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[*] Court of Justice of the EC, L - 2925 Luxemburg. Privatdozent, Humboldt-Universität at Berlin; Adjunct Associate Professor of International Law, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. This article was written during my time as EU Fellow at the Fletcher School in 1994/1995. I am particularly grateful to the Court of Justice of the European Communities for having me offered this marvellous opportunity. - I am indebted to helpful comments from Ingrid Persaud, Joel Trachtmann and the Seminar-Workshop on Advanced Issues in Law and Policy of European Integration at Harvard University, in particular Joseph Weiler. Helen Keller gave me important advice on Swiss law. All errors of fact and weaknesses of opinion are my own.
[1] Cf, e.g., D.Z. Cass,'The Word That Saved Maastricht? The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Division of Powers within the European Community', CMLRev (1992) 1107.
[2] Omitted from Art 130r ECT as redrafted by the Maastricht Treaty.
[3] Special applications of the subsidiarity principle can be seen in the provisions of Articles K 3 (2) (b) of the Maastricht Treaty, 118a, 126-129a, 130 and 130g ECT and Art 2 of the Agreement on social policy; cf S. Langer,'Subsidiarität und Anerkennungsprinzip', 8 Zeitschrift für Gesetzgebung 193 (1993) 194. The Conclusions of the Presidency on Subsidiarity, adopted at the Edinburgh European Council of 11-12 Dec. 1992, Annex I to Part A, EC Bull (12-1992) 9, 13 (I.15, n3) quote Articles 118a, 126-129b and 130g ECT and Art 2 of the Agreement on social policy as "reflecting the idea of subsidiarity". K. Lenaerts and P. van Ypersele,'Le principe de subsidiarité et son contexte: étude de l'article 3 B du Traité CE', 30 CDE 3 (1994) 10, consider Art F (1) of the Maastricht Treaty an expression of the subsidiarity principle.
[4] Cf the Conclusions of the Presidency (supra n3) at 14 (I.4, 3rd indent) and Stefan Ulrich Pieper, Subsidiarität. Ein Beitrag zur Begrenzung der Gemeinschaftskompetenzen (Carl Heymanns Verlag Köln e.a. 1994) 300; G.A. Bermann,'Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States', 94 Columbia Law Review 331 (1994) 368 et seq.
[5] As the title of the article by Bermann (supra n4) correctly indicates.
[6] A similar suspicion is expressed by W. Möschel,'Zum Subsidiaritätsprinzip im Vertrag von Maastricht', NJW (1993) 3025, 3027; F. Dehousse,'La subsidiarité, fondement constitutionel ou paravent politique de l'Union européenne?' in Liber amicorum Prof. em. E. Krings, (E. Story-Scientia Brussel 1991) 51 et seq. Bermann (supra n4) 324, claims that "while the rhetoric of subsidiarity is unprecedented in the Community, the practice of subsidiarity is not". And cf Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Faust, The First Part of the Tragedy (W. Kaufmann, transl.) (Doubleday, Garden City NY 1961) line 1995 et seq: "Denn eben, wo Begriffe fehlen, da stellt ein Wort zur rechten Zeit sich ein" (For just where no ideas are The proper word is never far).
[7] Cf Goethe, ibid, line 1993: "doch ein Begriff muß bei dem Worte sein" (Yet some idea there must be).
[8] Implying that the interpreter, i.e. the individual academic or professional lawyer or judge, is wiser than the legislature.
[9] On which cf, e.g., H.J. Powell,'The Original Understanding of Original Intent', 98 HarvLR 885 (1985); Ch.A. Lofgren,'The Original Understanding of Original Intent?', 5 Constitutional Commentary 77 (1988). For one practical application of the theory cf Justice Frankfurter, Memorandum for the Conference in the case Brown v. Board of Education, n.d., Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School: "... indicates that the legislative history of the [Fourteenth] Amendment is, in a word, inconclusive". And cf Laurence H. Tribe/ Michael C. Dorf, On Reading the Constitution (Harvard University Press Cambridge 1991) 10 et seq; Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (The Belknap Press Cambridge 1986) 359 et seq.
[10] On the interpretation of Community law cf, e.g., M. Zuleeg, in: Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag (H. v. d. Groeben/ J. Thiesing/ C.-D. Ehlermann, eds) 4th ed (Nomos Baden-Baden 1991) Art 1, para 30 et seq; P.R. Dubinsky,'The Essential Function of Federal Courts: The European Union and the United States Compared', 42 AJCL 295 (1994) 321 et seq.
[11] D. Merten,'Subsidiarität als Verfassungsprinzip', in Die Subsidiarität Europas (D. Merten, ed; Duncker & Humblot Berlin 1993) 77, 80. Lord Mackenzie Stuart,'Subsidiarity A Busted Flush?', in Constitutional Adjudication in European Community and National Law, Essays for the Hon. Mr. Justice T. F. O'Higgins (D. Curtin/ D. O'Keeffe, eds; Butterworth (Ireland) Dublin 1992) 19, 24: "are intended as a definition, although this is not clear".
[12] Lord Mackenzie Stuart,'A Formula for Failure', The Times, Dec. 11, 1992, described the chosen formula as "gobbledygook", and, supra n11, as "ruin upon ruin, rout on rout, confusion worse confounded".
[13] It has rightly been pointed out that this definition encompasses two opposing ideas, the "necessity" test of subsidiarity and its "effectiveness" test. Cf Mackenzie Stuart (supra n11) 21 et seq and at 24; T. Stein,'Subsidiarität als Rechtsprinzip?', in Die Subsidiarität Europas (supra n11) 23, 29 et seq; H.D. Jarass,'EG-Kompetenzen und das Prinzip der Subsidiarität nach Schaffung der Europäischen Union', 21 EuGRZ 209 (1994) 210. According to J.A. Frowein,'Konkurrierende Zuständigkeit und Subsidiarität. Zur Kompetenzverteilung in bündischen Systemen', in Wege und Verfahren des Verfassungslebens. Festschrift für Peter Lerche zum 65. Geburtstag (P. Badura/ R. Scholz, eds; Beck München 1993) 401, the tension between the "not sufficiently" and the "better" is not easily resolved. However, the effectiveness test does only apply once the necessity test has been passed; this follows from the word "therefore" in Art 3b (2); cf Stein, ibid, 31; Merten (supra n11) 80 et seq; H.-J. Lambers,'Subsidiarität in Europa Allheilmittel oder juristische Leerformel?', 28 EuR 229 (1993) 235 et seq. Similarly, Jarass, ibid, 211.
[14] On this relationship, the Encyclica'Quadrogesimo anno', 23 Acta Apostolicae Sedis 177 (1931) is routinely quoted.
[15] According to Lambers (supra n13) 232, this is, at most, a political principle.
[16] In this sense, and of particular interest, are the Conclusions of the Presidency (supra n3) 13 et seq (I.15).
[17] A.G. Toth,'Is Subsidiarity Justiciable?', 19 ELRev 268 (1994) 278, in relation to Art 3 b (2) ECT.
[18] And, of course, within its exclusive competences. On the scope of Community competences, cf infra text after n195.
[19] On which cf infra sub IV C 2.
[20] In this sense also the Conclusions of the Presidency (supra n3) at 13 (I.15) and Jarass (supra n13) 213; Lambers (supra n13) 232. G. Strozzi,'Le principe de subsidiarité dans la perspective de l'intégration européenne: une énigme et beaucoup d'attentes', 30 RTDE 373 (1994) 378, 380 et seq. Lenaerts and Ypersele (supra n3) 10 et seq, try to distinguish between "competences" and "powers" of the Community, but agree that it is only the exercise of powers which is limited by Art 3b (2) ECT. Contrariwise, Merten (supra n11) 81, claims that the Community competences themselves are restricted by Art 3b (2). This view does not take into account that Art 3b (2) only applies when the Community has a concurrent competence.
[21] In this sense also Jarass (supra n13) 213; Strozzi (supra n20) 380 et seq.
[22] German Federal Constitutional Court, 89 BVerfGE 155 (1993) 211; English translation in CMLR (1994) 57, 106 (para 103); but cf Toth (supra n17) 278.
[23] A.G. Toth,'The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty', CMLRev (1992) 1079, 1091 et seq.
[24] Lambers (supra n13) 241; but cf Toth (supra n17) 275.
[25] Possible differences as to Community obligations to legislate are justiciable under Art 175 (3) ECT; cf, e.g., Case 13/83 Parliament v Council [1985] ECR 1513.
[26] J.H.H. Weiler,'The Transformation of Europe', 100 Yale Law Journal 2403 (1991) 2410 et seq, basing his analysis on A. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States (1970).
[27] J.P. Jacqué, 'La subsidiarité en droit communautaire', in The principle of Subsidiarity (FIDE XVIe Congrès, ed; Rome 1994) 7, 17 et seq.
[28] Ventilated by Weiler (supra n26) 2465.
[29] Case C-6/90 and 9/90, Francovich and Bonifaci [1991] ECR I-5403, 5414.
[30] Cf text supra after n13 et seq. P. Häberle, 'Das Prinzip der Subsidiarität aus der Sicht der vergleichenden Verfassungslehre', 119 AöR 169 (1994) 177, gives two examples of Austrian Land constitutions providing for the subsidiarity principle in the relationship between state and society.
[31] Cf Häberle (supra n30); english summary at 206; Cass (supra n1) 1108, for Australia. But cf n117 infra.
[32] Lenaerts and Ypersele (supra n3) 8 et seq, consider the second penultimate recital of the preamble of the Maastricht Treaty as manifestation of one function of the subsidiarity principle, i.e. "présider à la répartition constitutionelle des compétences". Similarly, Lambers (supra n13) 231 et seq, claims exactly the aspect mentioned in the text for the definiton of new Community competences by the Maastricht Treaty. But cf Möschel (supra n6) 3027: massive extension of potential fields of Community action in clear contradiction to the subsidiarity principle. And cf Bermann (supra n4) 347 et seq.
[33] Cf Häberle (supra n30) 186-189. The question "Dans votre pays, applique-t-on un principe de subsidiarité? En cas de réponse affirmative, quelle est sa conception?" was put to the reporters to the 16th Congress of the FIDE; cf FIDE (supra n27) 9. The following answers are in point: for Germany, R. v. Borries, 'Das Subsidiaritätsprinzip im Recht der Europäischen Union', 41, 66 et seq; for Belgium, F. Delpérée, 'Existe-t-il un principe belge de subsidiarité?', 97, 101 et seq; for the UK, N. Emiliou,'The Principle of Subsidiarity', 113, 130 et seq; for Spain, D.J. Liñàn Nogueras,'Rapport sur la subsidiarité', 183, 199 et seq; for Finland, P. Aalto/ K. Pimiä, 'The Principle of Subsidiarity', 209, 211 et seq; for France, J.C. Fourgoux'Le principe de subsidiarité', 237, 246 et seq; for Greece, E.R. Saphekidou,'The Principle of Subsidiarity', 253, 254 et seq; for Italy, P. Caretti,'Il principio di sussidiarietà e i suoi riflessi sul piano dell' ordinamento comunitario e sul piano dell' ordinamento nazionale, con particolare riferimento alle autonomie regionali', 293, 320 et seq; for the Netherlands, L.F.M. Besselink/ H.S.J. Albers/ W.T. Eijsbouts,'Subsidiarity in Non-Federal Contexts: The Netherlands and the European Union', 365, 373 et seq; for Portugal, C. Botelho Moniz/ P. Moura Pinheiro,'Le principe de subsidiarité', 415, 429 et seq; and for Switzerland, A. Epiney,'La subsidiarité: principe et conception en Suisse et dans la CE', 451, passim. Denmark and Luxembourg do not know the subsidiarity principle in their national law. J. Isensee, § 98: Idee und Gestalt des Föderalismus im Grundgesetz', in: 4 Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (J. Isensee/ P. Kirchhof, eds; C.F. Müller Heidelberg 1990) 517, 617 (para 175) relies on the subsidiarity principle to justify the Länder's power to create, among themselves, "common institutions" to fulfill (supra n3) 46 et seq.
[34] According to the new Art 23 (1) (1) BL, Germany participates in the development of a European Union based, among other things, on the subsidiarity principle. Cf Merten (supra n11) 83 et seq. Internal subsidiarity, however, is not provided for.
[35] Reinhard Hendler, Selbstverwaltung als Ordnungsprinzip. Zur politischen Willensbildung und Entscheidung im demokratischen Verfassungsstaat der Industriegesellschaft (Carl Heymanns Verlag Köln e.a. 1984) 343.
[36] Cf, e.g., Hans D. Jarass/ Bodo Pieroth, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Kommentar 2nd ed (Beck München 1992) who mention the subsidiarity principle in the index only referring to questions of local autonomy.
[37] Cf, e.g., Merten (supra n11) 93 et seq; Pieper (supra n4) 118 et seq; V. Constantinesco, 'Who's Afraid of Subsidiarity?', 12 YEL 33 (1992) 38 et seq; N. Emiliou,'Subsidiarity: An Effective Barrier Against `the Enterprises of Ambition'?', 17 ELRev 383 (1992) 388 et seq; R. Hofmann,'Il principio di sussidiarietà. L' attuale significato nel diritto costituzionale tedesco ed il possibile ruolo nell' ordinamento dell' Unione Europea', 3 Rivista Italiana di Diritto Pubblico Comunitario (RIDPC) 23 (1993) 24 et seq.
[38] Isensee (supra n33) 652 (para 242) looks at the subsidiarity principle as an expression of "state ethics".
[39] According to Mackenzie Stuart (supra n11) 19, quoting Jackson Turner Main, The Antifederalists (New York 1974) 129, "[t]he essence of the antifederalist argument turned on `subsidiarity'" (my italics). But cf A. Hamilton, The Federalist Papers, No. 33: "But it will not follow ... that acts of the larger society which are not pursuant to its constitutional powers but which are invasions of the residuary authorities of the smaller societies will become the supreme law of the land. These will be merely acts of usurpation and will be treated as such."
[40] But cf Bermann (supra n4) 403 et seq.
[41] Cf Weiler (supra n26) 2463, n173; Jacqué (supra n27) 16 et seq.
[43] A discussion of this point in the American context is offered by Bermann (supra n4) 404 et seq.
[45] Weiler (supra n26) 2645 et seq.
[46] Cf, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler,'The State `über alles'. Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision', forthcoming in Festschrift für Ulrich Everling (Nomos Baden-Baden 1995) and in Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts (1995).
[47] But cf the "No Demos Theory", discussed extensively by Weiler (supra n46) passim, and cf Th. Schilling, 'Die deutsche Verfassung und die europäische Einigung', 116 AöR 32 (1991) 61 et seq.
[48] Cf Th. Schilling,'Antebellum America and the EU: a Comparison, and a Plea for a European Constitutional Convention' (forthcoming).
[49] Cf, e.g., Case 101/78 Granaria v Hoofdproduktschap voor Akkerbouwprodukten [1979] ECR 623.
[50] Cf, e.g., Mackenzie Stuart (supra n11) 20, describing the 1990 discussion.
[51] Toth (supra n17) 270 et seq.
[52] Mackenzie Stuart (supra n11) 23, and supra n12.
[54] Cf Mackenzie Stuart (supra n11) 23.
[56] Toth (supra n17) 281; on the answer to this question, cf infra, sub IV b.
[57] Cf Lambers (supra n13) 241.
[58] Toth (supra n17) 281, formulates the question thus: "can the objectives of the ... legislation in question be better achieved by the Community or by the Member States?" With this formulation, he supports the "effectiveness" test in Art 3b (2) ECT to the detriment of the "necessity" test also contained in that provision.
[59] Stein (supra n13) 35; Lambers (supra n13) 240.
[60] Cf the text supra at n50.
[61] On all this, cf Lambers (supra n13) 240. And cf, e.g., W. Kahl,'Das Subsidiaritätsprinzip nach Art 3b EG-Vertrag', 118 AöR 414 (1993) 418 et seq. Frowein (supra n13) though accepting the above answer (at 406) underscores the importance of the subsidiarity principle for reinforcing the Member States' position in disputes about EC law-making (at 409).
[62] Cf, e.g., Toth (supra n17); Emiliou (supra n33) 121 et seq.
[63] At least, that is one possibility of looking at the Common Law. Cf O.W. Holmes,'The Path of the Law', 10 HarvLR 457 (1897) 461: "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law." But cf H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 2nd ed (Clarendon Press Oxford 1994) 136 et seq and 141 et seq.
[64] Cf, with differences as to details, German Federal Constitutional Court (supra n22) para 103; Mackenzie Stuart (supra n11) 24; Cass (supra n1) 1132 et seq; Stein (supra n13) 37; Pieper (supra n4) 300; Jarass (supra n13) 211 et seq; Bernhard Schima, Das Subsidiaritätsprinzip im Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht (Manzsche Verlags- und Universitätsbuchhandlung Wien 1994) 139 et seq; Toth (supra n17) 282 et seq, Kahl (supra n61) 439 et seq, both with some qualifications; Lenaerts and Ypersele (supra n3) 72. Contra, e.g., W. Hummer,'Subsidiarität und Föderalismus als Strukturprinzipien der Europäischen Gemeinschaften?', Zeitschrift für Rechtsvergleichung (1992) 81, 90 et seq.
[65] On which cf Lenaerts and Ypersele (supra n3) 72 et seq.
[66] Cf, e.g., Stein (supra n13) 37 et seq; Toth (supra n17) 282 et seq; Emiliou (supra n37) 402 et seq; idem (supra n33) 123 et seq; Bermann (supra n4) 390 et seq; Strozzi (supra n20) 386 et seq; particularly critical Möschel (supra n6) 3028, according to whom Art 3b (2) ECT is scarcely able to be precised substantively. In this context, reference to the case law of the German Federal Constitutional Court on Art 72 (2) BL (BVerfGE 2, 213, 224; 65, 1, 63; 78, 249, 270) is common; cf, e.g., Frowein (supra n13) 404; Jarass (supra n13) 212; Merten (supra n11) 94 et seq; Lambers (supra n13) 239; Kahl (supra n61) 439 et seq; Langer (supra n3) 197; Bermann (supra n4) 393 et seq. However, this reference is misleading. The ECT must be interpreted autonomously, and the provision of Art 72 BL is quite different from Art 3b (2) ECT. In particular, the ECT does not contain a clause similar to Art 72 (2) (3) BL, which admits federal legislation if it is required by the maintenance of legal and economic unity, especially of the uniformity of living conditions; the tasks to be promoted according to Art 2 ECT do not require, by far, the same degree of uniformity (cf, in particular, Art 130a (2) ECT: "reducing disparities"). On these and other differencies cf v. Borries (supra n33) 74 et seq; Merten (supra n11) 96. It should be added that the Federal Constitutional Court's case law is, in Germany, heavily disputed; cf, e.g., H.-W. Rengeling, § 100: Gesetzgebungszuständigkeit', in: Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (supra n33) 723, 776 (para 124).
[67] But cf Josef Esser, Grundsatz und Norm in der richterlichen Fortbildung des Privatrechts [1st ed] (Mohr Tübingen 1956).
[68] Ronald Dworkin,'The Model of Rules I', in: idem, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press Cambridge 1987) 14, 22 et seq. And cf the answer by Hart (supra n63) 259 et seq.
[69] Cf Robert Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte (Nomos Baden-Baden 1985) 71 et seq; Th. Schilling,'Artikel 24 Absatz 1 des Grundgesetzes, Artikel 177 des EWG-Vertrags und die Einheit der Rechtsordnung', 29 Der Staat 161 (1990) 172 et seq.
[73] Dworkin (supra n68) 26 et seq.
[74] Cf Conclusions of the Presidency (supra n3) 13: "the principle of subsidiarity in the strict legal sense". R. Mastroianni,'Il ruolo del principio di sussidiarietà nella definizione delle competenze statali e comunitarie in materia di politiche culturali', 4 RIDPC 64 (1994) 82, sees Art 3b (2) ECT as a "presumption of competence" in favour of the Member States. This presumption, however, can only be a procedural enhancement of the substantive rôle the subsidiarity rule has to play.
[75] Möschel (supra n6) 3027; and cf Strozzi (supra n20) 384.
[76] Schima (supra n64) 26 et seq.
[77] Schima (supra n64) 35 et seq; cf Weiler (supra n26) 2438 et seq.
[78] Schima (supra n64) 39 et seq.
[79] Schima (supra n64) 50 et seq.
[80] A first example of a judicial application of the subsidiarity principle as principle can be found in the judgment of the Court of First Instance, ...
[81] V. Constantinesco,'La Subsidiarité comme principe constitutionnel de l'intégration européenne', 46 Aussenwirtschaft 439 (1991) 444.
[82] D. Lasok,'Subsidiarity and the Occupied Field', NLJ (1992) 1228, 1229; Strozzi (supra n20) 375.
[83] Helmut Lecheler, Das Subsidiaritätsprinzip. Strukturprinzip einer europäischen Union (Duncker & Humblot Berlin 1993), subtitle of the book.
[84] L. Vandelli,'Il principio di sussidiarietà nel riparto di competenze tra diversi livelli territoriali: a proposito dell' art. 3 B del Trattato sull' Unione Europea', 3 RIDPC 379 (1993) 379.
[85] On the value of the preamble for the interpretation of the EC-Treaty cf M. Zuleeg, in: Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag (supra n10) Präambel, para 2.
[86] Strozzi (supra n20) 375, sees this fact as demonstration of the subsidiarity principle's importance.
[87] Cf Dworkin (supra n68) 40, and the discussion by idem, 'The Model of Rules II', in idem (supra n68) 46, 66 et seq.
[88] Lasok (supra n82) 1229; and cf Strozzi (supra n20) 375.
[89] Lenaerts and Ypersele (supra n3) 10 and 81, whilst agreeing to the principle character of this side of the subsidiarity principle, conceive it as being connected "plus de la science politique que du droit"; similarly M.A. Dauses/ F. Fugmann, 'Die politisch-institutionelle Stellung des Europäischen Parlaments nach dem Maastricht-Vertrag', Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament, B3-4/95, 24. But cf Strozzi (supra n20) 383: "Il est certain que la notion [de subsidiarité] peut revêtir aussi d'autres significations et être considérée sous d'autres aspects, tirés de son acception plus générique et moins technique, à laquelle on peut attacher des effets qui sont susceptibles également d'influencer et de conditionner le comportement des institutions communautaires."
[90] On this issue, cf Lenaerts and Ypersele (supra n3) 52 et seq.
[91] Cf, e.g., C.-D. Ehlermann,'Quelques réflexions sur la communication de la Commission relative au principe de subsidiarité', Revue du marché unique européen (4/1992) 215, 218.
[92] Strozzi (supra n20) 383, who adds that the subsidiarity principle requires the execution of Community decisions to be left to the national (or sub-national) level.
[93] Cf Bermann (supra n4) 366 et seq; Mastroianni (supra n74) 84. Lenaerts and Ypersele (supra n3) 29 and n64, discuss, under this aspect, the delegation of regulatory powers by the Community to the Member States.
[94] The terminology is not standardized; Emiliou (supra n95) 400, speaks of concurrent competence, R. Bieber,'On the Mutual Completion of Overlapping Legal Systems: The Case of the European Communities and the National Legal Orders', 13 ELRev 147 (1988) 148 et seq, of parallel powers, the Commission (supra n110) 119, of shared powers, A.G. Toth, 'A Legal Analysis of Subsidiarity', in: Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (D. O'Keeffe/ P.M. Twomey, eds; Chancery Law Publishing Chichester 1994) 37, 39, and passim, of non-exclusive competences. v. Borries (supra n33) 53, distinguishes between concurrent, parallel and subsidiary competences.
[95] Cf Toth (supra n94) 37; J. Steiner,'Subsidiarity under the Maastricht Treaty', in: Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (supra n94) 49, 55 et seq; N. Emiliou,'Subsidiarity: Panacea or Fig leaf', ibid, 65, 68 et seq; Lecheler (supra n83) 99; but cf ECJ, Opinion 1/93 [1993] ECR I-1064, 1077.
[96] Cf, e.g., the exclusive legislation Congress has, according to Art I (8) of the U.S. Constitution, over the District of Columbia, or the discussion of the "exclusiveness issue" by C. Herman Pritchett, The American Constitution 3rd ed (McGraw-Hill Book Company New York e.a. 1977) 202 et seq.
[97] Cf e.g. Neil Finkelstein, Laskin's Canadian Constitutional Law 5th ed (Carswell Toronto 1986) 250 et seq.
[99] Cf, e.g., U. Häfelin/ W. Haller, Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht 3rd ed (Schulthess Zürich 1993) para 296.
[100] Cf, e.g., H. Simonart, in: La Cour d'arbitrage. Actualité et perspectives (R. Andersen et al. eds, Bruxelles 1988) 129; Francis Delpérée, Droit constitutionnel 2nd ed (F. Larcier Bruxelles 1987) 221 and 238.
[101] Cf, e.g., Ludwig K. Adamovich/ Bernd-Christian Funk, Österreichisches Verfassungsrecht: Verfassungslehre unter Berücksichtigung von Staatslehre und Politikwissenschaft, 3rd ed (Springer Wien New York 1985) 165 and 185.
[102] Cf Commission (supra n110) 119.
[104] Toth (supra n94) 40. The learned author goes on to declare that many of the competences newly granted to the Community in the Maastricht Treaty and clearly intended to be concurrent only these are dealt with infra, before n182 are inextricably linked with the internal market and must, therefore, fall within the Community's exclusive competence (at 41 et seq). The same concept can be found in A.G. Toth,'The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty', CMLRev (1992) 1079, 1091 et seq. Similarly T.C. Hartley,'Constitutional and Institutional Aspects of the Maastricht Agreement', 42 ICLQ 213 (1993) 216, who takes the view that "subsidiarity would be applicable only when the Community legislated for the first time in a new field".
[105] German Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 7, 198, 208; and cf, e.g., BVerfGE 71, 206, 214.
[106] Cf, e.g., Jarass, in Jarass/Pieroth (supra n36) Art 5, para 47.
[107] Cf Case 9/70 Grad [1970] ECR 825, 838; Case 41/74 Van Duyn [1974] ECR 1337, 1348; Case 70/72 Commission v Germany [1973] ECR 813, 829. In Opinion 1/93 [1993] ECR I-1064, 1077, the Court clearly states that not all measures taken by the Community relieve of the latter's exclusive competence.
[108] On effet utile cf, e.g., Thomas Oppermann, Europarecht (Beck München 1991) § 441 et seq.
[109] Bieber (supra n94) 153; Pieper (supra n4) 263; but cf v. Borries (supra n33) 52. According to Jarass (supra n13) 210, the usage of the term "exclusive competence" in this context is hardly lucky.
[110] Communication on the Principle of Subsidiarity for Transmission to the Council and Parliament, EC Bull (10-1992) 116, 120. However, the Commission suggests, too, that "[t]he text of the Treaty cannot be interpreted so broadly as to leave common sense out of account". In the same vein Steiner (supra n95) 58.
[111] Commission (supra n110) 121 (my italics).
[112] Opinion 2/91 [1993] ECR I-1064.
[113] Ibid, 1077 (para 8 and 9).
[114] On the following, cf Häfelin/Haller (supra n99) para 296 et seq. On the comparability between Swiss federalism and the EC cf H. Blöchliger/ R.L. Frey,'Der Schweizerische Föderalismus: Ein Modell für den institutionellen Aufbau der Europäischen Union?', 47 Aussenwirtschaft 515 (1992). The following description is, as is indicated in the footnotes, not undisputed, at least as to the terminology used. However, as the Swiss system serves here only as a possible model for the conversion discussed in the text, I am not really concerned with this dispute.
[115] Häfelin/Haller (supra n99) para 365. Concurrent competences are known only in border areas between federal and cantonal competences; cf Theodor Schilling, Rang und Geltung von Normen in gestuften Rechtsordnungen (Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz Nomos Baden-Baden 1994) 256. But cf P. Saladin, in Commentaire de la Constitution Fédérale de la Confédération Suisse du 29 mai 1874 (J.-F. Aubert/ K. Eichberger/ J.P. Müller/ R.A. Rhinow/ D. Schindler, eds; Editions Helbing & Lichtenhahn Bâle 1987 ) Art 3, para 163.
[116] But cf K. Lenaerts,'Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism', 38 AJCL 205 (1990) 236.
[117] Cf, e.g., Swiss Federal Court, judgment of Oct. 28, 1982, Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft v Kanton Basel-Stadt, 108 BGE 392 (I) 397. According to Saladin (supra n115) para 56 et seq, the federal legislature, in using its competences, is bound to respect a subsidiarity principle.
[118] Indeed, it is called thus by Saladin (supra n115) para 163, who accepts, however, at para 150, that the Confederation may only temporarily refrain from using its competences.
[119] Opinion 2/91 (supra n112) para 9.
[120] K.C. Wellens/ G.M. Borchardt,'Soft Law in European Comunity Law', 14 ELRev 267 (1989) 310, quoting Case 7/71 Commission v France [1971] ECR 1003, 1018. However, the judgment quoted is not in point: The Court there decides (para 20) that "[p]owers ... conferred could not ... be withdrawn from the Community ... except by virtue of an express provision of the Treaty" (my italics). The judgment, therefore, deals with the question of an irreversible loss of Community competence, a possibility it denies.
[122] André de Laubadère/ Jean-Claude Venezia/ Yves Gaudemet, 1 Traité de droit administratif 12th ed (Librairie générale de droit et de Jurisprudence Paris 1992) para 923. And cf, e.g., Gallie v Lee, [1969] 1 All ER 1062, by Lord Denning: "... a self-imposed limitation; and we who imposed it can also remove it".
[123] Against the application of that principle, Lenaerts and Ypersele (supra n3) 22, claim that there will be, because of the principle of "acquis communautaire", no legal basis for a restitution of powers to the Member States.
[126] And cf K.M. Meessen,'Maastricht nach Karlsruhe', NJW (1994) 549, 554.
[127] Lenaerts and Ypersele (supra n3) 22, use a formulation similar to the subsidiarity principle to describe limits to the powers of the Community to restitute competences to the Member States.
[128] Cf v. Borries (supra n33) 52.
[129] Art 72 (1) BL and cf, on the concept of "making use" of a competence, Schilling (supra n115) 283 285.
[130] In its legal sense, on which cf, e.g., Ronald W. Rotunda/ John E. Nowak/ J. Nelson Young, Treatise on Constitutional Law. Substance and Procedure, vol. 2 (West Publishing Co. St. Paul Minn. 1986) § 12.1 (624). For a political meaning of the concept cf Joseph F. Zimmermann, Federal Preemption. The Silent Revolution (Iowa State University Press Ames 1991).
[131] Another possible consequence of such an act is, in the U.S., simply to override state law, without restricting state competence.
[132] Contra, apparently, Bieber (supra n94) 153. It is, however, not clear whether Bieber's dictum is meant to apply generally or is restricted to Community law.
[133] Particularly clear Lenaerts and Ypersele (supra n3) 21 et seq: in the case of a competence exclusive "par exercise" "il suffit théoriquement que la Communauté par un nouvel exercise de ses pouvoirs abroge le résultat de son exercise antérieur".
[134] Cf Dellmann, in Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (K.-H. Seifert/ D. Hömig, eds) 4th ed (Nomos Baden-Baden 1992) Art 72, para 2; Th. Maunz, in Grundgesetz. Kommentar (Th. Maunz/ G. Dürig et al, eds; Beck München 1963 ) Art 72, para 8; I. v. Münch, in 3 Grundgesetz-Kommentar (idem, ed) 2nd ed (Beck München 1983) Art 72, para 12; Schilling (supra n115) 252.
[135] Cf, e.g., A.B. Gunlicks,'Constitutional Law and the Protection of Subnational Governments in the United States and West Germany', 18 Publius: The Journal of Federalism 141 (Winter 1988) 144.
[136] Exemplary for this disregard is Schima (supra n64) 39 et seq. And cf Bieber (supra n94) 153; Steiner (supra n95) 58; J. Temple Lang,'European Community Constitutional Law: The Division of Powers between the Community and Member States', 39 NILQ 209 (1988) 218: "the scope of exclusive Community powers alters with each piece of Community legislation". However, Temple Lang has a rather vague concept of "exclusive" powers which appears to include even the mere supremacy of Community law; cf ibid, 213 et seq. Cf further Opinion 2/91 (supra n112). There, the Court appears to distinguish, within the concept of exclusive competence, between an exclusive competence in its technical sense (para 8) and a wider concept (para 9). Under the latter, it appears, the ECJ makes the quality of the Community competence dependent on the quantity of use the Community has made of a concurrent competence. This reliance on the quantity of Community legislation in a given area can be understood as making more convincing an interpretation of Community law as having pre-empted the field. There is an additional reason for the understanding just discussed. As the issue before the Court did not raise the subject of relinquishing Community competences to the Member States there is no reason to assume that the Court's claim to exclusive Community competence based on the quantity of Community legislation is more than a claim to that competence in its wider sense, i.e. to the pre-emptive use of a concurrent competence. According to this view, the Court's usage of exclusive competence is different from the technical one.
[137] Commission (supra n110) 121.
[138] Lenaerts and Ypersele (supra n3) 28: "va de soi".
[139] Ehlermann (supra n91) 216.
[141] Second penultimate recital of the preamble to the Maastricht Treaty.
[142] Cf Ehlermann (supra n91) 216.
[143] Lenaerts and Ypersele (supra n3) 13 et seq, distinguish, much in the sense here advocated, between competences exclusive "par nature" and "par exercise".
[144] Commission (supra n110) 120 et seq.
[145] Commission (supra n110) 121; my italics.
[146] Ibid. The'Interinstitutional Declaration on Democracy, Transparency and Subsidiarity' (EC Bull (10-1993) 118, 119) does not appear to follow the Commission's position. Rather, it provides that "[t]he explanatory memorandum for any Commission proposal shall include a justification of the proposal under the principle of subsidiarity" (my italics).
[147] Similar Steiner (supra n95) 58: "... cannot be correct".
[148] In the same sense, Lenaerts and Ypersele (supra n3) 28: only competences exclusive "par nature" are excluded from the application of the subsidiarity principle.
[149] The apparently contrary dictum of the ECJ quoted supra n112 concerns, as is there suggested, exclusive competences in their wider sense.
[150] In the debates leading up to the Maastricht Treaty a wider variety of categories of exclusive powers had been proposed; cf the discussion in Steiner (supra n95) 56. However, those proposals were made de lege ferenda only and are without incidence on the question under consideration.
[151] Emiliou (supra n95) 69. But cf Toth (supra n94) 39 et seq.
[152] "So that the Community can attain its objectives, certain obligations to act have been imposed on it ... because [the Community] is regarded as having sole responsibility for the performance of certain tasks": Commission (supra n110) 120 in this context, the Commission's first element characterizing an exclusive power is unexceptionable , and cf Lecheler (supra n83) 101; Lenaerts and Ypersele (supra n3) 24 et seq.
[153] Temple Lang (supra n136) 217, distinguishes between normal federations and the Community: in normal federations, the division of power "cannot be altered by normal legislation enacted by the federal legislature. ... In the Community ... the division of powers is altered by Community legislation, because of the principle that Community law prevails over national law ..." That appears to me to be erroneous on both counts: Of course, the division of powers in a normal federation can be altered be the federal legislature insofar as the constitution permits, i.e. in the areas of legislation within the concurrent legislative competence. Conversely, Community legislation can alter the divison of powers between Member States and the Community only insofar as the EC Treaty permits; that is, Community legislation cannot create an exclusive Community competence not provided for in the EC Treaty.
[154] Weiler (supra n26) 2432 et seq, considers the different implications of the U.S. and Canadian systems of power enumeration.
[155] Cf, e.g., Ehlermann (supra n91) 216. On the relevant reasons cf Bermann (supra n4) 355 et seq.
[156] Lecheler (supra n83) 99.
[157] Areas covered respectively by Art 74 Nos 1 and 14 BL.
[159] A somewhat similar power is listed in Art 73 No. 10 BL as an exclusive legislative power of the federal government: the competence to legislate on the co-operation between federal government and Länder in certain areas. However, there is a decisive difference. As the Länder do not have the power to regulate federal matters by legislation, it is obvious that the power granted under Art 73 No. 10 BL, if granted at all, cannot be but an exclusive power of the federal government. Cf Schilling (supra n115) 281.
[160] Cf Schilling (supra n115) 550.
[161] In that sense Eberhard Grabitz, Gemeinschaftsrecht bricht nationales Recht (Hamburg 1966).
[162] In that sense Manfred Zuleeg, Das Recht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften im innerstaatlichen Bereich (Carl Heymanns Verlag Köln e.a. 1969) 136 et seq, 154 et seq; idem,'Deutsches und europäisches Verwaltungsrecht Wechselseitige Einwirkungen', 53 Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 154 (1994) 161 et seq.
[163] Case 41/76 Donckerwolcke v Procureur de la République [1976] ECR 1921, 1937; Opinion 1/94 of Nov. 15, 1994, para 22.
[164] Cf J.A. Usher,'The Effects of Common Organisations and Policies on the Powers of a Member State', 2 ELRev 428 (1977) 436 et seq, quoting Joined Cases 37 and 38/73 Diamantarbeiders v Indiamex [1973] ECR 1609, 1623; and cf Case 161/88 Binder v Hauptzollamt Bad Reichenhall [1989] ECR 2433, 2438; Case 80/89 Behn Verpackungsbedarf [1990] ECR I-2671, 2676.
[165] Ehlermann (supra n91) 216, sees these two areas as being recognized by the ECJ as exclusive Community competences in this technical sense.
[166] Cf Arts 27 and 113 (1) ECT.
[167] However, learned authors discuss certain restrictions to this exclusive competence; cf Lambers (supra n13) 235; Oppermann (supra n108) § 1710 et seq; Lenaerts and Ypersele (supra n3) 16 et seq. And cf ECJ, Opinion 1/94, para 36 et seq, on the question which trans-border services are included in the common commercial policy, and para 48 et seq on transport agreements.
[168] Commission (supra n110) 121
[169] Commission (supra n110) 121. Lenaerts and Ypersele (supra n3) 16, appear to consider as competence exclusive "par nature", because excluding Member State competences, also those provisions that create fundamental Community rights of direct effect, although they concede those provisions do not transfer any legislative powers on the Community.
[170] Cf Ehlermann (supra n91) 217. Different restrictions are advocated by Lambers (supra n13) 235.
[171] The forms of organization enumerated in Article 40 (2) (2) EECT form a hierarchy according to the width of Community regulation; cf Gilsdorf and Griebe, in Kommentar zur Europäischen Union: Vertrag über die Europäische Union, Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (E. Grabitz, M. Hilf, eds; Beck München 1984 ) Art 40, para 5.
[172] Schilling (supra n115) 250.
[173] Added by Article 13 SEA, now Article 7a ECT.
[174] Commission (supra n110) 120.
[175] Cf, e.g., the quotations infra n199.
[177] In this sense Stein (supra n13) 33; Jarass (supra n13) 210.
[179] Cf Jarass (supra n13) 210.
[180] Cf, on this type of use of the praesumptio similitudinis, Konrad Zweigert/ Hein Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (T. Weir, transl.) 2nd ed (Clarendon Press Oxford 1992) 36.
[181] A similar result is reached by Stein (supra n13) 34: most Community competences are concurrent.
[182] Cf Toth (supra n94) 41, and, on Art 128 ECT, Mastroianni (supra n74) 81.
[183] Conclusions of the Presidency (supra n3) 13. Similarly, Bermann (supra n4) 365.
[184] Cf, e.g., Schima (supra n64) 35 et seq.
[185] Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, 1135; C.-D. Ehlermann,'Zur Diskussion um einen `Solange III'-Beschluß: Rechtspolitische Perspektiven aus der Sicht des Gemeinschaftsrechts', EuR Beiheft 1, 27 (1991) 35.
[186] Cf, e.g., Schilling (supra n115) 426 et seq; German Federal Constitutional Court (supra n22) 91 (para 55).
[187] Cf, e.g., Zuleeg 1994 (supra n162) 164 et seq. Doubts as to the legitimacy of this proposition are expressed by J.H.H. Weiler et al,'European Democracy and its Critics', forthcoming in West European Politics (1995) who appear to see a contradiction between the proclamation of a democracy deficit and the acceptance of the supremacy of Community law.
[188] For a particularly strong version of this case law, cf Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199 at para 15; on this decision, cf Dubinsky (supra n10) 319 et seq.
[189] On its development, cf Weiler (supra n26) 2414.
[190] Cf, e.g., W. Wengler,'Réflexions sur l'application de droit international public par les tribunaux internes', RGDIP (1968) 921, 960, and n108 (989).
[191] Th. Schilling,'Zu den Grenzen des Vorrangs des Gemeinschaftsrechts', 33 Der Staat 555 (1994) 556.
[192] German Federal Constitutional Court (supra n22) 90 (para 54). But cf Lenaerts and Ypersele (supra n3) 5; K.J.M. Mortelmans,'De interne markt en het facettenbeleid na het Keck-arrest: nationaal beleid, vrij verkeer of harmonisatie', SEW (1994) 236, 248.
[193] Mortelmans (supra n192) passim, speaks of "facettebeleid", i.e. politics on environment, health, work conditions, culture, education and consumers; ibid, 238.
[194] Cf Troberg, in Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag (supra n10) Art 59, para 13; Chr. Langenfeld/ A. Zimmermann,'Interdependenzen zwischen nationalem Verfassungsrecht, Europäischer Menschenrechtskonvention und Europäschem Gemeinschaftsrecht', 52 ZaöRV 259 (1992) 293.
[195] Lenaerts (supra n116) 220; and cf Bermann (supra n4) 357; R. Barents,'The Internal Market: Some Observations on the Legal Basis of Community Legislation', CMLRev (1993) 85, 86 et seq; Schilling (supra n47) 45, and cf, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler,'Problems of Legitimacy in Post 1992 Europe', 46 Aussenwirtschaft 411 (1991) 424 et seq; Jarass (supra n13) 209.
[196] This has led, in Canada, to the theory of federal paramountcy applying in those twilight fields in which both a federal and a provincial competence can be argued; cf Finkelstein (supra n97) 262 et seq; W.R. Lederman,'The Concurrent Operation of Federal and Provincial Laws in Canada', 9 McGraw Law Journal 185 (1963) 190 et seq. A similar approach has been advocated for Germany; cf M. Bothe in Kommentar zum Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Reihe Alternativkommentare (R. Wassermann, ed) 2nd ed (Luchterhand Neuwied 1989) Art 70, para 22. But cf Schilling (supra n115) 193.
[197] Cf text supra after n147, and cf Weiler (supra n26) 2436 et seq.
[198] Cf text supra after n156.
[199] Barents (supra n195) 106 et seq, declares Art 100a ECT to be a complement to the Dassonville formula which "gives the Community an almost free choice to legislate" and "is in fact nothing less than a `loi de plein pouvoir'"; more restrictive Mortelmans (supra n192) 243. And cf C.-D. Ehlermann,'The Internal Market Following the Single European Act', CMLRev (1987) 361, 384: "Article 100a gives the Council enormous scope for action, which is limited, I suspect, only by the existence of other enabling provisions". Weiler (supra n26) 2435 et seq, treads this phenomenon back to the 70's.
[200] Cf, e.g.. Oppermann (supra n108) § 523 et seq; Beutler, in Bengt Beutler/ Roland Bieber/ Jörn Pipkorn/ Jochen Streil, Die Europäische Union. Rechtsordnung und Politik, 4th ed (Nomos Baden-Baden 1993) 94 et seq; Lenaerts (supra n116) 260: "The Court of Justice pursues a constitutional model in which the legal orders of the Community and the Member States are as strictly separated as possible."
[202] Schilling (supra n115) 429 et seq.
[203] Schilling (supra n115) 429.
[204] This is due to the fact that there is, in the U.S., contrary to the situation in Germany, no constitutional provision providing for automatic federal pre-emption.
[205] Cf, e.g., New York State Dept. of Social Services v Dublino 413 U.S. 405, 413; 93 SCt 2507, 2513. In this decision, the Supreme Court upheld a New York State Law making the payment of federally granted family subsidies conditional upon the beneficiary's accepting work. And cf Bermann (supra n4) 424 et seq.
[206] A. Scalia,'Subsidiarity à l'Américaine: C'est à Dire Preemption', in Maastricht, Subsidiarity and Italian-EC Relations 4, 4 (The Mentor Group. The Forum for U.S.-EC Legal-Economic Affairs, Venice, 1992) quoted from Bermann (supra n4) 406, n295.
[209] This has been noted by some American writers; cf Rotunda/Nowak/Young (supra n130) § 12.4 (634) n8.
[210] Weiler (supra n26) 2447, speaking of the wide interpretation of Art 235 ECT: "One should not ... underestimate its enormity in comparison to other nonunitary (federal) systems."
[211] It is evident that the rule in Art 3b (2) ECT, embodying, as it does, a crystallization of the subsidiarity principle, is of no immediate relevance to the question under review. It is only the subsidiarity principle as principle which needs here to be discussed.
[212] Cass (supra n1) 1130, rightly assumes that the question of Art 3b (2) ECT must be answered before the question of supremacy arises.
[214] Weiler (supra n26) 2414, n26 (author's italics).
[215] Weiler (supra n26) 2348 et seq.
[216] According to Mortelmans (supra n192) 248.
[217] According to Herbert Wiedemann, 1 Gesellschaftsrecht: ein Lehrbuch des Untenehmens- und Verbandsrechts (Beck München 1980) 714, the decision of a conflict between those two concepts has to be found, in German law, by respecting to the utmost the specific purposes of the laws involved.
[218] Cf, e.g., German Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 2271.
[219] The lex posterior rule was apparently not discussed.
[220] Case T-61/89, Dansk Pelsdyravlerforening v Commission.
[222] Ibid, para 55: "... ne sont pas fondées à soutenir que le caractère de société coopérative de la requérante, non plus que son objet social, sont de nature à avoir une incidence quelconque sur les conditions d'applicabilité en l'espèce des règles communautaires de la concurrence".
[223] A legal basis for such legislation could be found in Art 54 (3) (g) ECT, read together with Art 54 (2) ECT. Cf Pipkorn, in Beutler et al. (supra n200) 405 et seq; and cf the Commission proposal of March 1992 on a European co-operative, quoted by Pipkorn, ibid.
[224] Cf Oppermann (supra n108) § 541, who, however, draws consequences quite different from those here advocated.
[225] Alexy (supra n69) 117 et seq. - This construction serves to restrict the effect of sweeping provisions. However, in the case of restricted provisions, the inverse way is possible, too: in Griswold v Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 484, the U.S. Supreme Court speaks of the "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights hav[ing] penumbras, formed by emanations from these guarantees that help give them life and substance".
[227] Cf supra text at n87 et seq. It is interesting to see that this distinction is reflected, in the case of Art 30 ECT, by an economic analysis distinguishing between rules and standards; cf W.P.J. Wils,'The Search for the Rule in Article 30 EEC: Much Ado about Nothing?', 18 ELRev 475 (1993) 481 et seq.
[228] Mastroianni (supra n74) 84 et seq, speaks, in this context, of an indirect intervention of the subsidiarity principle.
[229] J.G. Fleming,'General Report: Libel and Constitutional Free Speech', in XIIIth International Congress of Comparative Law, General Reports, 673 (Les Éditions Yvon Blais Cowansville Québec 1990) 678.
[230] Of course, it is always possible, in panel decisions, that the final decision is not based on a single set of reasons for all the judges, but on different sets. In common law countries generally and in some continental courts, this is made transparent by the individual speeches of the judges or be concurrent opinions. In such cases, it is generally impossible to achieve predicability of future decisions.
[231] Cf Fleming (supra n229).
[232] Mortelmans (supra n192) 249 et seq, proposes quite the contrary, i.e. the application of an "integration principle" under which Community and national policy makers should deliberate together on aspects of importance to both of them.
[234] Cf, in this sense, Mastroianni (supra n74) 76, who speaks of "un bilanciamento tra interessi statali di ordine culturale e pieno funzionamento delle libertà fondamentali garantite dal Trattato". In the form just described the test here proposed resembles closely the test applied by the ECJ under which the proportionality of a national provision restricting one of the internal market liberties is checked against the restricted liberty. Mortelmans (supra n192) 239 et seq, speaks in this context of the tension between the economic consequences taken into account at Community level and the non-economic targets realized mostly at national level and upheld as rule of reason exceptions. The main difference between the two tests lies in the different yardsticks used respectively. In the proportionality test, the yardstick is the EC liberty restricted by the national measure in question. This measure is seen as a restriction of the EC liberty, and itself restricted by the proportionality principle. If looked at from the vantage point of the subsidiarity principle, there is a fundamental flaw in this approach: the ordre public provisions just quoted are drafted as exceptions to the Community law generally applicable, and are, therefore, interpreted restrictively by the ECJ. The subsidiarity principle, on the other hand, is not an exception from general rules; rather, it is itself the fundamental principle of power allocation within the Community from which the Community competences must be seen as exeptions. For this reason and, as stated sub I D, under aspects of legitimacy it is the Community powers which have to be interpreted restrictively. It follows that the ordre public provisions cannot be seen as a sufficient implementation of the subsidiarity principle.
[235] Case 9/74 Casagrande v Landeshauptstadt München [1974] ECR 773, and cf the discussion by Weiler (supra n26) 2438 et seq.
[236] On educational grants cf e.g., J.M.E. Loman/ K.J.M. Mortelmans/ H.H.G. Post/ J.S. Watson, Culture and Community Law. Before and after Maastricht (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers Deventer, Boston 1992) 58 et seq.
[238] But cf now Art 126 et seq. ECT which, however, could neither serve as a basis for a relevant Community competence.
[239] Although the discussion of levels of generality (on which cf, e.g., Tribe/Dorf [supra n9] 73 et seq.) might be of interest in this context, it is not proposed to enter it.
[240] For the same reason, the application of the subsidiarity principle to the facts of Case 235/87 Matteucci v Communauté franüaise of Belgium et al. [1988] ECR 5589, would not lead to a result different from the one reached by the Court.
[241] Cf, e.g., German Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 80, 74 (refusal of interim relief); judgment of 22 March 1995.
[242] Cf Mastroianni (supra n74) 75: "La forte componente "culturale" del sistemo televisivo [olandese]".
[243] According to the provisions of Article 128 ECT, (1) "the Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States", and (2) its action "shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation between Member States". All steps taken in this context are to be taken, according to para (5) by the Council acting unanimously.
[244] Mastroianni (supra n74) 78 et seq, sees at least the Directive 89/552 not as absorption, but as real extension of Community competences.
[245] Case 148/91, Vereniging Veronica Omroep Organisatie v Commissariaat voor de Media.
[247] Mastroianni (supra n74) 75.
[248] Cf Veronica, para 10: "... de tels objectifs de politique culturelle ...".
[249] Veronica (supra n245) para 13.
[250] "Abuse of rights" has been described, in the context of international law, in this sense "that whatever these rights are, they must not be used in such a manner that its anti-social effects outweigh the legitimate interests of the owner of the right" (W. Friedmann,'The Uses of `General principles' in the Development of International Law', 57 AJIL 279 (1963) 288). The Court refers, in para 12, to Case 33/74 van Binsbergen v Bedrijfsvereniging Metaalnijverheid [1974] ECR 1299 at para 13. This paragraph, however, did not deal with "abuse" as an abstract concept but with the concrete situation of an individual acting from outside a Member State and whose activity was directed towards this Member State's territory, who had left that Member State "for the purpose of avoiding the professional rules of conduct" applicable in that Member State. The Court there conceded the Member State's right to take measures to prevent the exercise of that activity by that person. Although van Binsbergen and Veronica are comparable under some aspects, the difference between an individual acting from outside a Member State and a company remaining inside this Member State but setting up a subsidiary outside is such as to make the solution found in the one case not immediately fit for the other.
[251] Veronica, para 10. The reference to Case C-353/89 Commission v Netherlands [1991] ECR I-4096 at para 41 et seq, adds nothing to this reasoning.
[252] C-288/89 Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda [1991] ECR I-4007 at para 23.
[253] Mastroianni (supra n74) 84 et seq, in order to avoid the sphere of action reserved to the Member States under the subsidiarity principle being restricted by ECJ judgments considering state actions as incompatible with one of the four liberties, interpretes the relevant Community measure accordingly. This proposal has the disadvantage that the importance of the national measure does not enter into account.
[254] Case C-159/90 Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v Grogan & Ors [1991] ECR I-4733, 4739. On this decision, cf J. Coppel/ A. O'Neill,'The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?', CMLRev (1992) 669; S. O'Leary,'The Court of Justice as a reluctant constitutional adjudicator: an examination of the abortion information case', 17 ELRev 138 (1992); D.R. Phelan,'Right to Life of the Unborn v. Promotion of Trade in Services: The European Court of Justice and the Normative Shaping of the European Union', 55 MLR 670 (1992); H. Gaudemet-Tallon,'Note', RTDE 1992, 167; Schilling (supra n191) 567 et seq; B. Wilkinson,'Abortion, the Irish Constitution and the EEC', Public Law (1992) 20.
[255] Joint Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone v Ministero del Tesoro [1984] ECR 377 at para 16; Grogan (supra n254) 4739 at para 18.
[256] J.H.H. Weiler,'Europe after Maastricht Do the New Clothes have an Emperor?', Working Paper on file with Harvard Law School (1995), appears to ridicule the idea that "the logic of the Community forces a topic such as abortion to be treated as a `service'". Indeed, a comparative analysis reveals that approach, not surprisingly, as quite unique; cf Schilling (supra n191) 568, n77.
[257] Art 40.3.3, now protected, against Community law threats, by the'Protocol annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaties establishing the European Communities', OJ 1992 C 191/94.
[258] According to press reports, there were about 40 cases a year.
[259] Of course, a very convincing argument could be made, under the subsidiarity principle, for the decision being left to the mother concerned. But that is a different question on which cf, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion. An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom (Alfred A. Knopf New York 1993).
[260] Schima (supra n64) 38, claims that the subsidiarity principle can only influence the discussion concerning Community and Member State legislations in one and the same area. The case discussed in the text provides a striking counter-example.
[262] The facts of the Grogan case demonstrate well the difficulties encountered by applying the ordre public approach (cf supra n234). This approach implies that the free provision of services is the yardstick against which the national measure protecting the fetus against abortion must be checked. The preference for an economic right over a human right in its fullest sense of which this approach is the expression is due only to the fact that the former is a Community right, and the latter is not; it contrasts starkly with the substantive weight of the rights involved. An additional point carries, perhaps, even more weight. The proportionally test does not allow to take into account the size of the restriction of the yardstick provision, i.e., in Grogan, the free provision of services. Subject matter of the test is the question whether the national measure restrictive of the yardstick provision is proportional to the target it aims at. Subject matter is not the relationship between the target and the size of the restriction of the internal market liberty. It is submitted that this approach does not do justice to the subsidiarity principle. The balancing test here proposed, on the other hand, does, and must do, without any yardstick, and thereby avoids the bias in favour of Community values by necessity inherent in any application of the proportionality test. This approach, applied to Grogan, makes it possible to enter into the balance, on the one hand, the purely marginal restriction of the free provision of services and, on the other hand, the complete annihilation with which a human life is threatened once advertising abortion is permitted. It is submitted that this approach is best equipped to do justice to the subsidiarity principle.
[263] Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837 at para 5.
[264] Cf Th. Schilling,'Rechtsfragen zu Art 30 EGV', EuR (1994) 50, 58; M.P. Maduro,'Keck: The end? The beginning of the end? Or just the end of the beginning?', 3 Irish Journal of European Law 30 (1994) 39. On the progressive development of the Dassonville formula in the ECJ's case law cf Maduro, ibid, 31, and Wils (supra n227) 481 et seq, who distinguishes between different tests applied by the Court, especially between rule-like and standard-like tests.
[265] Under Art 36 ECT or, according to the so-called "rule of reason", because of "mandatory requirements", on which cf Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein ("Cassis de Dijon") [1979] ECR 649, 662, and, e.g., J.P.H. Donner,'Articles 30-36 EEC in general', SEW (1982) 362, 365 et seq.
[266] Cf Case C-267 and 268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097; further, Case 155/80 Oebel [1981] ECR 1993; Case 75/81 Blesgen v Belgium [1982] ECR 1211; Case 148/85 Direction générale des impôts v Forest [1986] ECR 3470; Case C-69/88 Krantz [1990] ECR I-594; Case C-23/89 Quietlynn and Richards [1990] ECR I-3077; Case C-93/92 CMC Motorrad-Center v Pelin Baskiciogullari; and cf, with a slightly different reasoning, but the same results, Case 60 and 61/84 Cinéthèque v Fédération nationale des cinémas franüais [1985] ECR 2618; Case C-145/88 Torfaen Borough Council v B & Q plc [1989] ECR 3885; Case 169/91 Council of the City of Stoke-on-Trent, Norwich City Council v B&Q plc [1992] ECR I-6654; Cases 69/93 and 258/93 Punto Casa SpA v Sindaco del Commune di Carpena, Commune di Carpena and Promozioni Polivalenti Venete Soc. coop. arl (PPV) v Sindaco del Commune di Torri di Quartesolo, Commune di Torri di Quartesolo; Everling (supra n267) 1069 et seq; Peter Oliver, Free Movement of Goods in the EEC: under Articles 30 to 36 of the Rome Treaty 2nd ed (European Law Centre London 1988) para 6.44, who advocates a rule of remoteness which, however, is indistinguishable from a rule de minimis expressly refuted by the Court (Joined Cases 177 and 178/82 van de Haar and Kaveka de Meern [1984] ECR 1797 at para 13) and by Oliver himself (ibid, para 6.16); H. Matthies, in Kommentar zur Europäischen Union (supra n171) Art 36, para 28, who advocates a rule of adequate causation which, however, is less than convincing in that the test of causation is said to be a hypothetical judgment based on general economic experience, not a judgment based on the facts of the individual case; E.L. White,'In Search of the Limits of Art 30 EEC Treaty', CMLRev (1989) 231, 245 et seq, who advocates a distinction between rules relating to product characteristics and rules relating to market circumstances, and has only the former fall under Art 30 ECT; this distinction, however, although it leads generally to adequate results, has no basis in the text of the EC Treaty; U. Becker,'Von `Dassonville' über `Cassis' zu `Keck' Der Begriff der Maßnahmen gleicher Wirkung in Art 30 EGV', EuR (1994) 162, 168 et seq, who slightly modifies White's approach; Maduro (supra n264) 42 et seq, who advocates a distinction between national measures regulating cross-national interests these measures "should only be submitted to a balance test by the Court if ... shown to be discriminatory" and other measures the Court should review without further requirements being met; against this distinction, the reservations brought forward against White's distinction apply, too; Schilling (supra n264) 61 et seq, who perceives the conflict between Art 30 ECT and the respective national provisions as a conflict between principles (in their technical sense) and advocates a resolution of that conflict according to the respective weight of the principles involved; but cf infra n279; Lenaerts and Ypersele (supra n3) 18 et seq.
[267] Cf U. Everling,'Reflections on the Structure of the European Union', CMLRev (1992) 1053, 1069 et seq; Schilling (supra n264) 58; Mortelmans (supra n192) 237.
[268] And cf Bermann (supra n4) 400 et seq.
[270] Cf White (supra n266) 235. And cf Keck (supra n266) para 14.
[271] OLG Düsseldorf, Case 2 U 180/93, NJW (1994) 741, 742; Schilling (supra n191) at n104. Such an interpretation is, as far as it goes, similar to that chosen by the ECJ for Art 34 ECT; cf White (supra n266) 279.
[272] Cf text supra at n217 et seq.
[273] Cf Schilling (supra n264) 57 et seq; idem (supra n191) 573 et seq. The case law of the Court offers some support of this view; cf Torfaen (supra n266) 3889 (para 14); Krantz (supra n266) 597 (para 10); Case C-312/89 Conforama and others [1991] ECR I-1021 at para 9; Keck (supra n266) para 12.
[274] Cf Becker (supra n266) 171, and cf text supra after n224.
[275] Cf text supra after n213.
[277] For Wils (supra n227) 478, "Art 30 ECT is the tool for policing the borderline between legitimate and illegitimate national regulation". Pursuant to Art 100b ECT, in its "Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Management of the mutual recognition of national rules after 1992. Operational conclusions reached in the light of the inventory drawn up pursuant to Article 100b of the EC Treaty" (OJ 1993 C 353/4) the Commission reports on its "inventory of barriers".
[278] Cf text supra after n232. This argument follows closely the lines of the argument for a supremacy principle, in accordance with the consequences of the superimposition of two levels of conflicts discussed supra sub 2 e.
[279] Schilling (supra n264) 62 et seq, tries to balance Art 30 ECT directly against the national aspects of public interest. Wils (supra n227) 490 et seq, sees with declared unease the Court doing exactly that. However, for reasons parallel to those explained supra sub 2 e à propos the concept of Community law supremacy, it is now felt that the interposition of the Community subsidiarity principle, although not strictly necessary to the argument, adds to its cogency.
[280] But cf Wils (supra n227) 479, for whom at this side of the balance "lies the valued regulatory effect of the national measure", obtained by weighing the regulatory objective, inter alia, by the "value of the objective pursued", which he declares to be (at 489) "the crucial element to be assessed in order to respect the societal concerns underlying Art 30". The subsidiarity principle is not taken into account. Instead, the development of the Court's case law in the direction of greater use made of standard-like tests is seen as consequence of increased integration (at 489). The present concern with subsidiarity will certainly not "cause a return to the pre-Cassis de Dijon era" (at n52) but it should cause a different weighting of the elements of the balance and an enhanced respect for Member States' points of view.
[281] For Wils (supra n227) 478, "those national measures should be struck down under Art 30 which are more harmful than beneficial, in that their obstructive effect on the integration of national markets outweighs their valued regulatory contribution". The level of abstraction reached here, it is feared, makes a plausibly reasoned decision impossible. In addition, Wils does not distinguish between the rule-core of Art 30 ECT and its penumbra, thereby dissolving that provision completely.
[282] Cf cases quoted supra n266.
[283] On this question, cf Schilling (supra n264) 59, quoting case C-126/91, Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft v Yves Rocher GmbH, para 10. In Torfaen and in Punto Casa (both supra n266) the respective national courts had determined that the English Sunday trading ban and the equivalent Italian provisions, respectively, did affect the intra-Community commerce; cf Torfaen, 3887 (para 7) and Punto Casa, para 7.
[284] Van de Haar (supra n266) 1812 et seq. (para 13).
[285] For a fuller discussion cf Schilling (supra n264) 63 et seq.
[286] According to White (supra n266) 247 et seq, it is the distinction between measures relating to the characteristics required of imported products and to the circumstances in which they may be sold.
[287] Indeed, in Cinéthèque (supra n266) the Court finds, in para 21, that the French system in question did "not have the purpose of regulating trade patterns", only to continue to find that "nevertheless, the application of such a system may create barriers to intra-Community trade" and that, therefore, it is only compatible with Art 30 ECT if justified (para 22).
[289] Case 286/81 Oosthoek's Uitgeversmaatschappij [1982] ECR 4575.
[290] Case 382/87 Buet and another v Ministère public [1989] ECR 1248.
[291] Case C-362/88 GB-INNO-BM [1990] ECR I-683; Yves Rocher (supra n283).
[292] Torfaen and Stoke-on-Trent (both supra n266).
[293] Oosthoek (supra n289) 4588 et seq, para 16 et seq.
[294] Buet (supra n290) 1252, para 15.
[295] Stoke-on-Trent (supra n266) 6659 (para 16).
[296] Oliver (supra n266) para 6.43 considers the first group of decisions as mavericks: "given the vast body of cases concerning indistinctly applicable measures decided since Cassis, it is scarcely surprising to find a small number of judgments which diverge from it"; and cf, e.g., Matthies (supra n266) para 28: the reasoning of the Court is not unproblematic, from a methodical point of view, and partly contradictory; J. Steiner,'Drawing the Line: Uses and Abuses of Article 30 EEC', CMLRev (1992) 749, 757: "These cases are not easy to reconcile."
[297] Contrary to the decision of the Court, the German prohibition on nightwork in bakeries (Oebel, supra n266) must be seen as intended to restrict imports. Cf, in more detail, Schilling (supra n264) 64 et seq.
[298] The Court considers Sunday trading bans nowadays as fulfilling the Keck requirements; cf Punto casa (supra n266) para 13.
[299] I.e. Keck (supra n266) Buet (supra n290) Oosthoek (supra n289) GB-INNO (supra n291) and Yves Rocher (supra n283).
[300] White (supra n266) 252 et seq, tries to distinguish Oosthoek (supra n289) from the other publicity restriction cases by stressing that in Oosthoek, the free gift was packaged together with the product to be sold in a single parcel; therefore, he claims, the case did concern not the question of the circumstances in which a product was sold but of the characteristics required of imported goods. But it surely would be a misplaced formalism to distinguish between a free gift packaged together with the product to be sold and a free gift not so packaged. Indeed, if White's distinction boils down to that point, as he claims himself, it comes dangerously close to a reductio ad absurdum.
[302] The Court's claim in Keck (supra n266) para 16, that the measure there considered affects "in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those from other Member States" (my italics) is a counterfactual fiction; cf Schilling (supra n264) 59.
[303] Schilling (supra n264) 59.
[304] E.g., Germany; cf Adolf Baumbach/ Wolfgang Hefermehl, Wettbewerbsrecht: Gesetz gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb, Zugabeverordnung, Rabattgesetz und Nebengesetze 15th ed (Beck München 1988) § 1 UWG para 224.
[305] The Court itself has convincingly demonstrated that the need to use different marketing conceptions in different Member States may amount to an import restriction: Yves Rocher (supra n283) para 10.
[306] Keck, Buet and Oosthoek.
[307] GB-INNO (supra n291) 685.
[308] Yves Rocher (supra n283) para 5.
[309] This is, in all probability, also the effect of the Court's overruling its previous unidentified relevant case law in Keck (supra n266) para 16. On this basis, the OLG Düsseldorf (supra n271) concluded that the German provision contested in Yves Rocher and condemned by the Court cannot any longer be seen as contradicting Art 30 ECT.
[310] Of the Oebel, Blesgen, Krantz and Quietlynn decisions discussed by Schilling (supra n264) 64 et seq, Wils (supra n227) 483, states that "the valued regulatory effect of [the respective national measure] most obviously exceeded its anti-integrationist effect". And cf idem, 491, n60.
[312] Keck (supra n266) para 16.
[313] First developed by White (supra n266) 247 et seq.
[314] And might therefore be considered as a simplified test in the sense used by Wils (supra n227) 479 et seq.