Harvard Law School

Jean Monnet Chair
Professor J.H.H. Weiler

Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper (Symposium)

This paper is a part of contributions to the Jean Monnet Working Paper 
No.7/00, Symposium: Responses to Joschka Fischer

Iulia Motoc

Europe and its Teleology: Is there a Central-Eastern Vision?

Harvard Law School    Cambridge, MA 02138

All rights reserved.
No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form
Without permission of the author.

© Iulia Motoc 2000
Harvard Law School
Cambridge, MA 02138 
USA
iulia motoc
Europe and its Teleology:
Is there a Central-Eastern Vision?
1.	Introduction
Can we simply forget Fischer? Let us imagine that Fischer is an actor on a stage: why has his performance given rise to such agitation and debate amongst his audience? Let us attempt to put forward a hypothesis to explain this phenomenon: with his speech on ideals, Fischer has addressed an audience that has, admittedly, been forgetful of its ideals, but has nevertheless maintained them deep within their hearts. A second hypothesis, in contrast, would centre around the notion of confession: the actor has ceased to play his part and has, instead, endeavoured to comment on the play by substituting his own speech for the written text. A third hypothesis is inspired by the not so distant experiences within Central and Eastern Europe. Plays were successful during communist times if they could be interpreted in different manners and hinted at what many believed, but few dared to express.

As in any balanced ‘cause-effect’ relationship, all of the causal hypotheses listed above may engender equally valid explanations. However, were the third explanation to be proven sound, it would imply that the EU is in the middle of what we might, in Foucouldian language, term as a crisis in the relationship between ‘truth’ and ‘power’.

Having already experienced a loss in legitimacy and a democratic deficit from the early 1990s onwards, the European Union is now faced with a massive enlargement into the East, and into post-Communist Europe. This challenge is only superficially touched upon within European discourse, including the discourse of European authorities, national authorities and civil society. Since the optimism created with regard to the EU’s future does not appear to have been accompanied by concrete solutions, the distrust of Europeans has grown and the deficit in substantive legitimacy has become even more considerable. The ‘power’ appears to have established a ‘truth’ which has become less and less convincing to ‘the people’.

In this context, what was required within the European public space was a demarche that would newly call into question what appeared to be the EU’s conception of itself. Or, to put it another way, an intellectual discourse. This circumstance may also account for the fact that Fischer’s critical—even dramatically-flavoured—descriptive review of present day Europe is mixed up with a wide, diverse, and consequently contradictory, assortment of normative prescriptions for the reform of Europe.

When describing both the present situation and the future of integration, Fischer substitutes the confident tone that is typical of European public discourse, with one that reflects a current concern—albeit one that is difficult to admit to. However, the normative elements within his speech are combined with too many of the ideas that have already been aired on the possible future shape of Europe. The outcome is that the puzzle of ideas offered by Fischer as an alternative for the future of the EU is only superficially consistent and is, therefore, vulnerable to criticism, especially academic criticism, as is demonstrated by the debate that this contribution forms a part of. It is possible, however, that the overview of the many ideas and concepts belonging to the European public domain was nevertheless necessary, precisely in order to stir up a debate.

Whilst he refers to the Founding Fathers from the very outset of his speech, Fischer’s statement does not seem to be typical of a ‘Founding Father’, and instead reflects the views of a ‘hero of open society.’ Certainly, the host of disappointments that stem from the inconsistency of the speech are joined by a substantive discontent that is related to the inconsistency of the European public space. Fischer is perfectly aware that his mantle as the German Foreign Minister cannot really be cast aside, and that a speech given by him will not pass unheeded.

If we accept this interpretation, we can view Fischer’s undertaking as a success, since it succeeded in launching the debate. This success should nevertheless be balanced against the fact that it would seem to be more useful to examine the reactions to Fischer’s speech than the speech itself. These include the reactions to the Eastward enlargement of the EU, a process that—although seemingly imminent—had remained somewhat confined within the realm of ‘taboo subjects’.

If we are asked to read Fischer’s discourse, we can find a lot of positive remarks about Central and Eastern Europe’s concern regarding European integration. Referring to the eidetic realm, he assesses the ‘historical challenge’ of the enlargement process and relies on the legacy of Jean Monnet’s ideal of Europe. Faithful to his eclectic approach, Fischer also raises geopolitical justifications for enlargement, which appear to justify an enlargement ‘as soon as [is] possible.’ By contrast, if we examine Central-Eastern European hermeneutics regarding Fischer discourse, we can learn that he is delving deeply into fallacy and working against Central-Eastern European interests: postponing the enlargement, with recourse to unclear federalist ideas, and by maintaining a hard-core exclusive European Union.

What is the meaning of this paradox? Does a more general framework exists, with reference to which we might understand some of the important contradictions that arise in relation to a European finality, which is firmly confined within an East-West format? Are there simply different views on the enlargement process, or do these different views reflect some deeply-rooted dissimilarities that are destined to remain with us for some time?

It is not our intention to reproduce the Central-Eastern European reactions to Fischer speech here. We shall try to respond to Joschka Fischer’s discourse by considering certain of its themes, which might help to clarify the paradox revealed above. First, we shall examine the ‘sense’ of Europe and the ‘ideal’ of reunification. Further, we shall briefly discuss the question of the hard-core federation and some of the strategic proposals made for the purposes of legitimising enlargement.
2.	To be a European: Natural Right and History 
The prospect of enlargement has, of itself, caused a great increase in the number of references to ‘Europe’ and its fate. This is apparent within Fischer’s rhetoric of ‘Quo vadis Europa’. This discourse has similarly caused a great swelling in the ranks of those concerned with the ‘historical’ side of the enlargement story: rather than using the terms ‘historical chance’ or ‘historical necessity’, Fischer opts for the phrase ‘historical challenge’. Having thus joined the ranks of the ‘anxious historicists’, Fischer nonetheless proceeds in the same manner as other commentators and does not question the ‘historicity’ of enlargement. He does, however, distance himself from this prosaic landscape by quoting the Jean Monnet foundational ideal relating to Eastern Europe.

Why question the ideals of enlargement? One must begin by asserting the importance of the philosophical realm for the process of European integration. But, as a matter of course in a political discourse like Fischer’s, ideals serve only as political instrument with legitimisation functions. The analysis of the ideals seems telling to us, simply because it was supposed to be the main tool for the legitimisation of Eastward Enlargement. But it was not. The Fischer’s debate is only the most recent piece of evidence for this.

B.Renaud expressed the philosophical dimension of the next European Enlargement in a thought provoking way: 

In what could be seen as a surprising rupture, the process of Central and East European accession to the EU brings us back to the essence of European spiritual identity, all the way towards the European soul. 

In the terms of political philosophy, the European soul may be equated with the European telos. This telos is, in essence, not simply a matter of the best form of government, but is also related to the individual, whose ‘natural’ rights are inextricably bound up with the notion of justice. Every doctrine of natural right asserts that principles of justice and ‘the truth’ should be accessible to the individual. At the same time, each standpoint has its own account of the nature of truth and justice, and any attempt to compare them, or to find a neutral principal, would be utopian. Accordingly, following this argument, the natural right to be a European could be a mere tautology.

The political modernity of the Eighteenth Century caused this natural right, and with it the European telos, to disappear. As demonstrated by Leo Strauss, the dissolution of this natural right was the result of a confrontation with historicism—the belief that all human values are historical-qualified and are relatives—and of the battle with positivism; i.e., the conventional understanding of the truth, given by a external law.

Nonetheless, a certain nostalgia for this human and political telos and for the establishment of a perfect relationship between natural right and justice remained a constant within the history of political ideas, albeit often with an anti-modern and an anti-liberal political focus. For example, the attempt to reconstruct and reinterpret the moral code of pre-modern societies was a common feature of Central-European political ideas during communism.

Although very different in their political attitudes, the Czech, Jan Patocka and the Romanian, Constantin Noica, leading philosophical figures within their own countries, took the question of the soul as their core philosophical concern. Both entertained reservations about integral humanism, and were obsessed with the potential for the spiritual reinvention of Europe, which they considered might be a possible solution for the crisis of modernity.

The legacy of this line of thinking is present in Vaclav Havel’s essays and speeches. Havel’s discourse is not only striking, it is also unique within modern Europe. He is, as a simple matter of fact, the only political leader for whom the discourse on European values does not possess an explicit instrumental connotation which is further related to specific interests and/or practical purposes, be they merely for purposes of legitimisation or mobilisation. Furthermore, Havel’s thought fills the gap between the Husserlian vision of Europe as a solution to the modernity crisis and the post communist Europe of democratic return, and space of responsibility. Clearly, however, all the references to the idea of Europe failed to attain their goal. The section of Fischer’s speech that deals with ideals seems to have been ignored by both ‘West’ and ‘East’ Europeans.

Why is it that today, when Europe is teetering on the brink of attaining its telos through enlargement, there is such a significant amount of indifference towards Europe, and even occasional outright hostility? One possible explanation might be the very major difference between the Europe of 2000 and the Europe of 1951; the former has attained the goals of the latter, having grown into what J.H.H. Weiler has termed a ‘fin de siecle Europe’. Accordingly, and set against this background, were Europe to come at all close to finding its soul or telos, the latter would nonetheless seem to be so remote from the ideas and values found within the current, shared, public political culture that it would no longer—and justifiably so—have an audience. To employ other words: in a world that is void of ideals—arguably the situation existing within the EU—latent ideals, such as enlargement, are incapable of commanding any enthusiasm.

Yet another hypothesis is that the European telos suffers—as it has done so from the very creation of the EU—from the fragility of idealism within political modernity. Today, the European telos has a very particular and historically-qualified meaning and is also subject to a transformation process initiated by the positive law that governs European integration. As is the case with any modern polity, the EU also experiences epochs when idealism takes over from realism. Undoubtedly, ideals must be instrumentalised and transformed into interests and practices before they can be mobilised.

What, then, of idealism under conditions of political modernity? In order to be operationalised, ideals must be accompanied by a common understanding of values, a favourable form of positive law and, on the procedural side, by political forces and elites capable of converting them into reality. Let us consider the enlargement process with regard to these three conditions.

First, the act of understanding the common European values that were supposed, automatically, to lead to the enthusiastic sharing of a future common destiny for East and West is not as simple a matter as current European discourse might suggest. It is an elementary observation that the East refers to common values more often than the West does so. At the same time, however, the notion of a European identity, which is even now being asserted in the East, is more in the nature of a ‘claim’, rather than something that could be taken for granted.

Equally, however, the West’s discovery of the East during the past decade has also raised certain question marks about the concept of common identity. Some commentators argue that the cultural differences that have given rise to such question marks are simply a temporary consequence of Communism. Others maintain that such differences have their roots in a distant historical past which was characterised by separateness, rather than commonality. According to this view, Western European integration was possible only because Western Europe was separated from Eastern Europe.

Second, important challenges to European integration of Eastern states stem from the incorporation of European law. What can be taken as a fact, however, is that the process of accession to an international organisation, like the EU, is based on certain positive substantial and procedural rules. States were thus required to meet the criteria laid down in Copenhagen. If they failed to do so, they could not participate in the process of European integration.

Third, the conversion of the ideal of the reunified Europe into reality, which has been the core of the European agenda since 1990, has failed. Naturally, enthusiasm for the reunification of Europe was greater during the period that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall than it is today. However, the reaction of the EU was, even then, a cautious one, which probably explains Lord Dahrendorf’s statement that he was ashamed that the European Union did not approve the accession of the East European countries immediately after their had cast their democratic choice. One might say that this was a moment of idealism, which favoured enlargement, that was nevertheless lost. 

Fischer quoted the Jean Monnet foundational ideal relating to European reunification. One could make guesses about the predictive capabilities of the Founding Father, but it seems to us that the argument of Monnet extends beyond the somewhat simple ideal of reunification. First, Monnet invited Europeans to build ‘a fraternal Europe’; a Europe which would be able to offer ‘moral support’ and ‘help with the transformation’ of Eastern Europe. The ‘fraternal’ European vision, capable of extending the integration model, is, in its political values, closer to the communitarian model of the polity, which is still a normative one for the EU. 

We have very briefly discussed the manner in which the European telos and the ideal of reunification is now being called into question. Such doubts, however, should not be taken to mean that there is no potential for idealism within the EU, or with regard to enlargement. Why, then, is the year 1951 so distinct from that of 2000?

In effect, it is not the character of the European telos that distinguishes 1951 from 2000, but, rather, its ‘enemies’, historicism and positivism: it is not the status of the ideals that is different, but rather the conditions in which they must be put to work. Firstly, although the history of ‘the six’ was also marked by conflicts, there was, nevertheless, a marked awareness of the existence of a common identity and common fate that does not seem to be present within the current relationship with Eastern Europe. Equally, the creation of the European Communities within a new legal framework, or a ‘ground zero of European integration’, was a great advantage and even a privilege, which cannot be reproduced today. Furthermore, in contrast to the early era of European integration, post-Cold War Europe is characterised by an inability to convert idealism into real-world structures and by disagreement between elites and the general public upon the appropriate nature of enlargement.
3.	‘Europe, You will Remain the Same’
‘A European Federation’ and a ‘core Europe’, unity and increased differentiation are two paramount themes of Fischer speech. Both of them are dressed-up in the rational-normative mantle of the European integration debate. We will not dwell on the false empirical point of departure of Fischer’s speech here, or on the important contradictions within his vision. We are trying, here, to look at Fischer’s speech in the light of its—apparently puzzling—reception in Eastern Europe. Is there a different Eastern-European vision of European integration, or simply a misunderstanding? Equally, if Eastern ideas about European integration are different, why is this so and when do we have to take them into account?

Let us begin with a novel. One of Eastern Europe’s most celebrated novels—The Doll, by Boleslaw Prus—describes a situation that is similar to the one in which Eastern Europeans now seem to find themselves with regard to the ‘finality’ of European integration that is described by Fischer and others. 

The novel’s main character, Wokulski, a lower class lad, has a crush on an aristocratic maiden. He structures his entire life with a view to conquering the maiden, becomes rich and is on the verge of marrying her—he dreams of living with her in a villa that he will build and name Isabellon—when a single trip to Krakow, just prior to the planned marriage, reveals to him the painful truth that, for him, the maiden’s charm has vanished away. One might say that this is a simple illustration of love’s fate: it is always an illusion that eventually fades away. One might, of course, also argue that the maiden herself changed during the period of distant adoration. A more cynical, yet subtle view, however, would assert that she must have changed since she would not otherwise have accepted a proposal of marriage from a man of Wokulski’s condition. The analogy is now simple and transparent. Yet, this is only the mournful side of the story of the eastward enlargement that might be distilled from Fischer’s speech.

The aspect of Fischer’s vision of political finality that causes most concern in Eastern Europe is the emphasis placed upon a centre of gravity inside the Union, which is seen as being absolutely necessary in order to maintain the process of European integration after enlargement towards the East. The arguments put forward by Eastern Europeans to account for their reluctance about the creation of a federation with a hard core, primarily stem from historical experience, and are, at the end of the day, only to be expected of states that are not yet full participants within the process of European integration. Clearly, since the vision of unity and an alteration in the Monnet method have become even less realistic today, we now require a more comprehensive debate on the federal traditions of new members.

The first argument relates to federalist ideas and derives from the lack of a strong federal tradition within this part of the continent. Eastern Europe has nevertheless experienced plenty of federalist projects, but here again, memories are mixed. In the last two centuries alone, the mixed fate of federalism within the East is adequately illustrated by reference to the story of the Habsburg Monarchy following the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, or to the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. These two different forms of federalism and types of political regime were the cause of significant international instability. 

As Schlesinger has pointed out, proposals for federal projects such as Neumann’s Mitteleuropa or Hodza’s Federation in Central Europe were regarded with great suspicion by Eastern Europeans. We can, therefore, agree with the conclusion that ‘the people of East Central Europe have not been adequately conditioned by their history to embrace readily the habits and attitudes of international federalism’ A close analysis of Eastern Europe’s federal experiences reveals the fact that an important source of instability was the unequal status of peoples within the federation. This is the story of the Slavs, Magyars and Romanians during the Hapsburg Empire, of the non-Serb population in Yugoslavia and, at the end of the day, of the Slovaks in Czechoslovakia.

The second argument invoked by Eastern Europeans emphasises the importance of preserving sovereignty. We can make mention of the newly acquired sovereignty of Eastern Europe. Certainly, the question of foreign occupation could be discussed at length here, either in Kundera’s terms with regard to Communism in Central Europe, or in the geopolitical terms of the Brejnev doctrine. Nonetheless, sovereignty is by no means a simple notion to grasp, either in theory or in practice. It is certainly a particular challenge to discuss its ‘permeability’ or ‘desegregation’ within the European Union. 

Although Eastern Europeans have attempted to present their viewpoints as being close to those taken by other Governments, such as the UK Government, which was also critical about Fischer’s proposal, there still are significant differences between the respective stands. Whilst Great Britain appears reluctant about European integration in general, Eastern European countries are enthusiastic about the current EU, and are sceptical about the Europe envisaged by Fischer.

It is worth noting that among the motivations driving Eastern European countries towards the process of European integration is the equal status that smaller or less developed states seem to enjoy inside the European Union. Pro-integration feelings within Eastern Europe are also bolstered by the fact that other countries that have experienced similarly unfavourable economic conditions were to make great progress as Member States. It has been said of Eastern Europeans that theirs is a pragmatic approach towards the West, and that material advantages explain the attractiveness of the European Union. Undoubtedly, the only guarantee of effective integration between the two regions will be a levelling up of their economic performance. Thus, we can suggest that the Eastern-European vision is more closely related to the supranational approach to integration, a dimension that is lacking within the unitarian-differentiated model proposed by Fischer.

At the same time, however, although Eastern Europeans might wish for Europe to remain the same after the completion of the current enlargement round, they are aware that this is not going to be the case. This fact contributes to the stiff competition and lack of solidarity between Eastern European countries, and between them and other partner countries in the EU, which enjoy assistance from it in various forms.

On the other hand, it equally true that, as enlargement is delayed and accession to the EU grows ever more complicated, enthusiasm for accession to the EU within Eastern European countries is diminishing. Even if it is true that European identity is a constant value for Eastern Europeans, certain groups have begun to discover that integration might work against their economic interests; its contribution to the overall economic growth within individual countries has becomes less than certain. If we are to explain the process of state preference formation in terms of domestic institutions, we might say that, in Eastern Europe, we are witnesses to an ongoing process of the clarification of market incentives that has motivated domestic actors to advocate certain policies (commercial liberalism), that have begun to counterbalance domestic social identities and values (ideational liberalism).

Although attitudes towards the EU are shaped by historical experiences throughout Europe, Eastern European discourse on integration is particularly marked by historical references. This will come as no surprise. A historical debate on the recent past, i.e., on Communism, is not a current priority. The situation differs starkly from that prevailing after World War Two. The general impression is that the qualification of Communism as totalitarism is a debate that is not going to, and will never, take place. World War Two was followed by a discourse that held that a totalitarian regime must bear certain responsibilities. These things appear very unclear today: on the one hand, there is dispute about the totalitarian nature of Communism; on the other, there is much ambiguity about the issue of responsibilities.

We can now see more clearly why Eastern European identity formation within the process of European integration can be defined by contrast to identity formation in Germany. Certainly, both demonstrate a deep attachment to Europe. In Germany’s case, however, this is concomitant with the fading away of national identity, while in Eastern European attachment goes hand in hand with the assertion of identity. One should also note that all Eastern European countries have a tendency to minimise their divergence from Western Europe, and to assert and emphasise their own performance. 

If we were to sketch the identity of Eastern Europe, we would primarily see it as combining attachment to Europe with self-assertion, self-confidence and even a certain kind of nationalism that we might view as being useful. It is highly likely that this identity is conditioned by Eastern Europe’s ongoing absence from the process of European construction, and by the requirement that it (almost) unconditionally accepts the existing European legal framework. 
4.	Constitution and Castle-Building in Europe
It is a fact that the interest of the various commentators of Fischer’s speech was captured, to the same degree, both by the vision of political finality offered and by the strategy elaborated in order to reach that vision. Whilst it is true that the EU is experiencing a normative revolution, it seems, at the same time, to have great difficulties in defining strategies and policies. Shortly before the deadline for the completion of the IGC meant to prepare for enlargement, the EU has become aware that it lacks the means to achieve the aims it has laid down. 

This major strategic difficulty is combined with the EU’s deepening lack of social legitimacy, which seems to us to be Fischer’s main concern. It has long been noted that a lack of social legitimacy is related to economic performance within the EU. Empiricism in excess governed EU thinking to the point that the danger of the organisation being deprived of this source of legitimacy and being confronted with a democratic deficit was ruled out. As is usually the case, the ‘poverty of realism’ becomes evident when its effects are made tangible. It is a fact that the EU is now engaged in an effort to tackle this deficit. 

This effort—one that addresses the three aspects of deficit: accountability deficit, federal deficit and constitutional deficit—is covered by the notion of ‘constitutionalisation’. Thus, everyone now favours a constitution for Europe. Leaving aside the substantive critique of this effort—once again beyond the scope of this essay—it might, for the time being, be welcomed as the only endeavour to shore up EU legitimacy, even though it is not enough and has yet to have a real impact. On a constructive note, we can be confident that this demarche will have visible effects in the future. 

Most of the positive effects of enlargement will also only be seen in the future. It is noteworthy that although Fischer’s speech explicitly pleaded for as fast an enlargement process as possible, it has frequently been read as proposing its postponement. It is a fact that, following Fischer’s address, there were a series of reactions which, when taken in combination with a perceived reluctance on the part of the French Presidency, were felt by Eastern Europeans to be arguments for the delaying of enlargement. The truth is that EU strategy towards the Eastern countries is changing. This change has come hard on the heels of a clearer view that has been established about the dimensions of enlargement following Helsinki, and the realisation that the financial and institutional means that would allow for the accession process to start have yet to be clarified.

Leaving aside the fact that a polity that has difficulty in taking common political action will always be inconsistent, does this change in strategy really come as a surprise? Has the end of the Cold War had immediate positive consequences for the process of European integration? Recalling the ambiguous impact of the communist era, it is apparent that dialogue and the building up of a common strategy will be difficult. We will further examine these strategic possibilities, even though we are aware that they sometimes seem to belong to an area of unfinished, Cekhovian dialogue, rather than have an existence per se.

First, one previously discussed strategic possibility that was revisited following Fischer’s speech was the adoption of certain institutional solutions that would bind Eastern Europe to Western Europe without, however, running the risk of eroding the EU. One such institutional proposal, originally formulated by Delors and adopted by Fischer, was the notion of adopting several treaties. Indeed, if you look at enlargement merely in terms of offering solutions to the post-Cold War European balance of power dilemma, or of coming to terms with instability on the continent, multiple treaties would not seem to be necessary. Other institutional mechanisms which have those purposes in mind might be imagined.

Experience nevertheless shows how difficult it is to create functional and effective international institutions, especially in the short-term, as Eastern Europe required. It is also debatable whether such alternative solutions would ever be less costly or enjoy greater legitimacy than enlargement. Certainly, they would have come as a disappointment to Eastern Europeans, and may similarly not have enjoyed any greater a degree of legitimacy in Western Europe. 

It now seems that the pro-enlargement argument that Eastern Europe might otherwise pose, challenges the security of the continent—as Fischer indicated in his geopolitical considerations—and is somewhat counterproductive. Despite the recent Yugoslavian crisis, Europeans now appear to be unwilling to accept this argument. Applying a neo-realist balance of power rationale to European security, we can assume that West Europeans will not fear war as long as there is a United States presence on the continent. At the same time, there have been notable evolutions in the concept of security. Individual, economic or environmental security have gained in importance as threats to national security have become more remote. It is the former forms of security that now appear to be challenged by conditions in Eastern Europe, and this is irrespective of the institutional scenario that is being followed (enlargement or otherwise). It is, however, to be assumed that enlargement will allay these fears in the future.

The second proposal related to enlargement that arose in the debate following Fischer’s speech refers to a referendum to decide on new accessions to the EU. Although the idea was presented as a mechanism that might provide the enlargement process with broader popular support, it was also perceived negatively by Eastern Europeans. Not only would this popular consultation in each and every Member State have been a very lengthy process, but it would also have carried with it the danger of negative results. 

In terms of substance, the need for a referendum could be deemed the ‘realist illusion’ or ‘political illusion’ about enlargement. A first ground for objecting to this is the fact that we are not actually dealing with a reunification of Europe and there is no ‘European people’ to give their views on its fate. At the same time, it is true that the accession of East European States will bring about major and profound transformations of the European Union. However, what seems to be a constant within the EU strategy on enlargement is the desire that it will not produce substantial changes. By using the same accession procedures and management timetable for accession that was used in previous processes, the EU appears to be maintaining that this enlargement will not cause any greater changes than did previous enlargements. This may very well be an explanation for the frequent changes in strategy and delays in the accession of the first new members. 

Third, let us examine the connection between political integration and enlargement. To state that they should go hand in hand would be an oversimplified view on how the EU will be able to achieve enlargement and deepening at the same time. Clearly, postponing enlargement until after the completion of political integration would amount to a sine die shelving of the issue. Beyond the lack of clarity in the understanding of its limits, political integration has been notably difficulty throughout the history of the EU. This also accounts for the negative reactions coming from Eastern Europeans on the proposed juxtaposition of political integration and enlargement to the East, as two processes that are seen as equivalent in terms of political possibilities. Thus, the argument on the need to complete political integration before enlargement, can be seen as being the ‘idealist illusion’ or ‘legalistic illusion’ about enlargement. Before the massive enlargement to the East occurs, the European construction must achieve as great a degree of consistency and perfection as is possible. 

5.	Conclusion
The major part of Fischer’s discourse is dedicated to the intellectual exercise of shaping the future of Europe, ‘far beyond enlargement’, to a European Union that also comprises Central-Eastern European States. But does he really mean it? The speech can be considered to have been instrumental, not only in launching a debate about overall European architecture, but also in offering solutions to very present and practical dilemmas related to enlargement. The real concern of Mr Fischer seems, to us, to be the legitimacy of ‘today’s’ Europe; a concern that is dressed up in the noble mantle of a far-reaching vision. How, then, might we envisage the future? Mr. Fischer is making plans for an as yet unborn Europe, since half a good half of post enlargement Europe will comprise new members, mostly Eastern European states, who have very different identities and visions of the future Europe.