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Can we simply forget Fischer? Let us imagine that Fischer is an actor on a stage: why has his performance given rise to such agitation and debate amongst his audience? Let us attempt to put forward a hypothesis to explain this phenomenon: with his speech on ideals, Fischer has addressed an audience that has, admittedly, been forgetful of its ideals, but has nevertheless maintained them deep within their hearts. A second hypothesis, in contrast, would centre around the notion of confession: the actor has ceased to play his part and has, instead, endeavoured to comment on the play by substituting his own speech for the written text. A third hypothesis is inspired by the not so distant experiences within Central and Eastern Europe. Plays were successful during communist times if they could be interpreted in different manners and hinted at what many believed, but few dared to express.
As in any balanced `cause-effect' relationship, all of the causal hypotheses listed above may engender equally valid explanations. However, were the third explanation to be proven sound, it would imply that the EU is in the middle of what we might, in Foucouldian language, term as a crisis in the relationship between `truth' and `power'.
Having already experienced a loss in legitimacy and a democratic deficit from the early 1990s onwards, the European Union is now faced with a massive enlargement into the East, and into post-Communist Europe. This challenge is only superficially touched upon within European discourse, including the discourse of European authorities, national authorities and civil society. Since the optimism created with regard to the EU's future does not appear to have been accompanied by concrete solutions, the distrust of Europeans has grown and the deficit in substantive legitimacy has become even more considerable. The `power' appears to have established a `truth' which has become less and less convincing to `the people'.
In this context, what was required within the European public space was a demarche that would newly call into question what appeared to be the EU's conception of itself. Or, to put it another way, an intellectual discourse. This circumstance may also account for the fact that Fischer's critical-even dramatically-flavoured-descriptive review of present day Europe is mixed up with a wide, diverse, and consequently contradictory, assortment of normative prescriptions for the reform of Europe.
When describing both the present situation and the future of integration, Fischer substitutes the confident tone that is typical of European public discourse, with one that reflects a current concern-albeit one that is difficult to admit to. However, the normative elements within his speech are combined with too many of the ideas that have already been aired on the possible future shape of Europe. The outcome is that the puzzle of ideas offered by Fischer as an alternative for the future of the EU is only superficially consistent and is, therefore, vulnerable to criticism, especially academic criticism, as is demonstrated by the debate that this contribution forms a part of. It is possible, however, that the overview of the many ideas and concepts belonging to the European public domain was nevertheless necessary, precisely in order to stir up a debate.
Whilst he refers to the Founding Fathers from the very outset of his speech, Fischer's statement does not seem to be typical of a `Founding Father', and instead reflects the views of a `hero of open society.' Certainly, the host of disappointments that stem from the inconsistency of the speech are joined by a substantive discontent that is related to the inconsistency of the European public space. Fischer is perfectly aware that his mantle as the German Foreign Minister cannot really be cast aside, and that a speech given by him will not pass unheeded.
If we accept this interpretation, we can view Fischer's undertaking as a success, since it succeeded in launching the debate. This success should nevertheless be balanced against the fact that it would seem to be more useful to examine the reactions to Fischer's speech than the speech itself. These include the reactions to the Eastward enlargement of the EU, a process that-although seemingly imminent-had remained somewhat confined within the realm of `taboo subjects'.
If we are asked to read Fischer's discourse, we can find a lot of positive remarks about Central and Eastern Europe's concern regarding European integration. Referring to the eidetic realm, he assesses the `historical challenge' of the enlargement process and relies on the legacy of Jean Monnet's ideal of Europe. Faithful to his eclectic approach, Fischer also raises geopolitical justifications for enlargement, which appear to justify an enlargement `as soon as [is] possible.' By contrast, if we examine Central-Eastern European hermeneutics regarding Fischer discourse, we can learn that he is delving deeply into fallacy and working against Central-Eastern European interests: postponing the enlargement, with recourse to unclear federalist ideas, and by maintaining a hard-core exclusive European Union.
What is the meaning of this paradox? Does a more general framework exists, with reference to which we might understand some of the important contradictions that arise in relation to a European finality, which is firmly confined within an East-West format? Are there simply different views on the enlargement process, or do these different views reflect some deeply-rooted dissimilarities that are destined to remain with us for some time?
It is not our intention to reproduce the Central-Eastern European reactions to Fischer speech here. We shall try to respond to Joschka Fischer's discourse by considering certain of its themes, which might help to clarify the paradox revealed above. First, we shall examine the `sense' of Europe and the `ideal' of reunification. Further, we shall briefly discuss the question of the hard-core federation and some of the strategic proposals made for the purposes of legitimising enlargement.