into account the importance of gender equality in football” (Art.15(j), FIFA 2016).

* Moya Dodd, former international footballer for Australia; former member of the FIFA Council; Partner, Gilbert + Tobin Lawyers; LL.B. (Hons), University of Adelaide; Executive MBA, Australian Graduate School of Management, University of New South Wales; Australia

**Dr. Catherine Ordway, Assistant Professor (Sports Management); PhD, University of Canberra; BA (Jur), LLB, University of Adelaide; GDLP, University of South Australia; Graduate Diploma in Investigations Management, Charles Sturt University; Australia Primary contact: catherine.ordway@canberra.edu.au

Further, FIFA's Objectives were expanded: "to promote the development of women's football and the full participation of women at all levels of football governance" (FIFA 2016 Art.2(f)); and "to use its efforts to ensure that the game of football is available to and resourced for all who wish to participate, regardless of gender or age (FIFA 2016, Art.2(e)). Six positions were reserved for women on the 37-person FIFA Council, and FIFA's governance regulations were also amended to embed specific obligations on gender inclusion within the governance system.

This paper explores how these landmark amendments came into existence. It provides an insider's view as an author, Moya Dodd, was one of the first women on FIFA's Executive Committee and became "the driving force in the recent push for women within FIFA" (Clarey 2016). She chaired FIFA's Women's Football Taskforce which drafted the *Women's Football: 10 Key Development Principles* (FIFA WFT 2014). During the corruption crisis of 2015, she submitted reform proposals and led a public '#womeninFIFA' campaign which gave voice to the broader community of support for gender reforms in FIFA. This professional practice autoethnographic research examines the process by which progress towards gender equality was, and can be, achieved.

1. Introduction

Sport has traditionally been developed by and for men (Hargreaves 2002), and women have been excluded or restricted in their freedom to participate. Football, the world's most popular sport, carries a legacy of gender exclusion. Not only were women effectively banned from playing football in numerous countries (Williams 2013; Onwumehili 2011), and continue to struggle for recognition and acceptance in many others (Pfister 2006; Crawford & McGowan 2019), but some are even prohibited from attending men's sport, as was highlighted through the recent death of Iranian football fan Sahar Khodayari, known as "Blue Girl" (Lewis 2019).

Women also remain largely absent from its leadership. Implicit and/or conscious biases perpetuate the under-development and under-resourcing of the women's game, and the under-representation of women in decision-making roles. As the Fédération

International Federation of Football Association (FIFA) acknowledges, “years of institutional neglect and a lack of investment have prevented girls and women from playing the game and from assuming roles in technical, administrative and governance functions. The long-standing lack of women in positions of responsibility in the football community means there have been limited voices to advocate for change” (FIFA Women’s Football Strategy 2018 p4).

The calls for change internationally have grown louder, in sport and more broadly in society. Most influentially, the International Working Group (IWG) on Women and Sport 1994 *Brighton Declaration* was expanded and became the *Brighton plus Helsinki 2014 Declaration on Women and Sport* (IWG 2014). Then in 2015, all United Nations (UN) Member States adopted the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. One of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals is “Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls” (UN 2015). Following the FIFA reforms, policies including the *Kazan Action Plan* (UNESCO 2017) and the International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) *Gender Equality Review Project* (2018), for example, created a normalising momentum on gender equality.

While FIFA had become a signatory to the IWG *Brighton plus Helsinki Declaration* in March 2015, the pressure from law enforcement and football stakeholders following the arrest of several high-profile FIFA members on corruption charges only two months later, created an environment where change was inevitable. Progressive and pragmatic FIFA members looked to shape their impact.

This article describes and reflects on the process by which voting members of FIFA agreed in 2016 to a range of governance reforms, in particular, gender equality provisions. A number of powerful learnings have been identified through this experience which have been shared for others similarly advocating for change.

2. Methodology

This article takes an interdisciplinary approach through legal and sports management lenses to analyse the process by which structural gender equality reforms were achieved by amending the FIFA Statutes and related regulations in 2016. This professional practice

research takes an autoethnographic viewpoint to reflexively examine the learnings from an ‘insider’ directly involved in FIFA’s governance reform (Costley 2010 p30-31). It is intended that these learnings are extrapolated for other sports and in broader contexts, through: “link[ing] critical theory with current practice to bring [this article] to life through . . . [a] dedicated critique of [a] contemporary case” (Schulenkorf & Frawley 2017 p3).

A lawyer and former elite footballer, Dodd has had a long involvement with football. As an international player she had appeared in the very first FIFA-organised women’s international game - for Australia vs Brazil in the inaugural 1988 women’s tournament (Crawford & McGowan 2019 p81, 107), known as the pilot World Cup. Twenty-five years later, she joined FIFA’s Executive Committee, by then having served as a director of the Football Federation Australia (FFA), and as a Vice President of the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) and chair of the AFC Women’s Committee for several years. During that period, she had become known for her advocacy for women (for example, in the campaign to lift the ban on wearing a headscarf on the field: Prouse 2015; Crawford & McGowan 2019 p107, 194), both inside and outside the formal governance structures of football. These roles gave Dodd the opportunity to engage with leading figures in world football, such as then FIFA President Sepp Blatter, from as early 2007. The process of seeking election in 2013 also required extensive engagement with decision-makers within FIFA from around the globe. These experiences and roles gave her the ‘intimate insider’ (Taylor, J 2011) position of privilege; to not only observe and understand, but also to influence, the events unfolding.

Dodd recounts the sequence of events, and ‘joins the dots’ here, based on her own recollections and observations, supported by the contemporaneous documentary evidence available. As described by DeDiego and Moret (2017), autoethnography: ‘serves as a constructive interpretation process . . . Reflexive writing examines the researcher perspective within social context connecting action, memory, and meaning’ (p130-131). Writing this reflexive piece then can also be considered an ‘autoethnographic life review’, as the events of 2015 provide a punctuation point in history that gives Dodd the

opportunity to look back on decisions made and action taken with the benefit of hindsight in order to determine where to prioritise future endeavours (Ellis 2013).

Coming into FIFA's exclusive, almost entirely all-male, environment as a relative newcomer, Dodd's 'insider' position can also be considered from a feminist standpoint perspective as an 'outsider', where: 'women's situated experience was able to express knowledge that had hitherto been marginalized or ignored.' (Harding 1987 in Costley 2010 p30). Dodd observed at the 2019 Equality Summit that: 'Football governance is a giant arm wrestle between governing bodies, clubs, leagues, and players. Women simply don't have an arm in that wrestle.' (quoted by Crawford and McGowan 2019 p256). This 'insider-outsider' perspective (Breen 2007) then, provided Dodd with the vantage point to: closely observe developments in governance and reform, be present for key meetings and events, and personally interact with the prime decision-makers, advisers and influencers. As a 'FIFA insider who thinks like an outsider' (Macur 2016) and a 'from-within revolutionary' (Davis 2016), Dodd also experienced these events through the lens of a newcomer who could critique and calibrate with other environments outside sport, including her experience in law and business.

Dodd also had to navigate the uniquely challenging and complex world of FIFA. The representatives from more than two hundred disparate FIFA affiliated associations (recognised national football bodies) include powerful members of royal families, sporting icons, wealthy business people and allies of ruling governments. These multi-layered networks outside of football, are further expanded through alliances of language, culture, religion, geography and history within the FIFA and Olympic families. In addition, the social status created by holding a FIFA representative position, together with geo-political nuances, commercial relationships, and the passion for football, meant that the stakes were so much higher than in 'normal' work-place settings. Few people in regular jobs are likely to say, as former Liverpool manager Bill Shankly is reported to have done: 'Some people believe football is a matter of life and death, I am very disappointed with that attitude. I can assure you it is much, much more important than that' (Bona 2015).

3. Extrinsic and Intrinsic Context for Gender Equality Reform

The world was changing in relation to gender equality, particularly in the western world, and yet FIFA's members continued to remain largely unmoved and immune from these societal pressures. An advocate observer might assume that either the international context FIFA found itself in would create the external motivation to introduce gender equality reform, or the internal motivation of doing the 'morally *right* thing' may have led to changes earlier than 2016. Yet for decades, the most salient feature of FIFA's policy on women's inclusion in governance remained the status quo. Instead, it took a crisis of a 'wildfire' magnitude to ignite the spark to create change.

3.1 Extrinsic motivators

If motivation is an inducement or an influence that provides the *reason* for moving or acting (Carlopio & Andrewartha 2008), then there were ample extrinsic motivators that could have been expected to create the shift in the status quo at FIFA prior to 2016. For example, the UN recognises the potential for sport to socially empower women and girls (UN 2007). Switzerland, where FIFA is seated, is one of the almost 190 State Parties who are signatories to the *Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women* (CEDAW) (UN 1979; UN Treaty Collection 2018). Broader than sport, the UN *2030 Agenda Sustainable Development Goals* (SDGs) recognise that women are subjected to biases and prejudice which can feature in their lives in a range of contexts, including the lack of pay parity, gender segregation, harassment and sexual assault. For this reason, gender equality and empowerment for women and girls has been designated as Goal 5 of the SDGs since 2015 (UN 2019; UNODC 2018).

Also, at the Governmental level, the *Kazan Action Plan* (adopted during the Ministers' meeting at the Sixth International Conference of Ministers and Senior Officials Responsible for Physical Education and Sport (MINEPS VI) held in Kazan, Russia 13-15 July 2017) directly links sport policy development to the UN 2030 Agenda. Although not formally adopted until after the FIFA reforms, the *Kazan Action Plan* was developed through extensive consultations with UNESCO's Member States (including the Swiss Federal Office of Sport), the Intergovernmental Committee for Physical Education and Sport (CIGEPS) and its Permanent Consultative Council. Consultations included other

experts and practitioners in sport policy, including the FIFA Secretary-General, Fatma Samoura, and other senior FIFA staff (UNESDOC 2017). The *Kazan Action Plan* called for signatories to:

1.5 Enforce gender equality/Empower girls and women
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education stipulate in various articles equal rights for all members of society to participate in all activities, including education, and to become engaged in policy development including taking over leadership positions. Physical education, physical activity and sport offer compelling levers for promoting gender equality and empowerment, and for challenging structural injustices that limit not only the life chances of girls and women but also other gender groups. The variety of levels at which girls and women can engage in these activities include participation, coaching, teaching, management and leadership (UNESCO 2017).

In this broader human rights context, FIFA was also criticised for neglecting human rights, especially in relation to workers' rights during preparations for the men's World Cups to be hosted in Russia in 2018 and Qatar in 2022 (Amnesty International 2014). Women's rights are human rights, thus creating synergies in pressure for reform between and across groups motivated to achieve positive outcomes for these agendas.

It might have been expected that the Swiss Government, as a signatory and SGD supporter, could have exerted some pressure on the organisations constituted under its laws, including the estimated 60-70 international sports federations (IFs) (Rütter & Schmid 2013), and the IOC. Several commentators have argued the governments should provide the inducement, or otherwise influence, international sports organisations to implement the international obligations ratified by the national governments where they are seated (eg: Jones 2012; Passas & Ordway 2016).

To mark International Women's Day in 2015, FIFA became a signatory to the IWG *Brighton plus Helsinki Declaration on Women and Sport* (FIFA Women's Football 2015,

March; IWG 2020). The Declaration consists of ten principles, committing signatories to implement, as follows:

- *Principle 1: Equity and Equality in Society and Sport*
- *Principle 2: Facilities*
- *Principle 3: School and Youth Sport*
- *Principle 4: Developing Participation*
- *Principle 5: High Performance Sport*
- *Principle 6: Leadership in Sport*
- *Principle 7: Education, Training and Development*
- *Principle 8: Sport Information and Research*
- *Principle 9: Resources*
- *Principle 10: Domestic and International Cooperation (IWG 2014)*

FIFA is also a member of the Olympic family. Noting that it is not clear what “fundamental ethical principles” are, or in fact if they are “universal” (Mazanov et al 2019), the IOC position, set out in its *Olympic Charter*, states that:

. . . Olympism seeks to create a way of life based on the joy of effort, the educational value of good example, social responsibility and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles (IOC 2013 p11).

After many years of resistance to the calls for gender equality in the Olympic movement across participation, medals, coaching, officiating and leadership (eg: Forgues 2000; Patsantaras & Kamberidou 2006), the IOC has also introduced several gender equality reforms. In 2016, UN Women and the IOC jointly launched the project *One Win Leads to Another*, in partnership with *Women Win* and the Brazilian Olympic Committee (Mlambo-Ngcuka 2019). Most recently, and notably after the FIFA 2016 reform, the IOC has recognised that women, and women’s sport, requires, not just equal treatment, but greater investment in resources to counter historical inequalities (IOC 2018). Subsequently, FIFA and UN Women also signed a memorandum of understanding aiming to promote gender equality and empowerment of women and girls through sport in June 2019 (UN Women 2019).

3.2 Intrinsic motivators

Noting that sport has traditionally been developed by and for men (Hargreaves 2002), women have been excluded or restricted in their freedom to participate in sport. A feminist approach, inspired by the work of Gilligan (1982), reframes gender equality efforts in sport by advocating for the creation of an environment focused on fairness, transparency, accountability, collaboration, diversity and inclusion. Based on this approach, it can be argued that a positive moral obligation applies where people in positions of influence and power are the beneficiaries of a system established and perpetuating historical and/or current inequities (racism, sexism, colonialism, slavery etc). As is the case for sports organisations, such as FIFA, it is therefore argued that a higher moral duty is imposed on those beneficiaries to actively include members of the community who have been excluded, in this case women. Those persuaded by this positive moral obligation then may be influenced to create inclusive policies and programs to compensate for past inequalities. It could be expected that this would be translated into affirmative action measures, such as increased financial resources, pay parity, mentoring/ training programs and governance quotas, for example.

There is little evidence to suggest that sport organisations, such as FIFA, have reformed on this basis. Carole Oglesby, a long-time campaigner and former co-chair of the IWG, observed that: "I don't think organizations have seen the light, but they think: 'Ok, this is something we have to do, to check the box'," (cited by Wissgott 2019). While there have always been some decision-makers open to a moral, and/or a feminist approach, or who believed it to be good business and a part of their duty to grow the game, there was evidently not a sufficient consensus to drive significant structural change on gender-balance within FIFA prior to 2016.

4. Tipping Point: FIFA Corruption Scandal context

The FIFA leadership has long been criticised for perpetuating the conditions in which corruption could flourish (Jennings 2006; Jennings 2016; Tomlinson 2014). FIFA's major governance failures have also been the focus of the international anti-corruption watchdog, Transparency International (Schenk 2011; Valloni & Neuenschwander 2016).

In the wake of the controversial vote on the men's World Cup hosting rights in 2010, FIFA formed an Independent Governance Committee in 2011, chaired by Professor Mark Pieth. On the Committee's recommendation, FIFA created an independent two-chamber (investigatory and adjudicatory) Ethics Committee and implemented several other reforms promoting integrity and financial controls (FIFA Chronology 2014). However, it was not without controversy on gender issues. One member, Alexandra Wrage, now referring to it as "the failed FIFA Independent Governance Committee" resigned after claiming she had been told by senior FIFA executives: 'You're going to have to give us more male candidates because a female candidate is not acceptable [for key appointments].' (quoted by Conway 2013; Wrage 2020). On completion of his final report, Pieth warned that reform was incomplete (Pieth 2014).

Internationally, there was also growing recognition that improved gender diversity lowers the risk of corruption in organisations (Swamy et al 2001; Esarey & Chirillo 2013; Ordway & Opie 2016 p48; Ordway 2019; FIFA Women's Football Taskforce 2015 footnote 8). In this context, corruption allegations created arguably the greatest threat to FIFA's existence, known as 'FIFAgate'. In late May 2015, just prior to a FIFA electoral Congress, Swiss authorities stormed a luxury Zurich hotel and arrested several football officials following an FBI investigation. FIFA's headquarters were also raided, with similar operations also undertaken elsewhere (Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland 2015). United States of America (US) Attorney General, Loretta Lynch, described the indictments against FIFA officials as "rampant, systemic and deep-rooted" corruption (Department of Justice 2015).

Two days after the raids, the FIFA elective Congress proceeded in Switzerland as planned. Sepp Blatter was returned as President, defeating Prince Ali of Jordan, demonstrating an inertia very commonly present in sport federation elections (Hough & Heaston 2017; Masters 2020). The FIFA Women's World Cup kicked off soon afterwards, on 6 June in Canada. The start of the World Cup came as a welcome relief, with the media focus moving back to the field. Blatter chose not to attend the World Cup, due to "travel risks" (PA Sport 2015), which was widely understood to mean the risk of being arrested in a country from where he could be extradited to the US.

5. FIFA Governance Reform – Gender Equality

5.1 Female Co-opted Positions

In football, the legacy of exclusion, and implicit and/or conscious bias, remains, with women largely absent from decision-making and leadership roles. In 2012, following a period of pressure to reform in the wake of the 2010 vote on the FIFA World Cup hosts for 2018 and 2022, FIFA passed a range of statutory amendments. One amendment created an additional position of “Representative of Women’s Football” (who must be a woman) on the Executive Committee. Perhaps reflecting a sense that greater representation in Africa was required, and certainly as one of the few female national Presidents, the then-President of the Football Federation of Burundi, Ms Lydia Nsekera, was immediately co-opted into that role for a year. In 2013, at the following FIFA Congress, the role was amended to “female member of the Executive Committee” (FIFA 2013(a) Art 24 and 30), and the first election to bring a woman onto the governing body was held. Each Confederation was entitled to nominate a candidate.

At that time, I was a board member of the Football Federation Australia [FFA] and the only woman Vice-President of a Confederation [Asia]. I was nominated as Asia’s candidate for the FIFA role, and campaigned hard. As a lawyer, I campaigned on a platform of strengthened governance, integrity and inclusion measures. As a former international player, I advocated for women’s football development, with policies to improve participation, build up the elite game, and engage women in its leadership. I promised to bring the perspective of a woman, a player and a lawyer to the highest leadership of football (Dodd 2013).

Among the voting constituency of Member Association Presidents, there was only one woman – Lydia Nsekera of Burundi, an IOC Member and former basketballer (Frimpong 2013). Assuming she would vote for herself - and therefore the only available votes that I could seek were those to be cast by men - I sought out the women’s football community working within federations or on committees to seek their help in persuading their voter male colleagues to support my candidacy. These women were very supportive, but their views did not necessarily determine the vote as to which woman would go to FIFA to represent them. No-one who had ever played women’s

football would cast a vote at that election, and there was not a single woman on the planet who could vote for me. The women's game was effectively disenfranchised.

The election was held in Mauritius, almost exactly 25 years since I played in the very first FIFA women's tournament in 1988. Once again, I was taking the stage as part of a "first" with high hopes of bringing about change. We were each given five minutes to address the Congress. Nsekera, the co-opted incumbent, received 95 votes and a four-year term on the FIFA Executive Committee. I polled second with 70 votes, and together with third place-getter, Sonia Bien-Aime (38 votes), I was "co-opted" to the Executive Committee for an initial 12-month period (FIFA 2013(b)). These additional roles had been proposed by Blatter, who wanted more than one woman at the table. This meant I could attend and speak at meetings, and receive the meeting papers, but had no right to vote. My mandate was extended twice, totalling a three year term.

An important factor in determining which countries were represented was a provision in the FIFA Statutes [FIFA 2012 Art 30.5] which prevented more than one person from the same association from serving on the Executive Committee simultaneously. It meant that women from countries who already had serving officials - being those countries with the importance and political capital to gain a seat on the governing body - were blocked. In 2013, this included significant women's football nations such as Germany, France, US and Brazil. There were special procedures regarding the United Kingdom member associations, which complicated the path for women from those four associations. Moreover, women from countries where male officials had future ambitions to nominate would likely be excluded, because if a woman held office, it would block or complicate the pathway for any men from the same nation. Perversely, the effect of this rule was that women from many of the geographic strongholds of women's football had no prospect of gaining office. UEFA and CONMEBOL - the centres of power in men's football - did not nominate a woman candidate at all.

As a result, from mid-2013 three women from Burundi, Australia, and the Turks and Caicos Islands were present on the 27-person FIFA Executive Committee, with only one [Nsekera] having the right to vote. The limitations of this initiative were not lost on some commentators:

While this seems like a big step forward for women in sport, dig a little deeper and the appointments aren't all they seem. Nsekera's 'female' seat was specifically created last year and while it ensures there will always be at least one woman represented in the beautiful game's governing body, it will also exist as an excuse to only ever have just one or a restricted number of females represented. The two 'co-opted' one year positions were given to the two other candidates vying for the full time 'womens seat'. Three out of 27 is hardly equal representation and reeks of the boys club trying to appear inclusive without being challenged for their positions (Squiers 2013).

5.2 Creation of FIFA's Women's Football Taskforce

The co-opted positions were designated "Co-opted Member for Special Tasks". The tasks were undefined, and there was no precedent for the roles. Moreover, the roles were created partway through FIFA's four-year election cycle, so the additional women were joining an already-established administration and committee set-up.

I was conscious that my opportunities to lead or influence would be limited. I had no vote on the Executive Committee. I did not chair any of the committees below it: their agendas were driven by others. However, I had observed the creation of the FIFA Task Force Against Racism and Discrimination in 2013 (FIFA 2016, September), chaired by FIFA Executive Committee member and CONCACAF President Jeffrey Webb. I decided to ask then-President Blatter if we could create a task force for women's football, which could be a platform to lead on gender equality, and a forum for action in advancing women's football. At the earliest opportunity, I met with Blatter and pressed my mission to improve conditions for women in football. I took printouts of photographs that my supporters had posted on social media, under the #Moya4FIFA hashtag during the campaign, to make visible the non-voting constituency who hoped and expected that I could make a difference.

Blatter was an astute politician, and could see the benefit to FIFA of acknowledging this constituency. I believe he also had a genuine interest in advancing women's football. In

late 2013, with the support of the FIFA President, the FIFA Women's Football Task Force (WFT) was created by the Executive Committee, and I was appointed chair. It included members from every Confederation - mostly women with deep lived experience in the game - with club football expertise represented by Olympique Lyonnais.

We met in early 2014 to identify and establish priorities for the development of women's football, discussing governance, development, gender equality and the creation of a women's Club World Cup among other things. (FIFA Media Release 2014, January).

5.3 Creation of the 10 Key Development Principles

The first priority of the WFT was to draft the *Development Principles (Women's Football: 10 Key Development Principles* (FIFA WFT 2014)), which could be adopted globally as a blueprint to guide football's leadership and help associations avoid the most common pitfalls (FIFA Media Release 2014, May). These *Development Principles* included three in particular that concerned governance and decision-making:

5. Women's football is at a different development stage to men's football, and differs in other important respects on and off the field - hence it requires special focus and expertise to thrive. Therefore, expertise in women's football is a valuable and unique skill set. Such experts should be involved in all key decisions about the women's game. . . .

8. Football, and especially women's football, will benefit from the involvement of women on governing bodies and in management. In principle, each Member Association should have women involved at all decision-making levels, including the Executive Committee. . . .

9. Because men's football is already well-established, women's football needs to be "incubated" within football's governing bodies via appropriate organisational structures which provide the necessary focus to realise its potential.

*The combined experience of the WFT members spoke to many years of inconsistent progress. Members identified repeating patterns of typical mistakes that hindered women's football development. As they shared their experiences, we began to ask: 'How can we stop these errors being repeated; how can we capture these learnings as principles to guide decision-making, to be promoted by FIFA globally?' We wanted anyone in the women's game – however junior, wherever they were in the world – to be able to point to them and say: 'FIFA says we should do *this*'. We wanted to break the cycle of errors that continually stalled our progress. We debated, polished and critiqued the learnings until we were confident that we had addressed the right issues in a way that would best enable them to be applied in as many of football's diverse situations as possible.*

Once finalised, they were presented to the Committee for Women's Football, and then to the Executive Committee. I had briefed as many of its members as possible in advance of the meeting, because I knew that some of the principles might be considered too progressive (such as having at least one woman on every member's executive committee). In the room, a few members were very supportive, a few were quite indifferent, and only one was openly scornful. The majority were in the middle - not opposed, yet not advocates - but their body language and eye contact indicated they were becoming more engaged and supportive. The Executive Committee agreed to recognise the Principles, and put them to the FIFA Congress in June 2014. This provided a greater opportunity – to promote women's football by presenting the Principles on a global and public stage – and they were approved (FIFA Congress 2014 p26).

6. “You never want a serious crisis to go to waste” (Emanuel 2009) – FIFA Governance Reform

6.1 Calls to Action at the Symposium for Women's Football

Towards the end of each Women's World Cup (every four years), FIFA had traditionally held a Women's Football Symposium, where the member associations attended presentations and workshops over two to three days, culminating in watching the World Cup Final (FIFA Women's Football, n.d.). Canada in 2015 was to host the 6th such

Symposium. It was also customary at each Symposium for there to be a declaration or 'Call to Action' – a plea for some specified improvements for the women's game - that would be read out by the FIFA President to the applause of the delegates, and which he would take to the Executive Committee for approval.

As then-President Blatter had indicated that he would not be attending the FIFA Women's World Cup Canada 2015, I wondered what Calls to Action might arise from the Symposium in his absence. Based on the Symposium agenda, I drafted three broad proposals to finalise with the FIFA administration, who agreed that they reflected the topics and spirited discussions of the Symposium. At the conclusion of the final day I read them to the gathered delegates from 171 countries, who approved them by acclamation (FIFA Women's Football, 2015, 5 July). Among other things, the Calls to Action covered increased inclusion of women in decision-making and the resourcing of football at all levels without gender discrimination, and were referred to the WFT to advance.

6.2 FIFA Reform Committee

In August 2015, the FIFA Reform Committee was created in response to the imperative for reform that arose from the arrests and 'FIFAgate' corruption crisis. It comprised twelve members plus its chair, Francois Carrard, a lawyer and former Director General of the IOC, who had: "guided the IOC through its own governance reforms in the wake of the bidding process for the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics" (FIFA 2015, August). The Reform Committee was charged with developing a package of reform proposals for voting on at an extraordinary FIFA Congress to be held six months later.

It was clear that the FIFA reform process was crucial to the institution's ability to survive and thrive. FIFA was being closely scrutinised by the US Department of Justice. It was in FIFA's interests to enact substantive reforms and dissociate itself from wrong doers. The senior ranks of the institution had been disrupted by arrests and bans. Many of those removed had been there for many years and were supportive of the status quo. Their removal then served to weaken any resistance to change. I was keenly aware that

this was a once-off opportunity to influence the reforms to improve the situation for women in football.

However, as I looked at the various ideas that were proposed within FIFA (such as those from the Chair of the FIFA Audit and Compliance Committee (FIFA 2015) and externally), gender issues were starkly absent. Put simply, football's gender balance was not considered as either part of the problem, or part of the solution, for the Reform Committee. In my view, it was both.

With the support and assistance of the WFT and others, I prepared a submission on behalf of the WFT containing proposals reflecting the 'Call to Action' from the July 2015 Symposium. I submitted into the FIFA Reform Committee, where it was presented by the only female member, Sarai Bareman (subsequently appointed as FIFA's Chief Women's Football Officer).

The submission, entitled *'Football, FIFA and women: why reforms must specify inclusion and investment'* (FIFA WFT 2015) focussed on the two key areas from the Calls to Action which could be addressed through governance reforms. The submission noted that football is overwhelmingly male as a result of decades of institutional barriers and neglect of women's participation, hence:

1. Women are under-represented in decision-making, and this lack of diversity was to the detriment of the sport;
2. Women's football is under-resourced, which contravenes football's bar on discrimination and has suffocated development. The potential of the women's game is demonstrated by the impact of Title IX in the US, which transformed women's participation and performance by requiring non-discriminatory, proportionate resourcing for women's sport in the US education system.

The submission went on to propose that women be included in decision-making roles throughout the football pyramid, starting with FIFA's governing body and committees using a quota of 20% women immediately, moving to 30% by 2020; and that women's football be funded in fair financial proportion to women's participation and potential,

without gender discrimination. It also set out how those measures could be implemented, including consequences for non-compliance.

6.3 The gender equality reform campaign: #womeninFIFA

Lodging the submission to the Reform Committee was only the first step in making an impact. What followed was a global public campaign, executed alongside private discussions with those who were shaping and voting on the reforms.

At my request, the WFT submission was made public on the FIFA website. This was enormously important. FIFA's publication of a document authored by a FIFA official on behalf of a FIFA Task Force, gave it immediate status and global visibility.

Together with a team of like-minded allies around the globe, we commenced a public campaign in support of the proposals. There were three main elements to raise awareness and influence the reform process:

(1) Mainstream media: *using opinion pieces e.g. in The New York Times (Dodd 2015), and Inside the Games by Olympic icon Donna deVarona (deVarona 2015), and through interviews with prominent footballers (including World Cup winners and Olympic gold medallists Julie Foudy and Mary Harvey) and lawmakers and advisers (Bendery 2015(a)(b)).*

(2) Digital and social media: *using the hashtag #womeninFIFA. This bottom-up movement was widely supported by the women's football community and their allies. This garnered enormous support, especially due to prominent sports figures ranging from Billie Jean King (Clarey 2016) to Iranian football captain Masoud Shojaei (Dodd 2016, February 5); plus an online petition organised by Athlete Ally with dozens of leading current and former Olympians and athletes from a range of sports (Gibson 2015). UN Women tweeted my New York Times op-ed, and many NGOs including streetfootballworld, Human Rights Watch, FARE, Women Win, CAFE and Kick It Out issued statements of support (for example: Women Win, 2015). The hashtag #womeninFIFA had a reach of 47 million on Twitter (Glass 2016).*

(3) Via FIFA: *the FIFA administration conscripted me for its press conferences and*

media briefings (Australian Associated Press 2015). I had not expected such a platform, but FIFA was under pressure to demonstrate its 'victim' status and willingness to reform. From my perspective, it was helpful that FIFA appropriated the WFT narrative on gender equality, because it amplified the message and dramatically increased the likelihood that our proposals would be included in some way in the reform package.

In parallel with the public campaign, we engaged individually with as many of the decision-makers as possible to urge their support. We scoured conference and meeting schedules to see where key targets would be, and who they would be speaking with, then tracked down sympathetic influencers or media who would also be in attendance. Wherever the decision-makers went, we wanted them to be asked about the gender reform proposals, and be invited to commit their support.

The degree of support and collaboration across so many sectors and roles was truly staggering - and very heartening. The notion that 'women do not support other women' was generally untrue in my football experience, and utterly untrue in my experience of the reform process. Football is a team sport, and so many women and their allies willingly joined the team to fight for progress and reform.

Male allies, including Prince Ali of Jordan (Al Hussein 2015) and Sunil Gulati of the US, himself acknowledged as a 'forceful advocate of reform' (Vinton et al 2015), provided significant support within football circles. Calls for gender equality gathered momentum as 'a tidal roll of support from women in public life in general and in sport in particular have rallied to the cause' (Radnedge 2015). Politicians took interest: 35 members of the US Congress wrote to the US Soccer Federation to demand that it support the WFT reform proposals (Bendery 2015(b)); and then UK Minister for Sport, Tracey Crouch, also met to discuss them (Crouch 2015).

In late 2015, the FIFA Reform Committee produced a report which acknowledged the need for gender reforms, stating that: 'FIFA should recognise that women represent the

biggest growth and development opportunity to football, and that football governance at all levels needs to include more women in order to create a more diverse decision-making environment and culture'. It concluded that the statutory objectives must include promoting the development of women's football and the full participation of women; and all members must be committed to the respect for women and the promotion of gender equality in all aspects of football (FIFA 2015, 2 December pp 9-10).

6.4 The statutory reform package

The reform report was accepted by the Executive Committee, and drafted into amendments to the FIFA Statutes, for which approval would be sought at the elective Congress in February 2016. They included the following provisions:

- a quota of 6 women (out of 37) on the (newly named) FIFA Council (Art.33.5)
- the addition of two new statutory objectives in Art.2:
 - e) to use its efforts to ensure that the game of football is available to and resourced for all who wish to participate, regardless of gender or age;
 - f) to promote the development of women's football and the full participation of women at all levels of football governance;
- a commitment to respect all internationally recognised human rights, and to strive to promote the protection of those rights (Art 3);
- strengthened non-discrimination clause (Art 4)
- a requirement that legislative bodies "must be constituted in accordance with the principles of representative democracy and taking into account the importance of gender equality in football" – applying to both member federations and Confederations (Art.15(j) and Art.23(j))
- inclusion of "appropriate female representation" on Standing Committees (Art.39.5).

While there were numerous added references to women and women's football in the amendments, I was concerned that our requests had been diluted, and some provisions were vaguely expressed. However, it was crucial for FIFA that the reform package was passed, and I took the pragmatic view that this package reflected the biggest step

forward that the institution was able to take at that time, and it captured progress that was unthinkable not long before. I was vocal in my support, calling it a more important vote than the Presidential election scheduled for the same day (Macur, 2016).

On 26 February 2016, the FIFA Congress passed the package of amendments to its Statutes (in its entirety, in a single vote), recording 89% support (Dodd 2015, February 26). Later that day, Gianni Infantino was elected FIFA President, marking a new era.

6.5 The devil is in the regulations...

Once the amendments to the FIFA Statutes were passed by Congress, FIFA's regulations were set to be refreshed to reflect the reforms - something that could be done by the newly named FIFA Council.

I saw a further opportunity to reinforce gender equality into FIFA's regulatory framework, and detail the obligations and consequences that would apply. I engaged with Council members and FIFA's lawyers to make drafting suggestions. Among other issues, I felt it was important that key committees operating below Council level should have express powers and duties on gender issues, because they would perform crucial functions such as budget setting, allocating development resources, setting policies, and monitoring compliance.

A few months later, in May 2016, revised FIFA Governance Regulations were passed by the FIFA Council (FIFA Governance Regulations 2016), which required that:

- members of FIFA bodies and FIFA employees shall do everything possible that is conducive to fulfilling FIFA's objectives, and refrain from any action that could be detrimental to those objectives (Reg 3.1);
- the FIFA Council has a specific duty to support "the full participation of women at all levels of football, including in governance and technical roles" (Reg 8.2(s));
- the FIFA President shall be a vanguard for promoting human rights, non-discrimination, and gender equality (Reg 14.2)

- various Standing Committees were given specific powers and responsibilities with gender equality in mind e.g.
 - the Development Committee: “to ensure that development activities, guidelines and regulations reinforce the importance of developing and resourcing women’s football, and to support the full participation of women in governance, technical and administrative roles”;
 - Finance Committee: “to ensure that budgets submitted for approval support the growth and development of women’s football”;
 - Governance Committee: “to advise on social responsibility, human rights, environmental protections and gender equality matters”
 - Audit Committee: “to monitor compliance with FIFA’s policies regarding social responsibility, human rights, environmental protection and gender equality matters”;
 - Football Stakeholders Committee: “to make recommendations and proposals to promote the growth of club football for women.”

7. Implementation

Following the passing of the reforms, the co-opted terms of the women on the FIFA Council were not renewed in anticipation of forthcoming elections in which at least six women candidates would take their quota seats on the FIFA Council. In the AFC, the elections were delayed twice and eventually held a year later. Dodd contested, and was disappointed not to win the women’s seat in Asia (Australian Associated Press 2017).

The implementation of the reforms remains a work in progress. Achieving cultural and institutional change is rarely immediate, yet there are some instances where the reforms have already been applied to positive effect:

- when the FFA’s statutes were revised in 2018, “taking into account the importance of gender equality” led to a 40/40/20 requirement on its governing board (FFA 2018 cl.44 and 45.1; Ordway 2018, November);
- FIFA’s statutory commitment in Art 3 to respect all internationally recognised human rights logically encompasses a commitment to protect women’s rights. It is

reinforced through its *Human Rights Policy* (in line with the UN *Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights*) and independent Human Rights Advisory Board, which reports publicly on issues of concern. Its Fourth Report, covering May - December 2019 (FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board 2020), listed two ‘priority cases’, both of which involved women’s rights (abuse of members of the Afghan Women's National Team and exclusion of women spectators from stadiums in Iran) and urged greater accountability at the political and governance level. It also indicated one of its three immediate future priorities being ‘Progress on FIFA’s strategy regarding women at all levels of the game, including strengthening grievance mechanisms.’ FIFA’s responses to and tracking of the issues raised are also public. (Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, 2020);

- In 2017, several Brazilian women’s national team veterans, including Sissi, Formiga and Cristiane, wrote an open letter (Tafarel 2017) to their member association, the Confederação Brasileira de Futebol (CBF), a move described in the New York Times as a ‘revolt’ (Panja 2017) as some players announced their retirements because they were ‘exhausted from years of disrespect and lack of support’. The letter went on:

We, the players, have invested years of our own lives and all of our energy to build this team and this sport to its strength today. Yet we, and almost all other Brazilian women, are excluded from the leadership and decision-making for our own team and our own sport...

CBF still has no women on its governing board. There are almost no women among its Congress and senior management. There are no meaningful pathways for former players to find their way into CBF and help to run their own game. Over many years we have lived and watched in despair as Brazil’s women were neglected by CBF... It is time for CBF to overhaul its practices, in line with FIFA’s reforms and principles.

CBF agreed to hold discussions with the players, and while change was not immediate, over the next three years significant progress was made. CBF appointed a highly regarded international female coach for the national team, hired two former national team players into key roles running women's football, and announced that they would provide equal allowances to their men's and women's national teams.

8. Conclusion: Lessons and Future Challenges:

Hutchingson and Duncan (2012) noted that the: "Quality of research within the discipline of law is normally evaluated not only by the citation of research papers by other researchers, but also by the referencing of pertinent research by the courts or law reform bodies. This is not the type of citation measure that is customary for other disciplines" (p91-92). In disciplines outside of the law, the way that academic "impact" is being assessed is currently undergoing a revolution (Given et al 2015). As neatly summarised by Kelly (2019): "Getting a journal article published is internal impact. Having that research create change in the world, is external impact." Sharing this success story from international sport is intended to achieve the greatest external impact, by influencing policy-makers, advocates and academics working in this space.

8.1 Learnings:

It is fascinating to consider the extent to which behavioural motivation models attempting to understand why people commit crimes, such as fraud, treason and corruption, can be applied to the sporting context. Why the corruption scandal 'FIFAgate' became the tipping point to create positive change, when all other extrinsic and intrinsic influences had had little or no influence on the senior leadership or voting members of FIFA, is worth considering. For example, the S.C.O.R.E model, which has been expanded to the S.C.C.O.R.E model, proposes a theory that people involved in fraud do so based on the following motivations: Stimulus; Capability; Collusion; Opportunity; Rationalisation and/or Ego (Vousinas 2019). Ironically, perhaps the same elements said to enable and/or support corruption may also apply to creating the conditions necessary to achieve reforms and create positive change. In this case, it could be said:

S. The *Stimulus* was the legal intervention and international pressure to reform, caused by the ‘FIFAgate’ arrests and allegations;

C. The *Capability* to generate reform proposals was achieved through the build-up of internal capability and the establishment of both the WFT and the Reform Committee supported by research-based proposals;

C. Drawing on internal and external allies created a form of *Collusion* for reform internationally;

O. Seizing the *Opportunity* presented - through the co-opted women’s positions, the opportunity to draft Calls to Action at the FIFA Women’s Football Symposium, and to submit them as proposals to the Reform Committee - was crucial;

R. Providing the *Rationalisation* that reforms, including gender equality reforms, were necessary to save the institution from imploding; and

E. Appealing to those both morally and commercially motivated from an *Ego* perspective that this was an opportunity to ‘face forward’ and be on the right side of history,

and these proved to be a successful combination for reforms to be passed in 2016.

Reflecting on the journey to achieve the gender equality reforms thus far has therefore enabled the identification of themes and learnings which may also provide powerful advice for others:

- **Women inside the tent:** The presence of women on the FIFA Executive Committee at the time the crisis occurred meant that gender issues were able to be prosecuted with a priority that would not have occurred had the female-specific positions not been created. Women inside who have knowledge of how the organisations function, who the key decision-makers are, and what the timing is for step decisions enabled statutory reforms to be achieved that were not within contemplation prior to the crisis. Dodd was able to use her knowledge of the institution and its instruments, her recognition of the opportunity, and her sense of timing to drive change. She explained: ‘we looked at each other and said, “Of course it is time for reform, but why isn’t anyone talking about gender equality?”’...

if we can make a difference here, we can make ten years of progress in six months’ (Glass 2016).

- **Influence:** Regulatory reforms were achieved despite none of the women having significant levels of direct power. There were three co-opted members on a Council of 27, and two of them had no right to vote. Rather, change was able to occur through a process of influence and advocacy from within based on long-established relationships of trust and respect.
- **A Driving Force:** Change ‘takes a village’ but the importance of a champion to drive change cannot be underestimated (Taylor, A et al 2011). As demonstrated here, and recognised by others, Dodd was identified as ‘the driving force in the recent push for women within FIFA’ (Clarey 2016) and ‘the one woman who was *most responsible* for reform on women's football’ (Foudy 2017).
- **Play the Long Game:** Dodd’s ability to influence change was the outcome of a long game; in football, in business, in law, and in governance. Eight years on governing bodies had provided the proximity to observe and understand the mechanisms of influence and decision-making and have insights into key decision-makers. This is not to suggest that changes cannot be achieved more quickly but being realistic about what is involved in creating systemic and/or cultural change may help to put the daily struggles and obstacles into perspective.
- **Collaborate with other women:** The shared experiences of those in the women’s game transcends borders and time, creating an engaged and passionate network of supporters and advocates. By 2015, the first generation of recognised international players were in their 40s or 50s, with significant professional and life experience behind them. Some held positions of influence in sport, media and business, and were keenly engaged in the cause. Committed volunteers among them worked with Dodd almost daily in developing strategies, sense checking, advocating, and recruiting more allies and advocates. The women’s game had also attracted passionate fans. Collaborating with the global community of women’s football supporters created a vocal public who were keen to express support for equality in football. The #womeninFIFA campaign had a Twitter reach of 47 million (Glass 2016).

- **Foster Allies:** Internal and external allies for reform were crucial. Internal allies ensured the progress of the gender reforms within the overall package and assisted in garnering support from the decision-makers (the Reform Committee, the Executive Committee and the Congress). Male allies were crucial (Heffernan 2018): men held almost all the decision-making power. Advocacy and questioning by other men was very powerful. In combination it demonstrated that the outside world was watching and expecting football to meet modern ‘real-world’ (if not ‘best practice’) standards.
- **Know what to ask for:** Knowing what to ask for, and what was likely to be accepted, during the various stages was crucial to the reform process. The Symposium Calls to Action, and the arguments set out in the WFT reform submission *‘Football, FIFA and women: why reforms must specify inclusion and investment’* were developed over months, based on years of learning and lived experiences, tapping into the generous input of many women’s football experts.
- **Leverage a crisis /Be prepared for the unexpected window to open:** It is said that “You never want a serious crisis to go to waste” (Emanuel 2009). Being positioned to influence the agenda, having relationships and allies, and knowing what to ask for, took years to develop - yet the window for action arrived suddenly and unexpectedly. The opportunity then had to be seized before the window closed again. Timing and instinct were therefore important keys to unlocking change. Dodd compared it to: “when the game opens up, your first instinct is to accelerate into that space” (Glass 2016). Without the arrests and bans of some FIFA members, the makeup of the decision-making group would not have changed as dramatically, and the imperative and possibilities for change would have been far more limited. Many opponents of reform were ‘red-carded’ and change suddenly became possible.
- **Utilise governance levers:** Funding decisions, and governance responses, such as the FIFA Associations Committee and the mechanism for installing FIFA normalisation committees, can be a powerful lever to force Member Associations to comply with governance reforms, including gender equality (see for example, implementation in Australia (Ordway 2018 February; 2018 November). FIFA has

promoted its use of the normalisation committee tool throughout the world to enforce compliance with its rules (eg: FIFA Media Release 2011; FIFA Media Release 2018).

- **Intersectional collaboration:** While this paper has focussed on gender reforms, many who backed the package took an intersectional approach. The #womeninFIFA campaign was backed by groups whose focus was on human rights and/or particular aspects of disadvantage e.g. racism, accessibility, homophobia and transphobia. They not only believed that the gender reforms were right; they believed that a gender-balanced FIFA would also help to address other issues. Their intersectional support was very powerful. Human rights, and anti-discrimination based on disability, were also included in the package of reforms, setting the stage for further progress on inclusion and respect.
- **Document the “why”:** Clearly document the thinking and intention behind the reforms sought and achieved, as memories can be short, personnel can change and hard fought for reforms can later be undone by the stroke of a pen if people do not understand why the reforms were implemented. Moreover, in a long struggle like the one for gender equality, the underlying rationale for reform measures can remain valid for many years. A clearly articulated record of that rationale can have the longevity to serve future campaigns.

8.2 Future Challenges:

While the decision-making environment within FIFA has changed, many areas remain challenging. Since the reforms were passed, FIFA launched its first Women’s Football Strategy (2018). This was a ripe opportunity for FIFA to take a strong leadership position in implementing the reforms. The Strategy includes, as one of five “key pillars”, “Govern & Lead ... Strive for Gender Balance” (FIFA Women’s Football Strategy Snapshot 2018). This is defined to mean:

- a. Ensure women’s football and female representation in key decision-making bodies*
- b. Refine regulatory frameworks to boost professionalisation*
- c. Empower those dedicated to the women’s game and foster a global network*

Krech (2020) explains the inherent and perhaps inevitable tensions in the Strategy between pre-existing institutional objectives, such as enhancing FIFA's authority, finances and reputation, and the new objectives of gender equality and human rights, and finds it more likely that those tensions 'will be resolved in favor of the former, thus undermining the transformative potential of the latter'. This may explain why the 'tangible goals' set out under 'Govern & Lead' are not especially ambitious, and raise important questions. Examples of issues and limitations with these goals include:

- (i) *Goal: 100% of FIFA member associations to have at least one woman present on their executive committee by 2026.*

Comment: In FIFA's 2019 women's football survey, around 70% of responding member associations indicated they already had one or more women (FIFA Women's Football 2019). Why it should take until 2026, and why the goal should be limited to a single woman, are not elaborated. Evidence from the corporate sector has long suggested that 'to fully realize the contribution that women can make to corporate governance, the goal should be not just to increase the number of boards that include a woman but to increase the number of women on boards.' (Konrad & Kramer 2006).

- (ii) *Goal: Every Member Association will dedicate at least one seat on its Executive Committee to representing the interests of women in football and women's football;*

Comment: This role – to be a dedicated representative of women's interests – is interesting in that FIFA itself adopted this approach for its own governing board in 2012, then abolished it a year later in favour of 'female members'. Subsequently, 2016 FIFA reforms favoured a gender mainstreaming approach under which women were added to almost all FIFA committees, but the three committees dedicated to women's football were all abolished. The strategy of seeking a dedicated board seat to represent women's interests suggests a view that, at member association level, the mere presence of women in the room may be insufficient to represent women in football and women's football. This role is not required to be filled by a woman, and there is no timeframe set. It also raises the

possibility that women’s interests could be marginalised as a discrete, one-person portfolio, rather than a mainstream responsibility borne by all members.

- (iii) *Goal: By 2022, at least one-third of FIFA committee members will be women.*

Comment: Since 2016, FIFA has had a statutory obligation to ensure that ‘appropriate female representation’ is present on all standing committees (Art 39.4) and judicial committees (Art 52.2), the members of which are respectively appointed or proposed by the FIFA Council. Why one third of members cannot be women in a much earlier time frame is not clear, especially when all members of FIFA bodies, and all FIFA employees, bear a positive duty to ‘do everything possible that is conducive to fulfilling FIFA’s objectives ... and refrain from any action that could be detrimental to those objectives’ (FIFA Governance Regulations 2016 at Reg 3.1). Since 2016, those objectives have included ‘the full participation of women at all levels of football governance’ in Art 2(f) of the FIFA Statutes (FIFA 2016). Indeed, the regulations also impose an express – and even broader - duty of inclusion on the FIFA Council to support “the full participation of women at all levels of football, including in governance and technical roles” via Reg 8.2(s).

(FIFA Women’s Football Strategy 2018 p16 – comments added).

Almost two years after the Strategy was released, FIFA released an extensive Women’s Football Administrator Handbook (FIFA Women’s Football 2020) to cover ‘gender matters in organisational structures and governance’ and bring together ‘all gender-specific areas in FIFA’s regulatory framework’. The chapter entitled ‘Institutionalising Gender Equality’ urges readers to: “anchor women’s football in governance to bring about gender balance”, citing FIFA’s statutory human rights commitment (Art 3) and noting that “gender equality is at the very heart of human rights” (p 31). The statutory Art 15(j) obligation - to take in to account the importance of gender equality in constituting

legislative bodies - is also cited, urging member associations to: “adopt the necessary regulations on equal opportunities for men and women.”

It is not known why the chapter does not cite the clearest statement of FIFA’s regulatory commitment to including women in governance and leadership, which is embedded in FIFA’s objectives at Art 2(f): “to promote the development of women’s football and the full participation of women at all levels of football governance”, and which flows down via the FIFA Governance Regulations to bind all members of FIFA bodies (thus binding all member associations as members of the FIFA Congress) and all FIFA employees. Nonetheless, the Handbook’s introductory statement: “Only by broadening female representation in the game’s decision-making bodies can we truly grow the sport for all” (p17) is a clarion call for dramatically increasing the participation of women, and the best practices it espouses are important tools for progress. At the same time, it acknowledges the reality that: “the establishment of women on governing bodies is a process that... requires as much patience and ambition” (p47).

It is evident that there are broader issues and challenges embedded in the governance system which impede the ability of the institution to implement meaningful change, including:

- Women remain profoundly disenfranchised. Insofar as women were Dodd’s key constituency, the quota system as designed did not enable that constituency to vote. Only 2% of voting association Presidents are female, and women’s football is not a major driver of voting intention;
- The statutory rule against more than one FIFA Council (and previously, Executive Committee) member from the same association, together with the incumbency of male leadership in football, has historically barred women from some of the strongest women’s football associations from even being nominated. While the fair representation of less developed associations is important, the system had the effect of excluding many of those with the greatest experience, participation and success in the women’s game, depriving FIFA of their expertise. As long-time US women’s national team captain Julie Foudy wrote: “Five out of the six women’s council seats do not crack the top 100 in rankings... This is clearly not representative of the women’s game.” (Foudy 2017). While FIFA’s Governance

Regulations were amended to allow a second seat to be held if one person is a ‘designated female representative’ (Reg 67.3), the FIFA Statutes (Art 33.6) do not yet reflect this (FIFA Legal Handbook 2020). Doing so would provide certainty for a significant class of quality female candidates.

- The elective mechanism for each Confederation to elect at least one female member to the Council has not been consistently applied, with allegations that some Confederations tried to block full implementation of the new rules (BBC 2017). One unsuccessful female candidate has appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport, alleging failure to follow election rules (Associated Press 2020). Lack of clarity about the election mechanism can act as a disincentive for candidates to nominate.
- The wording of the reforms is less specific than what was sought, and interpretations may differ. Such lack of clarity can be unhelpful in measuring and enforcing compliance. For example, when constituting a legislative body, the words “taking into account the importance of gender equality in football” does not set a clear ratio. Presumably zero women would not suffice, but is 30% enough? Moreover, the inclusion of gender non-binary people is not expressly contemplated anywhere.
- The nature of member-based organisations - which are widespread in sports governance - means that the appetite for reform, reporting, investigation, enforcement and sanctions is only as great within the governing body as it is among the consensus of its members. As an organisation, FIFA’s political will to implement the gender reforms that its Statutes promise, either on itself or its subsidiary bodies, depends on the collective and cumulative political will of its members. As has been seen in sports such as Handball (IHF), this can be compounded by the proportional representation voting system (Laursen Brock 2017). Member association representatives from countries that are not active in the sport, and may not even have women’s teams, enjoy the same voting rights as those who deeply care about the women’s game - and they can wield significant power.

- There are limited mechanisms and actions to ensure accountability in FIFA, its Confederations and its Member Associations to adopt, implement and comply with the gender equality provisions. However, there are at least two tools to progress this, subject to will and opportunity.
 - First, the human rights provision of the FIFA Statutes has been elaborated in its FIFA *Human Rights Policy* (2017) which broadly adopts the UN *Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights* following the Ruggie Report (2016). The Policy specifically states that: ‘FIFA places particular emphasis on identifying and addressing differential impacts based on gender and on promoting gender equality and preventing all forms of harassment, including sexual harassment’ and commits to ‘contributing to providing remedy where individuals have been adversely affected by activities associated with FIFA’ (FIFA Human Rights Policy 2017 p6, 9). It is a laudable policy, but meaningful remedies and timely mechanisms to hold wrong-doers to account are at best a work in progress. Accusations of sexual abuse against two association presidents have highlighted the formidable challenges in fulfilling this policy (Panja 2020). The development of grievance and redress mechanisms under FIFA’s human rights commitments will be an important means to also deliver on its gender equality reforms.
 - Second, FIFA already has powerful levers which could be applied. Governance responses, such as the FIFA Associations Committee and the mechanism for installing FIFA normalisation committees, can require Member Associations to comply with governance reforms, including gender equality (see for example, implementation in Australia (Ordway 2018 February; 2018 November). FIFA has promoted its use of the normalisation committee tool throughout the world to enforce compliance with its rules (e.g: FIFA Media Release 2011; FIFA Media Release 2018). Funding conditions are another powerful lever: FIFA’s Forward program regulations already impose obligations on grantees to ensure that principles of anti-discrimination and human rights are protected and promoted, and to take

measures to safeguard children and minors (although not women) from potential abuse (FIFA Forward 2.0 2019, p 22).

- The pathways into football governance and the process by which ‘merit’ is assessed - or how voting intention is otherwise formed - is an area for future research. Dodd has described her presence on the FIFA Executive Committee as: “In some ways, it was a total accident ... You couldn’t have planned it, but it happened at a good time for me, and the experience I had accumulated was not an accident. I’d had nearly 20 years of professional experience in a range of roles across law, media and consulting, I had a law degree and an MBA, and I felt I was equipped to give it a red hot go” (Settimi 2018). Developing a pool of candidates who are motivated to develop all aspects of the game, and educated in ethical leadership, then nominating and electing them, should not be an “accident”. Better pathways into governance, together with election systems that ensure integrity and fair representation by committed, active and ethical leaders (of any gender), require a major overhaul across all sports internationally.

Dodd recently reflected on what had been achieved during her stint with FIFA: “Women’s football went from being neglected without consequence to a gold star issue, in that you got a gold star for doing something for the women’s game. . . Now it needs to move towards a consistent and equal program of involvement and investment. The return on investment on a marginal dollar in women’s football is far higher than on a dollar in men’s football, where the progress has already been made” (quoted by Pender 2019). Clearly, further work needs to be done. The intersection of the global movement towards gender equality and the rise of women’s sport is a fertile ground for progress when the mechanisms for change are triggered by external events, and/or otherwise created through strategic and careful planning.

Bibliography:

- Al Hussein, A (2015). Twitter, 25 November 2015 Retrieved from <https://twitter.com/AliBinAlHussein/status/669186969029750784>
- Amnesty International. (2014, March 19). FIFA Executive Committee Must Address Qatar Migrant Workers' Rights. Press Release. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2014/03/fifa-executive-committee-must-address-qatar-migrant-workers-rights/>
- Associated Press (AP). (2020). Former FIFA candidate appeals to overturn Asian soccer vote. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/bc09f5f1ea9def0bd02af88e2701c036>
- Australian Associated Press (AAP). (2015). Former Matildas footballer Moya Dodd says Fifa reforms are long overdue, *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/dec/04/former-matildas-footballer-moya-dodd-says-fifa-reforms-are-long-overdue>
- Australian Associated Press (AAP). (2017, May 9). Moya Dodd disappointed to lose FIFA spot, *The World Game*, SBS. Retrieved from <https://theworldgame.sbs.com.au/moya-dodd-disappointed-to-lose-fifa-spot>
- BBC. (2017). Miguel Maduro says Fifa's Gianni Infantino opposed blocking Vitaly Mutko. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/sport/football/41238114>
- Bendery, J. (2015, November 17)(a). “Why Gender Diversity Could Be FIFA's Saving Grace”, *HuffPost US*. Retrieved from https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/entry/fifa-women-soccer_n_564a1d82e4b08cda3489e54a
- Bendery, J. (2015, November 20)(b). Members of Congress Now Involved In Gender Equity Push At FIFA, *HuffPost*. Retrieved from https://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/entry/fifa-gender-equity-soccer_n_564e7126e4b0258edb30d941
- Bona, E. (2015, 29 Sept), “Bill Shankly remembered: 11 brilliant quotes from Liverpool's iconic manager”, *The Liverpool Echo*, Retrieved from <https://www.liverpoolecho.co.uk/news/liverpool-news/bill-shankly-remembered-11-brilliant-10156199>
- Breen, L. (2007). The researcher 'in the middle': Negotiating the insider/outsider

dichotomy. *The Australian Community Psychologist*, 19(1), 163-174.

- Brock, J. L. (2017, 20 November). IHF President set to carry on pursuit of member nations. *Play the Game*. Retrieved from https://www.playthegame.org/news/news-articles/2017/0384_ihf-president-set-to-carry-on-pursuit-of-additional-member-nations/
- Business and Human Rights Resource Centre. (2020). *FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board*. Retrieved from <https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/fifa-human-rights-advisory-board>
- Carlopio, J., Andrewartha, G., & Armstrong, H. (2008). *Developing management skills: A comprehensive guide for leaders*. Frenchs Forest, Australia: Pearson Education.
- Clarey, C. (2016, 6 March). Billie Jean King Campaigns for Women's Soccer, *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/07/sports/soccer/billie-jean-king-campaigns-for-womens-soccer.html?searchResultPosition=1>
- Conway, R. (2013, March 27). FIFA ignoring key ideas for internal reform, says adviser, *BBC*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/sport/football/21944765>.
- Costley, C. (2010). "Research Ethics and Insider-Researchers" in Costley, C., Elliott, G., & Gibbs, P. (eds) *Doing Work Based Research: Approaches to Enquiry for Insider-Researchers*, SAGE Publications, London, pp25-35
- Crawford, F. & McGowan, L. (2019). *Never Say Die: The Hundred-Year Overnight Success of Australian Women's Football*, NewSouth Publishing, Sydney
- Crouch, T. (2015). Twitter, 2 December 2015 Retrieved from https://twitter.com/tracey_crouch/status/671713535546793987
- Davis, E. (2016, February 12). Moya Dodd Has A Radical Idea For FIFA Reform: Include Women, *Vice*. Retrieved from https://www.vice.com/en_au/article/yp8z47/moya-dodd-has-a-radical-idea-for-fifa-reform-include-women
- DeDiego, A. C., & Moret, L. (2017). Trauma, family, and emergency medical services: an autoethnography of a ride-along experience. *International Annual Edition of Applied Psychology: Theory, Research, and Practice*, 122-139. Retrieved from

<https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/trauma-family-and-emergency-medical-services-an-autoethnography-of-a-ride-along-experience>

- deVarona, D. (2015, November 22). Donna deVarona: A Message to FIFA Leadership, *Inside The Games*. Retrieved from <https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1031894/donna-de-varona-a-message-to-fifa-leadership>.
- Dodd, M. (2013). Election brochure *Candidate for FIFA Executive Committee Female Member*. Available at <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1f8eUWdgmJCSXN4rTzg1qzy8P3PgbHy5N/view>
- Dodd, M. (2015, November 19). “FIFA Needs More Women”, *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/20/opinion/fifa-needs-more-women.html>
- Dodd, M. (2016, February 5). Meet Masoud Shojaei. Retrieved from <https://www.facebook.com/moyadoddfootball/posts/748252435305846:0> and <https://twitter.com/moyadodd/status/696579343451947008>
- Dodd, M. (2016, February 26). Twitter. Retrieved from <https://twitter.com/moyadodd/status/703164367840243715?s=20>
- Department of Justice (DOJ). (2015, May 27). *Nine FIFA Officials and Five Corporate Executives Indicted for Racketeering Conspiracy and Corruption*. Attorneys General of the United States of America. Retrieved from <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nine-fifa-officials-and-five-corporate-executives-indicted-racketeering-conspiracy-and>.
- Ellis, C. (2013). Crossing the rabbit hole: Autoethnographic life review. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 19(1), 35-45.
- Emanuel, R. (2009, February 9). You never want a serious crisis to go to waste. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1yeA_kHHLow
- Esarey, J., & Chirillo, G. (2013). “Fairer sex” or purity myth? Corruption, gender, and institutional context. *Politics & Gender*, 9(4), 361-389.
- Football Federation of Australia (FFA). (2018). Constitution, Approved 16 October 2018. Retrieved from <https://www.ffa.com.au/sites/ffa/files/2018-10/CON%2018->

1016%20FFA%20Constitution%20-%2016%20October%202018%20-%20FINAL.pdf

- Forgues, C. (2000). A Global Hurdle: the implementation of an international nondiscrimination norm protecting women from gender discrimination in international sports. *BU Int'l LJ*, 18, 247.
- Foudy, J. (2017). Dear FIFA, do better to support equal representation, ESPN. Retrieved from https://www.espn.com/espnw/voices/story/_/id/19364609/dear-fifa-do-better-support-equal-representation
- Frimpong, N. (2013, June 4). Introducing football's 'Iron Lady'- Lydia Nsekera. Retrieved from <https://www.goal.com/en-za/news/4622/africa/2013/06/04/4026735/introducing-footballs-iron-lady-lydia-nsekera>
- Glass, A. (2016, March 21). How Women Are Reforming FIFA's Brand Crisis, *Forbes*. Retrieved from <https://www.forbes.com/sites/alanaglass/2016/03/21/how-women-are-reforming-fifas-brand-crisis/#4fdb13aab33a>
- Gibson, O. (2015, November 17). FIFA pushed to give more roles to women as letter spells out disparity, *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/nov/16/fifa-women-executive-committee>
- Gilligan, C. (1982). *In a Different Voice*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Given, L. M., Kelly, W., & Willson, R. (2015, November). Bracing for impact: The role of information science in supporting societal research impact. In *Proceedings of the 78th ASIS&T Annual Meeting: Information Science with Impact: Research in and for the Community* (p. 48). American Society for Information Science.
- Hargreaves, J. (2002). *Sporting females: Critical issues in the history and sociology of women's sport*. Routledge
- Heffernan, C. D. (2018). Gender Allyship: Considering the role of men in addressing the gender leadership gap in sport organizations. Proquest Information & Learning. University of Minnesota Digital Conservancy. Retrieved from <http://hdl.handle.net/11299/201034>

- Hough, D., & Heaston, W. R. (2017). The art of missing the point: FIFA and the control of corruption. In Kubbe, I., & Engelbert, A. (Eds.). *Corruption and Norms: Why Informal Rules Matter*. Springer. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. 329-346
- Hutchinson, T., & Duncan, N. (2012). Defining and describing what we do: Doctrinal legal research. *Deakin L. Rev.*, 17, 83.
- International Olympic Committee (IOC). (2018, March). *Gender Equality Review Project*. Retrieved from <https://www.olympic.org/~media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/News/2018/03/IOC-Gender-Equality-Review-Project-Recommendations-Overview-March-2018.pdf>
- International Working Group (IWG). (2014). The Brighton plus Helsinki Declaration, Retrieved from <https://iwgwomenandsport.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Brighton-plus-Helsinki-2014-Declaration-on-Women-and-Sport.pdf>
- International Working Group (IWG). (2020). Brighton Signatories: International & Intergovernmental Organisations. Retrieved from <https://iwgwomenandsport.org/brighton-declaration/international-and-inter-government-organizations/>
- Jennings, A. (2006). *Foul!: The secret world of FIFA: Bribes, vote rigging and ticket scandals*. London, HarperSport.
- Jennings, A. (2016). *The dirty game: Uncovering the scandal at FIFA*. Random House.
- Jones, K. L. (2012). The applicability of the "United Nations convention against corruption" to the area of sports corruption (match-fixing). *The International Sports Law Journal*, (3-4), 57-59.
- Kelly, W. (2019, 21 May). The Emerging Impact Landscape, *The Research Whisperer*, retrieved from <https://researchwhisperer.org/2019/05/21/the-emerging-impact-landscape/>
- Konrad, A. & Kramer, V. (2006). How Many Women Do Boards Need? Harvard Business Review, December 2006. Retrieved from <https://hbr.org/2006/12/how-many-women-do-boards-need>
- Krech M. (2020). "Towards Equal Rights in the Global Game? Fifa's Strategy for

Women's Football as a Tightly Bounded Institutional Innovation' (2020) 25 *Tilburg Law Review* 12. Retrieved from <http://doi.org/10.5334/tilr.190>

- Lewis, S. (2019, September 21). Death of Blue Girl shines light on women's rights in Iran, *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/football/2019/sep/21/death-of-blue-girl-shines-light-on-womens-rights-in-iran>
- Macur, J. (2016, February 25). 'Forget President: The More Important FIFA Vote Is on Reforms', *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/25/sports/soccer/forget-president-the-more-important-fifa-vote-is-on-reforms.html>
- Masters, R. (2020, April 17). Reign Coates: Extension could become life term for AOC president. *Sydney Morning Herald*. Retrieved from <https://www.smh.com.au/sport/reign-coates-extension-could-become-life-term-for-aoc-president-20200417-p54ks5.html#:~:text=Coates%20will%20have%20served%2032,as%20boss%20of%20world%20swimming>.
- Mazanov, J., Huybers, T., & Barkoukis, V. (2019). Universalism and the spirit of sport: evidence from Greece and Australia. *Sport in Society*, 22(7), 1240-1257.
- Mlambo-Ngcuka, P. (2019, April 2). Op-ed: Empowering women through sport. *UN Women*. Retrieved from <https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2019/4/op-ed-ed-phumzile-empowering-women-through-sport> [also available from <http://olympicreview.touchlines.com/110/48-1> pp40-49]
- Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland. (2015, 27 May). "The Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland seizes documents at FIFA", *The Federal Council*, Retrieved from <https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-releases.msg-id-57391.html>
- Onwumechili, C. (2011). Urbanization and female football in Nigeria: history and struggle in a 'man's game'. *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, 28(15), 2206-2219.
- Ordway, C. (2018, February, 15-16). Gender Diversity and Sports Governance: Ethics of Care and Football Federation of Australia, Interdisciplinary Colloquium on Sport;

Inclusion, Equity and Diversity in Sport: Constraints, Challenges and Perspectives, Bond University, Gold Coast. Retrieved from

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h_zpsZ9NG8o

- Ordway, C. (2018, November, 21-23). How to structurally incorporate gender equality within culturally patriarchal systems, when those currently in power benefit from maintaining the status quo? Case study: Football Federation of Australia (FFA), Book of Abstracts: SMAANZ Annual Conference, Adelaide, p59. Retrieved from <http://smaan.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Book-of-Abstracts-20-November-update.pdf>
- Ordway, C. (2019, September 3-6). Protecting Sports Integrity: Sport Corruption Risk Management Strategies, Book of Abstracts, EASM Annual Conference, Seville, pp 488-489. Retrieved from <https://easm2019.com/BOAEASM2019.pdf>
- Ordway, C., & Opie, H. (2016). Integrity and corruption in sport. In Schulenkorf, N., & Frawley, S. (Eds.). *Critical issues in global sport management* (pp. 60-85). Routledge.
- PA Sport. (2015, 5 July). FIFA boss Sepp Blatter 'not going to take the risk of travelling', *ESPN*. Retrieved from <https://www.espn.com/soccer/fifa-world-cup/story/2513303/sepp-blatter-not-going-to-take-the-risk-of-travelling>
- Panja, T. (2017). Brazil's Women Soccer Players in Revolt Against Federation, *New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/sports/soccer/brazil-women-soccer.html>
- Panja, T. (2020). Sexual Abuse Case in Global Soccer Puts FIFA Under Scrutiny Again, *New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/22/sports/soccer/sexual-abuse-soccer-haiti-fifa.html>
- Passas, N. & Ordway, C. (2016). Sports Corruption: Justice and Accountability through the Use of the UNCAC and the UNTOC. In *ACAD Symposium Compendium 30-31 Oct 2015* (pp. 120-137). Vienna, Austria: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Retrieved from <https://researchprofiles.canberra.edu.au/en/publications/sports-corruption-justice-and-accountability-through-the-use-of-t>

- Patsantaras, N., & Kamberidou, I. (2006). Gender Equity in Olympic Sports: Absenteeism and 'Invisibility. *Pandektis International Sports Law Review*, 6(3-4), 361-375.
- Pender, K. (2019, August 22). Moya Dodd: My role was to represent women's football at the top table, *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/football/2019/aug/22/moya-dodd-my-role-was-to-represent-womens-football-at-the-top-table>
- Pieth, M. (2014). Final Report by the Independent Governance Committee to the Executive Committee of FIFA. Retrieved from https://baselgovernance.org/sites/default/files/2019-01/final_report_by_igc_to_fifa_exco_en.pdf
- Pfister, G. (2006). On the Past and Present of Women's Football in Germany. In A. Tomlinson, & C. Young (Eds.), *German Football: History, Culture, Society*, 93-127.
- Prouse, C. (2015). Harnessing the hijab: the emergence of the Muslim Female Footballer through international sport governance. *Gender, Place & Culture*, 22(1), 20-36.
- Radnedge, K. (2015, November 23). Calls for women to have greater say in running of football. *World Soccer*. Retrieved from <https://www.worldsoccer.com/columnists/keir-radnedge/calls-for-women-to-have-greater-say-in-running-of-football-365958>.
- Ruggie, J. (2016). For the Game. For the World. FIFA and Human Rights. Retrieved from https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Ruggie_humanrightsFIFA_report_April2016.pdf
- Rütter, H. & Schmid, C. (2013). The economic importance of international sports organisations in Switzerland, Rütter+Partner, Sozioökonomische Forschung + Beratung. Retrieved from <https://www.icsspe.org/system/files/The%20economic%20importance%20of%20international%20sports%20organisations%20in%20Switzerland%20-%20Report.pdf>
- Schenk, S. (2011). Safe Hands: Building Integrity and Transparency at FIFA. *Transparency International*. Retrieved from

https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/safe_hands_building_integrity_and_transparency_at_fifa

- Schulenkorf, N. & Frawley, F (2017) "Critical issues in global sport" in N. Schulenkorf & S. Frawley (Eds.), *Critical issues in global sport management* pp. 1-6. London, England: Taylor & Francis, Routledge
- Settimi, C. (2018, March 27). Moya Dodd, One Of Soccer's Most Powerful Women, Isn't Done Playing. *Forbes*. Retrieved from <https://www.forbes.com/sites/christinasettimi/2018/03/27/moya-dodd-one-of-footballs-most-powerful-women-isnt-done-playing/#24d4a58d458c>.
- Squiers, S. (2013, June 3). Underlining or Undermining Women Leaders in Sport, *Sportette*. Retrieved from <http://www.sportette.com.au/underlining-or-undermining-women-leaders-in-sport/>
- Swamy, A., Knack, S., Lee, Y., & Azfar, O. (2001). Gender and corruption. *Journal of development economics*, 64(1), 25-55.
- Tafarel, M et al. (2017). Open letter from veterans of women's football addressing current situation in Brazil. Available at www.bit.ly/womeninCBF
- Taylor, A., Cocklin, C., Brown, R., & Wilson-Evered, E. (2011). An investigation of champion-driven leadership processes. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 22(2), 412-433.
- Taylor, J. (2011). The intimate insider: Negotiating the ethics of friendship when doing insider research. *Qualitative research*, 11(1), 3-22.
- Tomlinson, A. (2014). The supreme leader sails on: Leadership, ethics and governance in FIFA. *Sport in Society*, 17, 1155–1169.
- United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organizations (UNESCO). (2017). *Kazan Action Plan*. Retrieved from <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000252725/PDF/252725eng.pdf.multi>
- UNESDOC. 2017. *Provisional list of participants*. International Conference of Ministers and Senior Officials Responsible for Physical Education and Sport, 6th, Kazan, Russian Federation, 2017, SHS/2017/2 INF. United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organizations. Retrieved from <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000252271>

- United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC). (2018). Module 9: *Gender Dimensions of Ethics*, Education for Justice (E4J) initiative. Retrieved from <https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/integrity-ethics/module-9/index.html>
- United Nations (UN). (2015). Sustainable Development Goal 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls. Retrieved from <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg5>
- UN Women. (2019, June 7). Press release: FIFA and UN Women sign first-ever memorandum of understanding, UN Women. Retrieved from <https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2019/6/press-release-fifa-and-un-women-sign-mou>
- Valloni, L. W., & Neuenschwander, E. P. (2016). The role of Switzerland as host: Moves to hold sports organisations more accountable, and wider implications. Transparency International Global Corruption Report: Sport. 321-326. Retrieved from https://www.froriep.com/upload/prj/publication/6.4_SwitzerlandAsHost_ValloniNeuenschwander_GCRSport.pdf
- Vinton, N., Red, C. & O'Keeffe, M. (2015, December 12). U.S. Soccer prez Sunil Gulati wades through shock of corruption scandal to pave new road for world's game, *New York Daily News*. Retrieved from <https://www.nydailynews.com/sports/soccer/u-s-soccer-prez-gulati-pave-new-road-sport-article-1.2463961>.
- Vousinas, G. L. (2019). Advancing theory of fraud: the SCORE model. *Journal of Financial Crime*. 26(1) 372-381.
- Williams, J. (2013). *A game for rough girls?: a history of women's football in Britain*. Routledge.
- Wisgott, S. S. (2019, 14 June). Women's football: An ongoing battle for attention, *CGTN*. Retrieved from <https://news.cgtn.com/news/2019-06-14/Women-s-football-An-ongoing-battle-for-attention-HwvfqhmL7O/index.html>
- Women Win. (2015). Calling FIFA. Retrieved from <https://www.womenwin.org/calling-fifa>
- Wrage, A. (2020). LinkedIn profile. Retrieved from <https://www.linkedin.com/in/alexandra-wrage-781a153>

Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) Policies and Documentation:

- FIFA. (2012, July). *FIFA Statutes*, July 2012 edition. Retrieved from <https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/fifa-statutes-2012.pdf?cloudid=znhveeenbqbdzi7dmova>
- FIFA. (2013(a)). Encl. 3, Draft FIFA Statutes Congress 2013: Regulations Governing the Application of the Statutes Standing Orders of the Congress, 63rd FIFA Congress Mauritius, 30-31 May 2013. Retrieved from <https://img.fifa.com/image/upload/vlwxqyf5ytqqaw1cgijz.pdf>
- FIFA. (2013(b)). Minutes of the 63rd FIFA Congress Mauritius 2013. Retrieved from <https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/fifa-congress-2013-minutes-2225841.pdf?cloudid=ia8yz6l83vasbn9j7geb>
- FIFA. (2015). Substantiation of the Reform Proposals Presented at the FIFA Executive Committee Meeting of 20 July 2015. Retrieved from <https://img.fifa.com/image/upload/os9bydwdirboingogovk.pdf>
- FIFA. (2015, August 11). François Carrard to lead FIFA reform process, Who We Are. FIFA.com. Retrieved from <https://www.fifa.com/who-we-are/news/francois-carrard-to-lead-fifa-reform-process-2670347>
- FIFA. (2015, 2 December). 2016 FIFA Reform Committee Report. Retrieved from <https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/1514-proposals-of-the-2016-fifa-reform-committee.pdf?cloudid=npyfsjqt5diw9ncaxpyw>
- FIFA. (2016). *FIFA Statutes*, April 2016 edition. Retrieved from <https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/the-fifa-statutes-in-force-as-of-27-april-2016-2782907.pdf?cloudid=vga5sv1yxeayptzrdudx>
- FIFA. (2016, September 29). Clarification on FIFA Task Force Against Racism and Discrimination. Who We Are. FIFA.com. Retrieved from <https://www.fifa.com/who-we-are/news/clarification-on-fifa-task-force-against-racism-and-discrimination-2837757>
- FIFA. (2018(a)). *FIFA Statutes*, August 2018 edition. Retrieved from <https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/the-fifa-statutes->

[2018.pdf?cloudid=whhncbdzio03cuhmwfxa](#)

- FIFA. (2020). Committees, Who We Are. Retrieved from <https://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-are/committees/>
- FIFA Chronology. (2014). The Reform Process - Chronology. Retrieved from <https://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-are/news/the-reform-process-chronology-2756734>
- FIFA Congress. (2014). Minutes, 64TH 2 FIFA Congress, São Paulo 2014. Retrieved from <https://img.fifa.com/image/upload/qbla7vsmrhogbtqgaftc.pdf>
- FIFA Forward 2.0 (2020). *FIFA Forward Development Programme Regulations*. Retrieved from <https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/1659-fifa-forward-development-programme-regulations-fifa-forward-2-0.pdf?cloudid=qdot1ebd3e4k9fmimmke>
- FIFA Governance Regulations. (2016). Retrieved from <https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/fifa-governance-regulations-2016-2112075.pdf?cloudid=hoqftq5c00zsy25kio1y>
- FIFA Human Rights Policy. (2017). Retrieved from <https://img.fifa.com/image/upload/kro5dqyhwr1uhqy2lh6r.pdf>.
- FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board. (2020). *Fourth Report of the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board*. Retrieved from <https://img.fifa.com/image/upload/pyume2cahuue2szxgjqwq.pdf>
- FIFA Legal Handbook. (2020). Retrieved from <https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/fifa-legal-handbook.pdf?cloudid=hrj9obwjarigak8a58z4>.
- FIFA Media Release. (2011, April 4). Decision to appoint normalisation committee Indonesian FA. Retrieved from <https://www.fifa.com/fifa-tournaments/news/y=2011/m=4/news=normalisation-committee-indonesia-1411950.html>
- FIFA Media Release. (2014, January 15). FIFA Task Force for Women's Football hold first meeting. Retrieved from <https://www.fifa.com/womens-football/news/fifa-task-force-for-women-football-first-meeting-2261648>
- FIFA Media Release. (2014, May 12). Dodd: Women's football deserves a blueprint

for growth. Retrieved from <https://www.fifa.com/news/dodd-women-s-football-deserves-a-blueprint-for-growth-2337280>

- FIFA Media Release. (2018, August 29). Decision to appoint normalisation committee Ghana FA. Retrieved from <https://www.fifa.com/governance/news/y=2018/m=8/news=appointment-of-a-normalisation-committee-in-ghana.html>
- FIFA Reform Committee. (2015, December 2). *2016 FIFA Reform Committee Report*. Retrieved from <https://www.fifa.com/who-we-are/news/2016-fifa-reform-committee-report-presented-to-the-executive-committee-2741751>
- FIFA Women's Football (n.d). FIFA Women's Football Symposium. Retrieved from <https://www.fifa.com/womens-football/symposium.html>
- FIFA Women's Football (2015, March 6). Football experts voice need for quotas for women. Retrieved from <https://www.fifa.com/womens-football/news/football-experts-voice-need-for-quotas-for-women-2555749>
- FIFA Women's Football (2015, July 5). 6th Women's Football Symposium 2015 Day 3 viewed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t9_O4FveM24 at 2hr 20 min, and written report at <https://www.fifa.com/womens-football/news/a-host-of-inspiring-ideas-for-a-better-future-2661483>
- FIFA Women's Football. (2019). *Member Associations Survey Report 2019*. Retrieved from <https://img.fifa.com/image/upload/nq3ensohyxpuxovcovjo.pdf>
- FIFA Women's Football. (2020). *Women's Football Administrator Handbook*. Retrieved from <https://img.fifa.com/image/upload/nduju6vk2fyr7d8doyu3.pdf>
- FIFA Women's Football Taskforce (WFT). (2014). *Women's Football: 10 Key Development Principles*. Summarized in FIFA Women's Football Development Programmes and Guidelines 2015 - 2019 p 6 Retrieved from <https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/women-s-football-development-programmes-and-guidelines-2015-1018-2439064.pdf?cloudid=i95clphzcaq2uc71agpx>. Available in full at <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ymqtdwWtNOsUonL1ZXrZdvjFySAirMDr/view>
- FIFA Women's Football Taskforce (WFT). (2015, October). *FIFA, football and women: why reform must specify inclusion and investment*. Retrieved from

<https://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-are/news/chair-of-the-fifa-task-force-for-women-s-football-submits-proposals-to-2722358> and

<https://img.fifa.com/image/upload/i2berd89n7syxdjl5fhq.pdf>

- FIFA Women's Football Strategy. (2018). Retrieved from <https://img.fifa.com/image/upload/z7w21ghir8jb9tguvbcq.pdf>
- FIFA Women's Football Strategy Snapshot. (2018). Retrieved from <https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/strategy-for-women-s-football-snapshot.pdf?cloudid=uov9bd2mnwxfvg3iwjgi>