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of Governance**



**GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AS PUBLIC AUTHORITY:
STRUCTURES, CONTESTATION, AND NORMATIVE CHANGE**

Jean Monnet Working Paper 11/11

Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt

**Domestic Politicization of International Institutions:
Testing Competing Explanations Using Party Manifestos**

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**Global Governance as Public Authority:
Structures, Contestation, and Normative Change**

This Working Paper is the fruit of a collaboration between The Jean Monnet Center at NYU School of Law and the Global Governance Research Cluster at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin. The Research Cluster seeks to stimulate innovative work on global governance from different disciplinary perspectives, from law, political science, public administration, political theory, economics etc.

The present Working Paper is part of a set of papers presented at (and revised after) a workshop on 'Global Governance as Public Authority' that took place in April 2011 at the Hertie School. Contributions were based on a call for papers and were a reflection of the intended interdisciplinary nature of the enterprise - while anchored in particular disciplines, they were meant to be able to speak to the other disciplines as well. The discussions at the workshop then helped to critically reflect on the often diverging assumptions about governance, authority and public power held in the many discourses on global governance at present.

The Jean Monnet Center at NYU is hoping to co-sponsor similar symposia and would welcome suggestions from institutions or centers in other member states.

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Prologue:

Global governance is no longer a new phenomenon – after all, the notion became prominent two decades ago – but it still retains an aura of 'mystery'. We know much about many of its instantiations – institutions, actors, norms, beliefs – yet we sense that seeing the trees does not necessarily enable us to see the forest. We would need grander narratives for this purpose, and somehow in the muddle of thousands of different sites and players, broader maps remain elusive.

One anchor that has oriented much work on global governance in the past has been the assumption that we are faced with a structure 'without government'. However laudable the results of this move away from the domestic frame, with its well-known institutions that do not find much correspondence in the global sphere, it has also obscured many similarities, and it has clouded classical questions about power and justification in a cloak of technocratic problem-solving. In response, governmental analogies are on the rise again, especially among political theorists and lawyers who try to come to terms with the increasingly intrusive character of much global policy-making. 'Constitutionalism' and 'constitutionalization' have become standard frames, both for normative guidance and for understanding the trajectories by which global institutions and norms are hedged in. 'Administration', another frame, also serves to highlight proximity with domestic analogues for the purpose of analysing and developing accountability in global governance.

In the project of which this symposium is a part, we have recourse to a third frame borrowed from domestic contexts – that of 'public authority'. It seeks to reflect the fact that much of the growing contestation over global issues among governments, NGOs, and other domestic and trans-national institutions draws its force from conceptual analogies with 'traditional rule'. Such contestation often assumes that institutions of global governance exercise public authority in a similar way as domestic government and reclaims central norms of the domestic political tradition, such as democracy and the rule of law, in the global context. The 'public authority' frame captures this kind of discourse but avoids the strong normative implications of constitutionalist approaches, or the close proximity to particular forms of institutional organization characteristic of 'administrative' frames. In the project, it is used as a heuristic device, rather than a normative or analytical fix point: it is a lens through which we aim to shed light on processes of change in global governance. The papers in the present symposium respond to a set of broad questions about these processes: what is the content of new normative claims? which continuities and discontinuities with domestic traditions characterise global governance? how responsive are domestic structures to global governance? How is global governance anchored in societies? and which challenges arise from the autonomy demands of national (and sometimes other) communities?

The papers gathered here speak to these questions from different disciplinary perspectives – they come from backgrounds in political science, international relations, political theory, European law and international law. But they speak across disciplinary divides and provide nice evidence for how much can be gained from such engagement. They help us better understand the political forces behind claims for change in global governance; the extent of change in both political discourse and law; the lenses through which we make sense of global governance; and the normative and institutional

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responses to competing claims. Overall, they provide a subtle picture of the pressure global governance is under, both in practice and in theory, to change its ways. They provide attempts to reformulate concepts from the domestic context, such as subsidiarity, for the global realm. But they also provide caution us against jumping to conclusions about the extent of change so far. After all, much discourse about global governance – and many of its problems – continue in intergovernmental frames. Global governance may face a transition, but where its destination lies is still unclear. 'Public authority' is an analytical and normative frame that helps to formulate and tackle many current challenges, though certainly not all. Many questions and challenges remain, but we hope that this symposium takes us a step closer to answering them.

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**DOMESTIC POLITICIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS:
TESTING COMPETING EXPLANATIONS USING PARTY MANIFESTOS**

By Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt*

Abstract

This paper analyzes the politicization of international institutions, that is, a process in which international institutions become salient and controversial on the level of mass politics. Differentiating between dissenting and supportive acts of politicization, the paper matches data on party manifestos from 22 OECD countries to test a number of alternative explanations for varying stances of parties on the internationalization of governance. Results suggest that scholarly debate tends to overestimate the role of globalization for driving politicization, while institutional variables are too often neglected, although they are crucial to understanding the different levels of politicization. The results of the analysis support neofunctionalist expectations, according to which institutions attract societal awareness and demands in terms of “gravity of power.” Nevertheless, a significant amount of dissent seems to be driven by legitimacy concerns. Additionally, I find strong evidence that parties operate differently depending on their ideological positioning across the political spectrum and their size.

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1. Introduction

Massive public resistance to international institutions like the EU, the WTO or the World Bank by non-governmental actors has put the politicization of internationalized governance—that is, a process in which questions of internationalized governance become salient and controversial on the level of mass politics—on the academic agenda. In accordance with this overall theme, my focus is on electoral politics in the highly industrialized countries of the OECD world. Adding to a growing body of politicization research, I ask why the internationalization of governance has become a topic of political party agendas in terms of either supportive or dissenting positions vis-à-vis international institutions' policies and procedures.

A thorough understanding of why international institutions become politicized is crucial for practical as well as normative reasons. First, politicization significantly changes the terms by which international cooperation in general, and the internationalization of political authority in particular, operate. International relations (IR) has begun to debate the extent to which international institutions have started to adapt to a changing operational environment in which a plurality of societal actors regularly observe and question the policies and procedures of global institutions.¹ Second, our understanding of politicization is important from a normative perspective as well. While the institutionalization of international cooperation has been widely treated as desirable for furthering the common good, it may nevertheless pose severe problems from a democratic theory viewpoint.² What is needed according to at least some observers is a

¹ ROBERT O'BRIAN, ANNE M. GOETZ, JAN A. SCHOLTE & MARC WILLIAMS, *CONTESTING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS AND GLOBAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS* (Cambridge University Press 2000); Sidney Tarrow, *Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in International Politics*, 4 *ANNUAL REVIEW OF POLITICAL SCIENCE*, 1-20 (2001); Michael Zürn, *Global Governance under Legitimacy Pressure*, 39 *GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION*, 260-287 (2004); MICHAEL ZÜRN AND MATTHIAS ECKER-EHRHARDT, *GESELLSCHAFTLICHE POLITISIERUNG UND INTERNATIONALE INSTITUTIONEN* (Suhrkamp 2011).

² DAVID HELD, *DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER. FROM THE MODERN STATE TO COSMOPOLITICAL GOVERNANCE* (Polity Press 1995); Michael Zürn, *Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation-State. The EU and Other International Institutions*, 6 *EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*, 183-221 (2000); ANDREW KUPER, *DEMOCRACY BEYOND BORDERS. JUSTICE AND REPRESENTATION IN GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS* (Oxford University Press 2004).

process of widespread politicization that leads to a global citizenry willing and capable of holding empowered institutions accountable.³

Given the importance of understanding politicization, the objective of this paper is to integrate current theorizing on the causes of politicization in the context of electoral politics and society more generally. In terms of hypotheses, an initial set of explanations focuses on the social costs of economic and cultural globalization.⁴ Economic interdependence, it is said, has had far-reaching repercussions for domestic politics by fomenting conflicts between the “winners” and the “losers” on a highly competitive world market, resulting from intensified exchange relations between societies (neoliberal push & backlash hypothesis). Similarly, cultural globalization is expected to foster a divide between a more cosmopolitan part of society, on the one hand, and a more parochial part critical of any cultural or political integration, on the other (cosmopolitan push & nationalist backlash hypothesis).

While this is a plausible route to take, in order to explain at least some of the dynamics of politicization, I argue that the phenomenon is actually more directly connected to the increased breadth and depth of international institutions’ regulatory authority itself. Neofunctionalists long ago predicted that the empowering of international institutions would incite and attract domestic interest. However, this “gravity of power” for substantive interests tells only one part of the institutionalist story, given that global institutions are severely criticized for deficient policies and procedures. Observers have interpreted this decline in support as a backlash against international institutions that have exceeded their social room to maneuver by acquiring supranational power against the will of those affected. Hence, widespread legitimacy concerns about the lack of

³ Richard Falk, *On Humane Governance. Toward a New Global Politics*. The World Order Models Project Report of the Global Civilization Initiative (The Pennsylvania State University Press 1995); Daniele Archibugi, *Cosmopolitan Democracy and its Critics: A Review*, 10 *European Journal of International Relations*, 437-473 (2004); Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt, *Cosmopolitan Politicization? Relating Public Perceptions of Interdependence and Expectations in Internationalized Governance*, 17 *EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*, published online 22 February 2011, DOI: 10.1177/1354066110391823 (2011).

⁴ HANSPETER KRIESI, EDGAR GRANDE, ROMAIN LACHAT, MARTIN DOLEZAL, SIMON BORNSCHIER & TIMOTHEOS FREY, *WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION* (Cambridge University Press 2008); Brian Burgoon, *Globalization and Backlash: Polanyi's Revenge?*, 15 *REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY*, 145-178 (2009); Andrea B. Haupt, *Parties Responses to Economic Globalization*, 16 *PARTY POLITICS*, 5-27 (2010).

inclusiveness, transparency, and accountability of international institutions might be one of the driving forces behind politicization, the more that these institutions acquire supranational competences.⁵

I test these alternative explanations for politicization empirically with data on political party manifesto content from 22 OECD countries. Recent research already suggests that politicization is reflected in and shaped by the changing domestic political discourse in which parties start to reorient themselves programmatically in times of globalization.⁶ This paper follows that route and matches data from the Comparative Manifesto Project with information on party-level attributes and on the economic, social, and political integration of the societies in which the parties operate.⁷ My results indicate that scholarly debates tend to overestimate the role of economic globalization for supportive and dissenting politicization, while the institutional variables are too often neglected, although they are crucial to understanding the different levels of politicization. The results in fact support the neofunctionalist expectation that institutions attract societal awareness and demands through gravity of power. However, a significant amount of dissenting politicization seems to be driven by legitimacy concerns related to supranationalization. Furthermore, parties operate differently depending on their size and ideological positioning across the political spectrum. Hence, while there is strong evidence for the overall importance of institutions as incentives for party actors to politicize international ones, the results also show that politicization is shaped significantly by strategic action vis-à-vis domestic factors.

The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. In section one, I review the theoretical literature and derive competing hypotheses on the general causes of politicization and on the level of political party positions. After discussing the data and methodology in section two, I turn to the presentation and discussion of empirical results in section three. Section four concludes with a condensed summary of the main findings and some implications for future research.

⁵ Zürn, *op. cit.*

⁶ Haupt, *op. cit.*, Burgoon, *op. cit.*

⁷ HANS D. KLINGEMANN, ANDREA VOLKENS, JUDITH L. BARA, IAN BUDGE & MICHAEL D. McDONALD, *MAPPING POLICY PREFERENCES II. ESTIMATES FOR PARTIES, ELECTORS, AND GOVERNMENTS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, EUROPEAN UNION AND OECD 1990-2003* (Oxford University Press 2006).

2. Theorizing mass politicization of international institutions

To hypothesize under what conditions the politicization of international institutions occurs, we must start with the most basic question, namely, that of its conceptualization. There is remarkable convergence on the scientific usage of the term towards two fundamental features.

First, most of the relevant literature refers to *the high or increasing salience of international institutions and policies for a wide or widening array of societal actors* as a defining characteristic of politicization. In his seminal piece on politicization, Philippe Schmitter speaks of a “widening of the audience or clientele interested and active in integration,”⁸ and a number of recent contributions refer to the attentiveness of public opinion to European politics or its major importance for the structure of political spaces and party politics.⁹ In much the same way others have used politicization to denote the reflexive stage that internationalized governance has reached in virtue of a growing number of societal actors paying attention to and reflecting on “political order beyond national borders.”¹⁰ Hence politicization is meant to lead “societal actors, be they organized at the national or transnational level, [to] increasingly formulate demands towards governance beyond the nation state.”¹¹ As a matter of societal awareness, attitude formation, and the public articulation of such attitudes (in the broadest sense), however, much more research on international institutions as salient objects of public opinion, party politics, or social movements has actually contributed to

⁸ Philippe C. Schmitter, *Three Neo-Functionalist Hypotheses about International Integration*, 23 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 166, 161-166 (1969).

⁹ Peter Mair, *Popular Democracy and the European Union Polity*, EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE PAPERS NO. C-05-03 (2005); Paul Magette & Yannis Papadopoulos, *On the politicization of the European consociation: A middle way between Hix and Bartolini* EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE PAPERS NO. C-08-01 (2008); Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschiefer & Frey, op. cit.; Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, *A postfunctionalist theory of European integration: from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus*, 39 BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 1-23 (2008).

¹⁰ Zürn, op. cit.: 151.

¹¹ Michael Zürn, Martin Binder, Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt & Katrin Radtke, *Politische Ordnungsbildung wider Willen*, 14 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN 149, 129-164 (2007), author's translation.

the issue of politicization even though the term “politicization” was not used explicitly at the time.¹²

Second, most scholars discuss politicization by introducing terms that capture qualities and quantities of conflict (e.g., controversiality, contestedness, polarization, contention, extremity). Political theorists have long assumed that conflict is a constituent part of that which is political.¹³ But the current focus of research seems to be one-sided. Virtually all contributions to this body of literature refer to widespread resistance and the articulation of criticism as proof that something important is going on—be it in terms of protest mobilization against global economic institutions or widespread Euro-skepticism articulated in referendums, surveys, or national elections. To focus only on dissent, however, is to neglect an integral part of societal conflict, namely, support for international institutions. Research on public cosmopolitanism,¹⁴ on societal mobilization and advocacy networks,¹⁵ and on the cosmopolitan “global justice movement,”¹⁶ for instance, indicates that international institutions attract positive societal expectations and demands to remarkable degree. Put thus, I understand *dissenting* as well as *supportive politicization* as important constitutive moments of politicization in terms of attitude formation and, ultimately, public articulation of these attitudes (broadly understood).

¹² E.g., GARY MARKS & MARCO R. STEENBERGEN, *EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND POLITICAL CONFLICT* (Cambridge University Press 2004); Tarrow, *op. cit.*; Andrea Volkens, *Programmatische Stellungnahmen nationaler Parteien zur Europäischen Union*, in *EUROPAS OSTERWEITERUNG. DAS ENDE DER VERTIEFUNG?*, ed. Jens Alber & Wolfgang Merkel (Sigma, 2006); Catherine E. Netjes & Harmen A. Binnema, *The salience of the European integration issue: Three data sources compared*, 26 *ELECTORAL STUDIES*, 39-49 (2007).

¹³ E.g., CARL SCHMITT, *DER BEGRIFF DES POLITISCHEN* (Duncker und Humblot 1932).

¹⁴ Peter A. Furia, *Global Citizenship, Anyone? Cosmopolitanism, Privilege and Public Opinion*, 19 *GLOBAL SOCIETY*, 331-359 (2005); Ecker-Ehrhardt, *op. cit.*

¹⁵ MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, *ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS. ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS* (Cornell University Press 1998); THOMAS RISSE, STEPHEN C. ROPP, AND KATHRYN SIKKINK, *THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS. INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE* (Cambridge University Press 1999).

¹⁶ DONATELLA DELLA PORTA, *THE GLOBAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT: CROSS-NATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES* (Paradigm 2007).

2.1. Politicization driven by economic and cultural globalization

What do we know about the main causes of politicization in terms of societal awareness of international institutions, attitude formation, and the public articulation of such attitudes (in the broadest sense)? Significant parts of the literature suggest a neoliberal or nationalist backlash, referring to processes of globalization. The transnational flow of goods, services, communications, and people is said to intensify competition between individuals, companies, industries and even whole societies on a variety of markets.¹⁷ While the competitive parts of highly developed societies might benefit from opening new markets, many economists assume that trade liberalizations have extremely detrimental effects on the less competitive. First, increased competition with less developed countries, it has been argued, lowers the demand for unskilled workers.¹⁸ In consequence, where labor markets are flexible (e.g., in the US), less skilled workers are expected to lose bargaining power, to endure greater wage instability, and to have to work longer hours: “For those who lack the skills to make themselves hard to replace, the result is greater insecurity and a more precarious existence.”¹⁹ On the other hand, where labor markets are regulated by the states, as is the case in most European countries, globalization is assumed to heighten insecurities deriving from higher rates of unemployment.²⁰ Moreover, because investors and traders are expected to go where domestic settings are less regulated, policy competition between the more regulated markets and the less regulated ones has been shown to cause the diffusion of more liberal economic measures, aggravating individual vulnerabilities.²¹

¹⁷ Ethan B. Kapstein, *Winners and Losers in the Global Economy*, 54 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 359-384 (2000); Michael J. Hiscox, *Class Versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade*, 55 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 1-46 (2001); Kenneth Scheve & Matthew J. Slaughter, *Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production*, 48 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 662-674 (2004).

¹⁸ Adrian Wood, *How Trade Hurt Unskilled Workers*, 9 THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 57-80 (1995).

¹⁹ DANI RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE TOO FAR? 27 (Institute for International Economics 1997).

²⁰ André Sapir, *Globalization and the Reform of European Social Models*, 44 JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 369-390 (2006).

²¹ Beth A. Simmons & Zachary Elkins, *The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy*, 98 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 171-189 (2004).

Although this understanding has been contested on theoretical and empirical grounds²², most scholars of domestic politics now seem to assume that globalization has a significant impact on the structure of domestic conflicts. A major expectation formulated in the literature is that growing insecurities lead to negative attitudes towards globalization and a shift to protectionism.²³ In this process, international institutions like the WTO, the World Bank, and the IMF, and less formalized organizations like the G8 have become major targets of globalization critics. Social movement actors focus their protests on these institutions as high-profile advocates of market liberalization and as institutional centers of global neoliberalism. Domestic elites, including governments, are said to have advanced the negative public image of these institutions as the main perpetrators of massive deregulation and social cuts.²⁴ Shifting the blame to international institutions as scapegoats for unpopular policy change has even been termed the new *raison d'état*²⁵ of national governments in these times of globalization.

Critics of neoliberalism often diverge in their views of whether international institutions *per se* are part of the problem or part of its solution.²⁶ European scholars have repeatedly shown that intra-European trade concentration (in conjunction with economic performance indicators like growth, inflation, or unemployment) explains net support for the EU from a comparative perspective.²⁷ As shown elsewhere, German citizens' perception of transnational interdependencies, for example, tend to strengthen

²² e.g., Torben Iversen & Thomas R. Cusack, *The Causes of Welfare State Expansion: Deindustrialization or Globalization?*, 52 *WORLD POLITICS*, 313-349 (2000).

²³ Scheve & Slaughter, *op. cit.*; Anna Maria Mayda & Dani Rodrik, *Why are some people (and countries) more protectionist than others?*, 49 *EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW*, 1393-1430 (2005).

²⁴ Cees Van der Eijk & Mark N. Franklin, *Potential for contestation on European matters at national elections in Europe*, in *EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND POLITICAL CONFLICT*, ed. Gary Marks & Marco R. Steenbergen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

²⁵ Klaus D. Wolf, *The New Raison D'Etat: International Cooperation Against Societies?*, in *CIVILIZING WORLD POLITICS. SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY BEYOND THE STATE*, ed. Matthias Albert, Lothar Brock & Klaus D. Wolf (Rowman & Littlefield 2000).

²⁶ O'Brian, Goetz, Scholte & Williams, *op. cit.*; Tarrow, *op. cit.*

²⁷ Richard C. Eichenberg & Russell J. Dalton, *Europeans and the European Community: The Dynamics of Public Support for European Integration*, 47 *INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION*, 507-534 (1993); *ibid.*, *Post-Maastricht Blues: The Transformation of Citizen Support for European Integration, 1973-2004*, 42 *ACTA POLITICA*, 128-152 (2007); Christopher J. Anderson & Karl C. Kaltenthaler, *The Dynamics of Public Opinion Toward European Integration, 1973-93*, 2 *EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*, 175-199 (1996); MATTHEW GABEL, *INTERESTS AND INTEGRATION: MARKET LIBERALIZATION, PUBLIC OPINION, AND EUROPEAN UNION* (University of Michigan Press 1998).

individual beliefs in the capability of international institutions to solve problems, which in turn might explain how economic interdependence could lead to higher levels of support for internationalized governance.²⁸ Whereas the winners of globalization are expected to support international institutions, some of the losers, despite finding themselves in more precarious situations, may nevertheless expect international institutions to contribute to a more just and secure world. In effect, we might see a significant increase in support for the idea that international institutions are capable of solving important problems. With respect to the issue of politicization, then, economic globalization losers may lash back and contest the policies of international institutions, while the winners may push for and support these policies because they benefit from economic globalization and/or they believe that international institutions represent a possible solution to problems arising from deepened economic dependencies. Formulated in terms of a testable hypothesis, we have the following.

H1: Economic globalization leads to greater societal salience of internationalized governance by the virtue of distributional consequences and ascribed problem-solving capability. (a) Supportive as well as (b) dissenting politicization are expected to go up with increasing levels of economic globalization (neoliberal push & backlash hypothesis).

But globalization might add to politicization not only by aggravating economic insecurities, but also in terms of increased social mobilization and the cultural influences such mobilization seems to imply. To start with, a number of scholars have argued that intensified contacts across borders will facilitate peaceful relations between actors and groups of different origins by virtue of an emerging sense of community.²⁹ Similarly, others have argued that globalization might widen individual horizons and

²⁸ Ecker-Ehrhardt, op. cit.

²⁹ KARL W. DEUTSCH, SIDNEY A. BURRELL, ROBERT A. KANN, MAURICE LEE, JR., MARTIN LICHTERMANN, RAYMOND E. LINDGREN, FRANCIS L. LOEWENHEIM & RICHARD W. V. WAGENEN, POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA : INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IN THE LIGHT OF HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE (Princeton Univ. Press 1957); EMANUEL ADLER AND MICHAEL N. BARNETT, SECURITY COMMUNITIES (Cambridge University Press 1998); WOLF-DIETER EBERWEIN & MATTHIAS ECKER-EHRHARDT, DEUTSCHLAND UND POLEN: EINE WERTE- UND INTERESSENGEMEINSCHAFT? DIE ELITEN-PERSPEKTIVE (Leske + Budrich 2001).

engender a cosmopolitan worldview with greater confidence in the problem-solving capability of, and stronger support for, international institutions.³⁰

However, research on nationalist autarky³¹ or demarcation³² considers cultural globalization primarily as a commonly perceived threat to national communities. Negative attitudes towards international institutions are considered to be part and parcel of a more complex syndrome of exclusive nationalist backlash including xenophobic reactions to immigration. International institutions, it is implied, are perceived as the main promoters of cultural globalization. In other words, politicization qua the contestation of international institutions is primarily caused by “fear of, or hostility toward, other cultures”³³ triggered by the experience of immigration. Evidence presented by Burgoon supports the notion that higher rates of migration have a significant impact on preferences for what he calls autarky or nationalist autarky.³⁴ In a similar way, Kriesi and colleagues have pointed to the reconfiguration of European domestic cleavage structures using a two-dimensional concept of economic and cultural integration/demarcation. Hence, I expect aspects of cultural globalization to foster supportive as well as dissenting politicization.

H2: Cultural globalization triggers (a) supportive politicization in terms of a “cosmopolitan push” as well as (b) dissenting politicization resulting from “nationalist backlash.”

2.2. Institutional gravity and legitimacy concerns

Explanations for politicization that focus solely on economic or cultural globalization may be incomplete because they do not account systematically for institutions as a main

³⁰ Peter H. Koehn & James N. Rosenau, *Transnational Competence in an Emergent Epoch*, 3 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES PERSPECTIVE, 105-127 (2002); Steffen Mau, Jan Mewes & Ann Zimmermann, *Cosmopolitan attitudes through transnational practices?*, 8 GLOBAL NETWORKS: A JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1-24 (2008); Ecker-Ehrhardt, op. cit.

³¹ Burgoon, op. cit.

³² Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschieer & Frey, op. cit.

³³ Lauren McLaren, *Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat?* 64 JOURNAL OF POLITICS 553, 551-566 (2002); JUAN DíEZ MEDRANO, FRAMING EUROPE, ATTITUDES TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN GERMANY, SPAIN, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM (Princeton University Press 2003).

³⁴ Burgoon, op. cit.

reason for politicization. Surprisingly, while most studies on politicization at least implicitly acknowledge the importance of an institutional power shift towards the international level for understanding politicization, these studies do not spell out the role of politicization in theoretical terms or account for its causal impact empirically. From theory we can derive a plethora of explanations for how power might induce societal awareness of, and conflicting attitudes towards, internationalized governance.

An initial cut-off point for how internationalization of political authority might lead to politicization was given by early neofunctionalists.³⁵ Expanding the scope and level of international authority would necessarily imply increasing the “controversiality of joint decision making” and the “widening of the audience or clientele interested and active in integration”.³⁶ According to the neofunctionalists, the politicization of internationalized governance is inevitable, given the causal gravity of institutional power (viz., the scope and level of competences) for conflicting domestic interests and expectations. Even if prominent proponents of neofunctionalism have bemoaned a surprisingly low politicization of European institutions,³⁷ empirical research supports the notion of gravity-of-power politicization. As Bernhard Wessels demonstrated, world market integration explains, to a great extent, domestic interest representation at EU level.³⁸ But Wessels also finds that “waves of interest group formation follow institutional reforms”³⁹: that is, even if actors focus on economic interests, a shift in salience towards European institutions as the addressees of these economically driven interests presupposes the empowerment of these institutions. In addition to interest group representation, rising public salience of European institutions as the focus of policy-

³⁵ Ernst B. Haas, *The Challenge of Regionalism*, 12 *INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION*, 440-458 (1958); Schmitter, op. cit.; LEON N. LINDBERG & STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, *EUROPE'S WOULD-BE POLITY. PATTERNS OF CHANGE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY* (Prentice Hall 1970).

³⁶ Schmitter, op. cit.: 166.

³⁷ Philippe C. Schmitter, *Ernst B. Haas and the legacy of neofunctionalism*, 12 *JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY*, 255-272 (2005): 261; Mair, op. cit.

³⁸ Bernhard Wessels, *Contestation potential of interest groups in the EU: emergence, structure, and political alliances*, in *EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND POLITICAL CONFLICT*, ed. Gary Marks & Marco R. Steenbergen (Cambridge University Press 2004).

³⁹ Wessels, op. cit.: 202.

specific media debates⁴⁰ and social movement mobilization⁴¹ also suggest that the gravity-of-power mechanism is at work. Finally, literature on transnational activism beyond the EU has pointed to a similar role of global institutions as the “coral reef” of transnational activism,⁴² transnational NGOs,⁴³ and other traditional interest groups.⁴⁴ Thus existing research indicates that the internationalization of governance is a major source of increased societal salience of international institutions in terms of the policy demands placed on them, and that this increased salience may translate either into rising support or into contestation.

But focusing on the substantive interests attracted by international institutions alone might be wholly inadequate to understand the gravity-of-power dynamics underlying contemporary politicization. While classical neofunctionalism formulates strong expectations about politicization, it anticipates only a unidimensional public shift in favor of further delegation of authority to the international level (as economic integration begins to affect more interests).⁴⁵ Recent results, however, point to the contrary. Perceived economic benefits from political integration might no longer lead to permissive support of European institutions.⁴⁶ Public concerns about expanding

⁴⁰ Ruud Koopmans, *Who inhabits the European public sphere? Winners and losers, supporters and opponents in Europeanised political debates*, 46 *EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH*, 183-210 (2007).

⁴¹ Doug Imig, *Contestation in the Streets*, 35 *COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES*, 914-933 (2002); Isabelle Bedoyan, Peter Van Aelst & Stefaan Walgrave, *Limitations and Possibilities of Transnational Mobilization: The Case of EU Summit Protesters in Brussels 2001*, 9 *MOBILIZATION*, 39-54 (2004).

⁴² Tarrow, op. cit.

⁴³ O'Brian, Goetz, Scholte & Williams, op. cit.; Jackie Smith & Dawn Wiest, *The Uneven Geography of Global Civil Society: National and Global Influences on Transnational Association*, 84 *SOCIAL FORCES*, 621-651 (2005).

⁴⁴ Mark Aspinwall, *Collective Attraction - the New Political Game in Brussels*, in *COLLECTIVE ACTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION. INTERESTS AND THE NEW POLITICS OF ASSOCIABILITY*, ed. Justin Greenwood & Mark Aspinwall (Routledge 1998); MICHAEL ZÜRN AND GREGOR WALTER, *GLOBALIZING INTERESTS. PRESSURE GROUPS AND DENATIONALIZATION* (State University of New York Press 2005).

⁴⁵ Philippe Schmitter acknowledged the possibility of a “nationalist reaction” (Philippe C. Schmitter, *Examining the Present Euro-Polity with the Help of Past Theories.*, in *GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION*, ed. Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe C. Schmitter & Wolfgang Streeck 141(Sage Publications 1996)) against the further internationalization of political authority. However, even if public contestation would rise to a point where it would impede smooth decision making on the European level in the medium run, Schmitter (*On the Way to a Post-Functionalist Theory of European Integration*, 39 *BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE*, 211-215 (2009)) believes “that the elite–mass gap would be rather quickly bridged and the overlapping consensus in favor of the integration process would assert itself” (p. 215).

⁴⁶ Richard Eichenberg & Russell J. Dalton, *Post-Maastricht Blues: The Transformation of Citizen Support for European Integration, 1973-2004*, 42 *ACTA POLITICA*, 128-152 (2007).

competences—that is, increasing the scope of policy areas and augmenting supranational authority as a result of extending majority voting to the European Council and strengthening the European Parliament—seem to play a decisive role in the public evaluation of European integration.

Such concern about procedures is noteworthy because global institutions have a long record in this regard.⁴⁷ What is often contested is the “executive” manner in which they decide and operate.⁴⁸ Politicization of international institutions is widely assumed to reflect apprehensions about the ensuing development of an undemocratic world polity. Nation states have started to lend international institutions a new quality by accepting their decisions as legally binding.⁴⁹ Nation states now “pool” their authority to a significant degree by allowing councils of international institutions to decide by majority rule rather than unanimous decision.⁵⁰ Further, they have started to delegate political authority to the international level by giving international secretariats like the European Commission the right to initiate and actively take part in international decision making⁵¹ and by delegating judicial authority to international courts (or court-like bodies) such as the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the International Criminal Court (ICC), or the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body.⁵² But authority is shifted to the international level without mechanisms to ensure that those affected can influence decision making or hold those empowered accountable.⁵³ Thus, legitimacy concerns become plausible motives for politicization the more international institutions acquire supranational components

⁴⁷ O'Brian, Goetz, Scholte & Williams, op. cit..

⁴⁸ Zürn, op. cit..

⁴⁹ Zürn, Binder, Ecker-Ehrhardt & Radtke, op. cit.; Scott Cooper, Darren G. Hawkins, Wade Jacoby & Daniel Nielson, *Yielding Sovereignty to International Institutions: Bringing System Structure Back In*, 10 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW, 501-524 (2008).

⁵⁰ ANDREW MORAVCSIK, *THE CHOICE FOR EUROPE. SOCIAL PURPOSE AND STATE POWER FROM MESSINA TO MAASTRICHT* (Cornell University Press 1998); Daniel Blake and Autumn Lockwood Payton, *Voting Rules in International Organizations: Reflections of Power or Facilitators of Cooperation?*, Paper presented at the ISA'S 49TH ANNUAL CONVENTION, San Francisco, CA (2008).

⁵¹ Yoram Z. Haftel & Alexander Thompson, *The Independence of International Organizations: Concepts and Applications*, 50 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 253-275 (2006).

⁵² Karen J. Alter, *Who Are the "Masters of the Treaty"? European Governments and the European Court of Justice*, 52 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 121-147 (1998).

⁵³ Held, op. cit.; Ngaire Woods & Amrika Narlikar, *Governance and the Limits of Accountability: The WTO, The IMF and the World Bank*, 53 INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE JOURNAL, 569-583 (2001); Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, *Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics*, 99 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 29-43 (2005).

that weaken democratic mechanisms confined to the national level.⁵⁴ To conclude, I expect the internationalization of governance to be causally connected to politicization in basically two ways. First, as a general process underlying politicization, societal actors are expected to become aware of international institutions and form supportive as well as critical attitudes the more these institutions affect their interests. Second, I expect the supranationalization of international institutions to foster legitimacy concerns that overlay the general gravity-of-power process. The following hypotheses capture these expectations.

H3: The internationalization of governance is itself a strong cause of (a) supportive and (b) dissenting politicization, given a diffuse gravity of power for societal demands and expectations (diffuse gravity-of-power hypothesis)

H4: Supranationalization fosters dissenting politicization in virtue of the legitimacy concerns it evokes (legitimacy concern hypothesis).

2.3. Party politics and politicization of internationalized governance

A number of important contributions on politicization and related issues focus on party politics, because political parties are expected to respond to and shape public opinion on globalization, economic policies, and international institutions. While classic voter theory⁵⁵ asserts that party elites seek policy positions that maximize votes, current literature converges on the description of parties as the more active political strategists who try to influence citizens' political agendas and attitudes⁵⁶ including the extent to which citizens are attentive to international politics and how they determine their preferences for given international institutions and policies.⁵⁷ Consequently, when Kriesi et al. found a remarkable isomorphism between parties' political preferences and those of citizens in six European countries, they took this as straightforward proof that

⁵⁴ Zürn, Binder, Ecker-Ehrhardt & Radtke, op. cit.

⁵⁵ e.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (Harper & Row 1957).

⁵⁶ e.g. IAN BUDGE & DENNIS FARLIE, EXPLAINING AND PREDICTING ELECTIONS: ISSUE EFFECTS AND PARTY STRATEGIES IN TWENTY-THREE DEMOCRACIES (Allen & Unwin 1983); BONNIE M. MEGUID, PARTY COMPETITION BETWEEN UNEQUALS: STRATEGIES AND ELECTORAL FORTUNES IN WESTERN EUROPE (Cambridge University Press 2008).

⁵⁷ e.g. Haas, op. cit.; SIMON HIX & CHRISTOPHER LORD, POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Macmillan 1997); Mair, op. cit.

political spaces are “pre-structured and mobilized by party politics.”⁵⁸ Empirical evidence indeed suggests that parties give the citizenry important cues for how to understand the complexities of globalization and how to interpret the internationalization of governance.⁵⁹ Either way, the research must account for varying strategic and ideological incentives for politicizing international institutions vis-à-vis similar degrees of globalization and political integration.

Extremist parties have been shown to politicize the power and policies of European institutions more so than centrist parties.⁶⁰ The theoretical literature points to centrist parties’ having had a longer history of governmental responsibility; thus, they became the main architects of today’s European institutions and have benefited from the so-called “permissive consensus” of a depoliticized electorate (which they would hope to maintain).⁶¹ Conversely, dissenting politicization may be more advantageous for marginal parties because “it reinforces a more general institutional skepticism that is normally directed towards domestic political structures.”⁶² A few studies have demonstrated that parties’ positioning on European integration is significantly related to traditional left–right polarity (expressed as an inverted U-curve): centrist parties tend to support European integration while extremist rightwing or leftwing parties tend to dissent.⁶³ I expect a similar mechanism to be operating as regards the politicization of international institutions in more general terms. While centrist parties are more likely to justify their country’s membership in international institutions, I expect extreme

⁵⁸ Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschieer & Frey, op. cit.: 323.

⁵⁹ Juan Díez Medrano and Michael Braun, *Cognition, Resources, and Institutions in the Explanation of Attitudes to Free Trade*, IBEI WORKING PAPER 2009/23, Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (2009).

⁶⁰ Paul Taggart, *A touchstone of dissent: Euroskepticism in contemporary Western European party systems*, 33 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, 363-388 (1998); Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks & Carole J. Wilson, *Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?*, 35 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, 965-989 (2002).

⁶¹ cf. Mair, op. cit.

⁶² Taggart, op. cit.: 373.

⁶³ e.g. Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, op. cit.; Van der Eijk & Franklin, op. cit.; Volkens, op. cit.; Hanspeter Kriesi, *The Role of European Integration in National Election Campaigns*, 8 EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS, 83-108 (2007).

parties to exploit opportunities to “set themselves apart from the ‘centre’ of politics” by contesting these institutions⁶⁴:

H5: Supportive politicization is stronger in the case of (a) centrist parties. Conversely, dissenting politicization is stronger in the case of (b) extremist parties.

Similarly, smaller parties are usually expected to be flexible and willing to pro-actively take up new issues like globalization and the internationalization of governance, in order to shift the comparative political balance in their favor. Conversely, larger parties may see incentives to keep such issues off the agenda in order to avoid internal party conflicts.⁶⁵ Thus internal cohesion may be an important factor, which constrains larger parties more than it does smaller ones, in relation to strategic positioning against international institutions. This leads to a further hypothesis on the relationship of size and dissenting politicization, namely,

H6: Dissenting politicization is stronger in the case of smaller parties.

Finally, the literature suggests that there are substantial differences between *left and right wing parties* in terms of how they address public demands and concerns related to the internationalization of governance. Given the long established discourse on internationalism on the left and a complementary record of nationalism on the right, leftist parties have been shown to be more willing to support international institutions than their right-wing counterparts, at least when extremism is controlled for.⁶⁶ Conversely, mainstream right-wing parties have been said to dissent more against regional integration than leftist parties, in the hopes of “closing off the electoral niche” for new right parties by exploiting nationalist concerns about internationalization.⁶⁷ In accord with these complementary expectations, I derive a final hypothesis on the role of

⁶⁴ Taggart, op. cit.: 384.

⁶⁵ Taggart, op. cit., Marco R. Steenbergen & David J. Scott, *Contesting Europe? The salience of European integration as a party issue*, in EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND POLITICAL CONFLICT, ed. Gary Marks & Marco R. Steenbergen (Cambridge University Press 2004), Meguid, op. cit.

⁶⁶ Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, op. cit.

⁶⁷ Kriesi, op. cit.: 88, Meguid, op. cit.

ideological positioning in shaping dissenting as well as supportive politicization of international institutions.

H7: Supportive politicization is stronger in the case of (a) leftist parties, while dissenting politicization is stronger in the case of (b) rightist parties.

3. Data

3.1. The dependent variables

To measure politicization, I use data gathered by the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) which has systematically coded the programmatic content of parties' election platforms.⁶⁸ According to the CMP analytical framework, party programs are important because they signal policy positions to the electorate to which politicians are bound if elected. Manifesto data has been criticized for a number of weaknesses, including its bias towards tactically important information and internal consensus, downplaying positions that are deemed electoral liabilities and internally contested.⁶⁹ However, the coverage and replicability of CMP data makes it an unrivaled first choice for my purposes, and important research has demonstrated the heuristic power of the data to shed light on domestic politicization and related issues.⁷⁰ Although CMP's focus on the saliency of policy goals might be detrimental for measuring party positions,⁷¹ it has an obvious advantage for studying politicization, especially when compared to alternative approaches that focus on claims.⁷² Recently published concerns about the reliability of the coding procedure have largely addressed the left–right scale as a primary tool of research, but this is generally irrelevant for this analysis.⁷³ The focus here is on 21 mature democracies of the so-called OECD world after 1945. For the analysis of party

⁶⁸ Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge & McDonald, *op. cit.*

⁶⁹ Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, Marco R. Steenbergen & Ryan Bakker, *Crossvalidating data on party positioning on European integration*, 26 ELECTORAL STUDIES, 23-38 (2007).

⁷⁰ Helen V. Milner & Benjamin Judkins, *Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization: Is There a Left-Right Divide on Trade Policy?*, 48 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, 95-120 (2004); Volkens, *op. cit.*; Netjes & Binnema, *op. cit.*; Burgoon, *op. cit.*; Haupt, *op. cit.*

⁷¹ Kenneth Benoit & Michael Laver, *Estimating party policy positions: Comparing expert surveys and hand-coded content analysis*, 26 ELECTORAL STUDIES, 90-107 (2007).

⁷² Koopmans, *op. cit.*

⁷³ Slava Mikhaylov, Michael Laver, and Kenneth Benoit, *Coder Reliability and Misclassification in the Human Coding of Party Manifestos*, Paper presented for the 66TH MPSA ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE, Chicago, IL (2008).

system politicization, those elections were omitted for which CMP's coverage of programs did not reach the critical level of two-thirds of the votes generated by covered programs (see the appendix for a complete list of elections and parties covered per country).

The basic coding unit of CMP is the quasi-sentence, defined as “a set of words containing, one and only one, political idea”.⁷⁴ My measures of politicization combine four categories of the CMP coding frame, which capture salience of internationalization of governance in terms of the percentage of quasi-sentences that party elites devote to this issue in a specific manifesto (“Internationalism: Positive” (per107), “European Integration: Positive” (per108), “Internationalism: Negative” (per109), “European Integration: Negative” (per110); see the appendix definition of categories).

Common knowledge holds that the absolute number of quasi-sentences is useless for statistical analysis because lengths of programs vary extensively. Therefore, analysts typically base their measurements on percentages of quasi-sentences (of various categories of the CMP coding scheme) given in the data set provided by CMP. However, descriptive statistics indicate that relevant measures (per107, per108, per109, per110) significantly deviate from normality and show a characteristic distribution of event-count data with many zeros (like the modal value) and a decreasing density with higher values. This is highly plausible, given the data-generating process that underlies manifestos in general and CMP coding in particular; but it suggests that analysis based on ordinary least squares (OLS) may be problematic. Using models for count data like Poisson (or its generalized version, viz., the negative binomial) to analyze skewed continuous data is also problematic, because such models assume that the data contain discrete numbers of events occurring in a given time span.⁷⁵ This problem can be solved, however, by recalculating absolute numbers of relevant quasi-sentences and applying count models with the total number of quasi-sentences per program as a measure of “exposure.” In so doing, the total number of quasi-sentences (TOTAL) qua exposure

⁷⁴ Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge & McDonald, op. cit.: II.3.

⁷⁵ Gary King, *Event Count Models for International Relations: Generalizations and Applications*, 33 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, 123-147 (1989); COLIN A. CAMERON & PRAVIN K. TRIVEDI, REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF COUNT DATA (Cambridge University Press 1998).

captures the varying space in a program that *ceteris paribus* is assumed to make the occurrence of quasi-sentences of a given category more or less likely.

Given this overall strategy for handling distributional concerns with the manifesto data, three related measures of politicization are derived using four categories of the CMP data set mentioned above. The first is POLITICIZATION, counting the absolute number of respective references in a given party manifesto; two additional measures split up POLITICIZATION according to supportive and dissenting references:

$$\text{OVERALL POLITICIZATION} = \text{Sum}(\text{per107}, \text{per108}, \text{per109}, \text{per110}) \times \text{TOTAL}$$

$$\text{SUPPORTIVE POLITICIZATION} = \text{Sum}(\text{per107}, \text{per108}) \times \text{TOTAL}$$

$$\text{DISSENTING POLITICIZATION} = \text{Sum}(\text{per109}, \text{per110}) \times \text{TOTAL}$$

3.2. The independent variables

I evaluate hypotheses concerning the effects of economic globalization (neoliberal push & backlash) by using trade data provided by Barbieri and colleagues from the Correlates of War Project (COW Trade Data Set V2.01).⁷⁶ TRADE equals the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) (taken from International Financial Statistics, IFS). The impact of cultural globalization is measured in terms of migration flows. MIGRATION is the annual change in the number of migrants as a percentage of population, according to the IFS. To account for different levels of social security, WELFARE is computed using data on public social expenditures as a percentage of GDP, as provided by the OECD Social Expenditure Database.

Hypotheses on institutional gravity are tested using information about a country's membership in international governmental organizations. Based on data collected by Pevehouse and colleagues from the Correlates of War Project (COW IGO Data Set Version 2.1.), the variable, IGO, counts the absolute number of organizations that a given country is a full member of, in a given year.⁷⁷ While COW data is coded as if

⁷⁶ Katherine Barbieri, Omar Keshk, & Brian M. Collins, *Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook*, Version 2.01, <http://correlatesofwar.org>, (2008).

⁷⁷ Jon Pevehouse, Timothy Nordstrom & Kevin Warnke, *The Correlates of War 2 International Governmental Organizations Data Version 2.0*, 21 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND PEACE SCIENCE, 101-119 (2004).

membership in the European Economic Community, European Coal and Steel Community, and Euratom ended in 1992, I recoded these memberships as continuing, to compensate for a factual deepening of European integration with the European Union becoming operative in 1993. Measuring supranationalization is more difficult because recent trends towards more autonomous and authoritative procedures⁷⁸ are a comparatively new phenomenon that are not yet sufficiently covered by the manifesto data. However, as an early (and yet unrivaled) exemplar of supranationalization, I take membership in the EU (starting in 1993) to be an acceptable test for whether legitimacy concerns are of any explanatory power (e.g., controlling for the number of IGO memberships in general). Note, that all variables on economic globalization and institutional membership are country specific and differ from election to election (although they remain constant for parties in a given election). These variables are lagged by one year to account for possible endogeneity.

Finally, a set of party-specific variables are introduced to capture party-specific position in the ideological space. The first is *RIGHTISM* for which I use an adapted version of the left–right measure suggested by CMP, leaving the indicator for negative internationalism (*per107*) out of the formula. For *RIGHTISM* ranging (in principle) from –100 (maximal leftism) to 100 (maximal rightism) the second measure, *EXTREMISM*, is computed by simply taken the absolute value of *RIGHTISM*. The third party-specific measure introduced is *VOTESHARE*, the percentage of votes received in an election.

The models address temporal dependence concerns for manifestos of the same party by introducing lagged dependent variables (delayed by one election). Country-specific intercepts are included to control for unobserved, time invariant characteristics of societies like political culture or domestic institutions.⁷⁹ Test statistics indicate that similar concerns with respect to different party families are unfounded (Wald tests for party-family-specific intercepts jointly equal zero significance < .001 for all models presented in the paper). A variable containing the year of the respective election is

⁷⁸ e.g., Cooper, Hawkins, Jacoby & Nielson, op. cit.; Zürn, Binder, Ecker-Ehrhardt & Radtke, op. cit.

⁷⁹ PAUL D. ALLISON, *FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSION MODELS* (Sage 2009).

introduced to account for possible trend effects. Finally, the absolute number, TOTAL, of quasi-sentences of the given manifesto is used as an exposure variable whose effect is restricted to unity to allow estimation of parameters by maximum likelihood.⁸⁰ The estimated models are negative binomial—a generalized version of Poisson regression, which allows for overdispersion vis-à-vis the dependent variable (i.e., counts of quasi-sentences indicating politicization). The model in its basic form (excluding interactions) can be written thus:

$$\begin{aligned}
 POLITICIZATION_{pt} = & \ [exp \ (\beta_0 \ + \ \beta_1 \ \%POLITICIZATION_{pt-1} \\
 & \ + \ \beta_2 TRADE_{ct-1'} + \ \beta_3 MIGRATION_{ct-1'} + \ \beta_4 IGO_{ct-1'} + \ \beta_5 EU_{ct-1'} \\
 & \ + \ \beta_6 RIGHTISM_{pt} + \ \beta_7 EXTREMISM_{pt} + \ \beta_8 VOTESHARE_{pt} \\
 & \ + \ \beta_9 \ lnGDP_{ct-1'} \ + \ \beta_{10} \ YEAR_{ct} \\
 & \ + \ u_c)] \times TOTAL
 \end{aligned}$$

The notation used captures the different lags and levels of analysis: $t-1$ denotes a lag by one election and $t-1'$ refers to the one-year lag in other explanatory variables; p denotes party-specific variables and c refers to country specific components of the equation. The lagged dependent variable enters the right side of the equation as a percentage of TOTAL, i.e., the absolute number of quasi-sentences, in order to control for different lengths of manifestos. The parameter, uc , denotes the set of country-specific constants; it follows fixed-effects logic and it is implemented by adding dummy variables.⁸¹ The model is nonlinear in that the effect of a change in one of the explanatory variables on the right-hand side depends on all of the values of the other variables. However the equation entails a linear combination of variables that allows for the introduction of interaction terms.⁸²

⁸⁰ SCOTT J. LONG & JEREMY FREESE, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL DEPENDENT VARIABLES USING STATA (Stata Press 2006).

⁸¹ cf. Allison, op. cit., chapter 4.

⁸² Long & Freese, op. cit.

4. Analysis

Tables 1 and 2 present the results for alternative models on *overall, supportive, and dissenting politicization of party manifestos*. All models control for different lengths of party manifestos by including TOTAL as an exposure variable whose effect is not estimated but constrained to 1, and therefore does not appear in the tables. The estimates for the overdispersion parameter, α , are all significantly larger than 0, indicating that the observed variance exceeds a simple Poisson in all models presented in tables 1 and 2. Thus the specification as negative binomial is preferable. Note that country-specific intercepts are not reported because they do not yield substantive interpretations of interest in terms of my hypotheses. Instead, additional information is given on percentage changes in the expected politicization for a standard deviation change in explanatory variables, in order to assess and compare derived estimates in terms of substantive impact of covariates.

4.1. Overall politicization

I begin with results on *overall politicization* to test for effects expected to be symmetrical over subtypes of supporting or dissenting politicization (table 1). The estimated coefficients for TRADE strongly disconfirm expectations of a neoliberal backlash (H1), according to which economic globalization ought to have a substantial and positive effect on politicization. This initial result is surprising, given the dominance of claims to the contrary in the literature. However, results on cultural globalization in terms of MIGRATION are much more in line with expectations, as the effect of MIGRATION on overall politicization is positive and significant. The transformation of coefficients indicates that the expected number of quasi-sentences indicating overall politicization increases by about 9 percent for a standard deviation increase in observed net migration.

Table 1: Covariates of Overall Politicization of Party Manifestos

Model	I	II	III	IV	
	coeff. (s.e.)	coeff. (s.e.)	coeff. (s.e.)	coeff. (s.e.)	%StdX
TRADE	-0.000 (0.003)		-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-3.3%
MIGRATION	0.305* (0.128)		0.345** (0.126)	0.323* (0.126)	9.0%
IGO		0.018*** (0.003)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.020*** (0.005)	51.0%
EU				0.144 (0.089)	5.4%
EXTREMISM	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.006** (0.002)	-8.7%
VOTESHARE	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-3.1%
RIGHTISM	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-10.3%
ln GDP	-0.136 (0.085)	-0.046 (0.076)	-0.134 (0.084)	-0.076 (0.089)	-12.8%
YEAR	0.019* (0.008)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.011 (0.010)	-11.6%
lagged DV	0.026*** (0.006)	0.030*** (0.006)	0.023*** (0.006)	0.023*** (0.006)	11.6%
χ^2	349.508***	429.919***	435.697***	446.276***	
A	0.498***	0.506***	0.489***	0.487***	
N	1578	1901	1578	1578	

Note: Negative binomial regression with exposure variable; robust standard errors clustered over parties given in parenthesis; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

%StdX = percent change in expected N of quasi-sentences (indicating politicization) for a standard deviation increase in the explanatory variable; computed using results of full model IV, standard deviations given in the appendix

Similarly, the overall effect of IGO is positive and significant, and therefore strongly confirms expectations (H4). The estimated coefficient in model IV relates to a remarkable 51-percent increase in expected overall politicization for an additional standard deviation in IGO membership of the respective country. This equals a 2-percent increase in politicization for every additional IGO a political party's country is a member of. Thus there is strong empirical evidence supporting the gravity-of-power hypothesis, even when controlling for EU membership. Note that estimated differences between manifestos inside and outside the EU are substantial, but they fail to reach an acceptable level of significance. I take this as unproblematic with respect to the legitimacy concern hypothesis (H4), because it focuses on dissenting politicization and is therefore indeterminate with respect to the class concept of overall politicization. The same holds for party-specific explanations of manifesto politicization, because the formulated expectations are explicitly asymmetrical over supportive and dissenting politicization.

4.2. Distinguishing supportive and dissenting politicization

Turning to a more fine grained view on different types of politicization indeed reveals the asymmetric quality of some relationships under debate (table 2). While results for TRADE again strongly disconfirm the notion of a neoliberal push and backlash (H1), estimated coefficients for MIGRATION vary significantly over subtypes of politicization. Regarding a cosmopolitan push (H2a), estimates are positive but fail to reach a minimal level of significance in the models on supportive politicization (V and VII). However, we see a strong and positive effect of MIGRATION on dissenting politicization, accounting for a 46-percent increase in the expected number of relevant quasi-sentences (indicating this type of politicization) per standard deviation increase in net migration. Therefore, although the cosmopolitan push hypothesis has to be rejected, expectations concerning a national backlash (H2b) are strongly supported by the manifesto data. Similarly, some estimates for institutional factors vary over subtypes, indicating the importance of differentiating between supportive and dissenting acts of politicization. If we test for gravity of power, IGO-variable coefficients strongly match expectations that predict a positive impact of international institutional membership on supportive as well as

dissenting politicization (H3). According to model VII, a standard deviation increase in IGO memberships relates *ceteris paribus* to a remarkable 53-percent increase in expected supportive politicization. In model X on dissenting politicization, the estimated coefficient points to a comparable impact of about 65 percent per standard deviation. However, regarding legitimacy concerns fueled by supranationalization, we find noticeable differences in line with expectations. Supportive politicization did not vary significantly among European member states with the founding of the EU—that is after 1993—but dissent did. While estimates for the EU dummy variable are insignificant in models VI and VII, those for models IX and X are significant: dissenting politicization increases by 25 percent per standard deviation increase, which corresponds to a unit increase for the respective dummy variable of about 83 percent. Controlling for other factors by means of multivariate statistics, these results suggest that the Maastricht Treaty accounts for almost doubling the amount of dissenting quasi-sentences in party manifestos. This outcome matches expectations according to the legitimacy concern hypothesis (H4), which predicts that supranationalization does not lead to (additional) support, but rather dissent (given the democratic deficit vis-à-vis procedures and procedural rules).

Table 2: Covariates of Supportive and Dissenting Politicization

Model	Supportive Politicization				Dissenting Politicization			
	V	VI	VII	%StdX	VIII	IX	X	%StdX
	coeff. (s.e.)	coeff. (s.e.)	coeff. (s.e.)		coeff. (s.e.)	coeff. (s.e.)	coeff. (s.e.)	
TRADE	-0.002 (0.003)		-0.002 (0.003)	-6.6%	0.000 (0.009)		-0.003 (0.009)	-8.5%
MIGRATION	0.188 (0.138)		0.216 (0.137)	6.0%	1.525*** (0.368)		1.423*** (0.375)	46.4%
IGO		0.016*** (0.004)	0.020*** (0.006)	53.3%		0.025* (0.010)	0.024* (0.012)	64.9%
EU		0.014 (0.101)	0.074 (0.094)	2.8%		0.557** (0.215)	0.607** (0.226)	24.9%
EXTREMISM	-0.012*** (0.002)	-0.010*** (0.002)	-0.012*** (0.002)	-15.4%	0.012* (0.005)	0.011* (0.005)	0.012* (0.006)	19.5%
VOTESHARE	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	2.0%	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.030*** (0.006)	-0.028*** (0.006)	-33.9%
RIGHTISM	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.008*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)	-13.8%	0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.9%
lnGDP	-0.118 (0.091)	-0.028 (0.088)	-0.085 (0.095)	-14.1%	-0.298 (0.229)	0.088 (0.236)	-0.047 (0.230)	-8.1%
YEAR	0.019* (0.009)	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.007 (0.011)	-8.3%	0.036 (0.022)	-0.030 (0.021)	-0.023 (0.024)	-23.3%
%DISS.POL.	-0.019* (0.008)	-0.020* (0.008)	-0.020* (0.009)	-5.2%				
%SUPP.POL.					-0.023 (0.025)	-0.030 (0.020)	-0.032 (0.023)	-12.6%
lagged DV	0.037*** (0.007)	0.038*** (0.007)	0.034*** (0.007)	15.3%	0.053* (0.027)	0.069** (0.024)	0.052 (0.027)	14.6%
χ^2	379.41***	541.59***	438.47***		261.49***	267.30***	296.82***	
A	0.548***	0.567***	0.538***		3.650***	3.672***	3.578***	
N	1578	1901	1578		1578	1901	1578	

Note: Negative binomial regression with exposure variable; robust standard errors clustered over parties given in parenthesis; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

%StdX = percent change in expected N of quasi-sentences (indicating politicization) for a standard deviation increase in the explanatory variable; computed using results of full model IV, standard deviations given in the appendix

Finally, party-specific variables do match expectations regarding an asymmetric process of politicization. Estimates for RIGHTISM suggest that supportive politicization of manifestos is significantly lower for rightist parties than it is for their leftist competitors. Similar estimates are derived for EXTREMISM, but not for VOTESHARE, which is in line with expectations. Set in perspective, the estimated coefficients in model VII indicate that a standard deviation increase in VOTESHARE relates to a marginal increase in expected supportive politicization of not more than 2 percent, while the respective impact of EXTREMISM and RIGHTISM is about 14 and 15 percent respectively (both in terms of decreasing supportive politicization). Turning to models on dissent, smaller and/or more extreme parties show higher levels of dissenting politicization than more centrist and/or larger ones. A standard deviation decrease in VOTESHARE here relates to an increase of a remarkable 34 percent in dissenting politicization; the respective effect of EXREMISM (in terms of decreasing dissent) is about 20 percent. However, the results indicate no significant effect of party ideology on dissent.

Taken together, the results show some degree of asymmetric complementarities regarding party-specific variables, as could be anticipated, given the existing literature on regional integration. To recall, centrist parties are expected to dissent less and support more (H5) because of their past prominent role as the architects of international institutions, while extreme parties at the fringes of the ideological space are more likely to contest mainstream projects pursued by centrist parties.⁸³ Controlling for alternative factors like ideology and size, results point to a significant fit between my conjecture and the empirical reality of party politics which we observe in electoral manifestos. This holds even if we extend the scope to include other international organizations and the OECD world. Similarly and as expected, arguments on the relevance of size for constraints on strategic action find strong support regarding dissent. As expected, larger political parties appear to focus on existing party cleavages and internal consensus, while smaller ones show more willingness to exploit strategic opportunities to attract the votes of citizens disappointed with international institutions'

⁸³ cf. Taggart, *op. cit.*

policies or procedures. However, while the ideological divide between leftist internationalism and rightist nationalism explains a more or less supportive stance on the internationalization of governance, it does not explain variation in the willingness to dissent. This raises doubts whether classic party ideology is as helpful in understanding domestic resistance as current literature tends to suggest.⁸⁴

Finally, concerning the robustness of the estimates, the jackknife procedure was used to determine whether the results remain robust if individual countries are omitted. Substantive results are almost identical. Using negative binomial regression with exposure could raise doubts about the extent to which the estimates are consistent with those derived using more familiar and more frequently applied techniques in manifesto data analysis. As the most plausible alternative, I used OLS regression with percentages of supportive or dissenting quasi-sentences to see if the results were robust. To account for the highly skewed distribution of these percentages, I transformed them using the square root of the original values. All estimated coefficients had the same sign compared to presented results using negative binomial regression. The analysis of residuals, however, reveals the familiar problems that OLS has coping with data that is non-normal and constrained to non-negative values.⁸⁵ I therefore take the negative binomial models to be more appropriate for reasons outlined earlier.

5. Conclusion

This paper analyzed the determinants of international institutions' politicization, that is the salience and contestedness of international institutions for a wide—or widening—array of societal actors. Data derived from the Comparative Manifesto Project was used to test how structural variables like economic interdependence, migration, and membership in IGOs perform in a multivariate setting that accounts for varying strategic and ideological attributes of the most influential domestic actors, namely, political parties. The analysis was comprehensive with respect to electoral politics in highly industrialized countries, including the election manifestos from 22 OECD

⁸⁴ Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschieer & Frey, *op. cit.*; Hooghe & Marks, *op. cit.*

⁸⁵ King, *op. cit.*

countries since 1945. Summing up the results, we see that correlates of manifesto politicization strongly diverge between supportive and dissenting components. In terms of theorizing politicization, taking supportive and dissenting variants separately is a plausible and highly promising approach.

Surprisingly, the evidence presented yielded only mixed support for the commonplace intuition that globalization is the main cause of politicization. Comparing party manifestos over different degrees of economic interdependence suggests that intensified competition between the winners and losers of globalization does not relate directly to either a supportive or a dissenting position of political party. Only in terms of migration do we find empirical support for the globalization mechanism playing an important role in facilitating politicization.

The main outcome of the analysis is that institutional approaches fare better in explaining supportive as well as dissenting politicization. While the results suggest that gravity of power attracts domestic interests, a significant amount of dissent seems also to be driven by legitimacy concerns. This unequivocally supports neofunctionalists as well as other critics who have expressed strong reservations that political authority has shifted to the international level because of a societal legitimacy deficit. However, there is probably some good news for political cosmopolitans: If the gravity of power exerted by international institutions leads mainly to supportive responses by domestic constituencies, then widespread hopes for the emergence of a cosmopolitan citizenry may well be justified on empirical grounds, at least in the long run.⁸⁶

Finally, the results suggest that international institutions as structural variables set the stage for parties to “make something out of” the internationalization of governance. Evidence indicates that ideological positions as well as size play a significant role in how parties politicize international institutions. Largely in line with existing research on the European case, small and peripheral parties are more likely to seize opportunities to politicize international institutions in terms of dissent. Leftist internationalism has also been shown to be significant. Taken together, the results tend to propel recent debates about party strategies over globalization. Further, what is shown is that we cannot stop

⁸⁶ Ecker-Ehrhardt, *op. cit.*

analytically at national borders and focus on structural variables alone, in order to understand the process of politicization; we must instead open up the “black box” of domestic politics in a theoretically informed way to adequately explain world politics in times of reflexive modernization.⁸⁷

Thus a first cut on party manifestos has already widened our understanding of the domestic politicization of international institutions in OECD countries. To be sure, future research should extend the theoretical as well as the empirical scope by introducing additional explanations and indicators, and testing the generalizability of explanations to a range beyond the OECD world. However, because political parties may play no roles at all or different ones in political settings beyond the global north, the “traveling capacity”⁸⁸ of familiar concepts like “electoral competition” or “political party” is presumably too little to permit comprehensive theorizing with a global reach. Parties are important, but they are just one form of societal organization. Future research will therefore have to go further than the Western notion of “party politics,” taking into account functionally equivalent non-Western ways to politicize international institutions within the domestic realm.

⁸⁷ Zürn, *op. cit.*

⁸⁸ Giovanni Sartori, *Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics*, 64 *AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW*, 1033-1053 (1970).

Appendix**A.1 Sample description: party manifestos per election and country**

Country	Elections				Manifestos					
	Total N in sample	Earliest sample	in	Latest sample	Total N in sample	Min. N per election	Max. N per election	in	in	in
Australia	23	28-Sep-1946		10-Nov-2001	83	3	4			
Austria	17	9-Oct-1949		24-Nov-2002	60	3	5			
Belgium	19	17-Feb-1946		18-May-2003	146	3	12			
Canada	18	11-Jun-1945		27-Nov-2000	71	3	5			
Denmark	24	30-Oct-1945		8-Feb-2005	210	6	11			
Finland	17	18-Mar-1945		16-Mar-2003	129	6	9			
France	16	10-Nov-1946		10-Jun-2007	96	5	7			
Germany	16	14-Aug-1949		18-Sep-2005	71	3	10			
Great Britain	17	5-Jul-1945		5-May-2005	65	3	8			
Iceland	17	30-Jun-1946		8-May-1999	80	4	6			
Ireland	17	4-Feb-1948		17-May-2002	80	3	7			
Israel	15	25-Jan-1949		17-May-1999	146	6	15			
Italy	15	2-Jun-1946		13-May-2001	133	5	14			
Japan	14	20-Nov-1960		25-Jun-2000	83	4	8			
Luxembourg	13	21-Oct-1945		13-Jun-1999	58	4	7			
Mexico	15	1-Jul-1946		2-Jul-2000	51	2	6			
Netherlands	18	17-May-1946		22-Jan-2003	108	5	9			
New Zealand	20	27-Nov-1946		27-Jul-2002	67	2	7			
Norway	15	8-Oct-1945		10-Sep-2001	99	6	8			
Sweden	18	19-Sep-1948		15-Sep-2002	101	5	8			
Switzerland	15	26-Oct-1947		19-Oct-2003	114	5	12			
United States	15	2-Nov-1948		2-Nov-2004	32	2	4			
Total	374				2083					

A.2 Items used to construct measures of party manifesto politicization

Coding instructions taken from the Manifesto Code Book are as follows:⁸⁹

Internationalism: Positive (per107): Need for international cooperation; cooperation with countries with which the manifesto country has no special relationship (e.g., former colonies); need for aid to developing countries; need for world planning of resources; need for international courts; support for any international goal or world state; support for the UN.

European Integration: Positive (per108): Favorable mentions of the European Community in general; desirability of expanding the European Community and/or of increasing its competence; desirability of the manifesto country joining (or remaining a member).

Internationalism: Negative (per109): Favorable mentions of national independence and sovereignty as opposed to internationalism; otherwise coded as per107, but negative.

European Integration: Negative (per110): Hostile mentions of the European Community; opposition to specific European policies that are preferred by European authorities; otherwise as per108, but negative.

⁸⁹ Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge & McDonald, op. cit..

A.3 Variable descriptives

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
TOTAL to	2083	360.43	477.22	8	3633
POLITICIZATION to	2083	20.27	42.75	0	767
SUPPORT to	2083	17.45	35.87	0	362
DISSENT to	2083	2.83	17.40	0	701
%POLITICIZATION t-1	2061	4.55	4.49	0	48.51
%SUPPORT t-1	2083	3.70	3.91	0	37.50
%DISSENT t-1	2083	0.86	2.45	0	44.34
TRADE t-1'	1879	52.22	28.41	6.58	193.15
MIGRATION t-1'	1578	0.08	0.27	-1.25	0.91
WELFARE t-1'	1283	18.81	6.65	1.90	34.86
IGO t-1'	2083	68.33	24.53	1	129
EU t-1'	2083	0.12	0.33	0	1
RIGHTISM t-1	2083	0.47	24.30	-74.30	85.00
EXTREMISM t-1	2083	19.16	14.93	0	85.00
VOTESHARE t-1	2083	17.06	15.12	0	90.65
lnGDP t-1'	1903	11.00	2.01	5.25	16.21
YEAR t-0	2083	1976.68	16.82	1945	2007

t-1 denotes a lag by one election, t-1' refers to a one year lag