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Armin von Bogdandy

Common Principles for a Plurality of Orders
A Study on Public Authority in the European Legal Area
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By Armin von Bogdandy*

Abstract
Public law was once exclusive to the type of social organisation called state. This exclusivity is no more, particularly in the European legal area: supranational and international organisations wield competences that transform them into institutions of public authority. Due to Europeanisation and internationalisation, the public law applicable on an EU Member’s territory can no longer be understood through the domestic constitution alone, but flows from a multiplicity of sources fed by a multitude of actors: A new public law tout court is under construction. The present article contributes to this by a study of founding principles. It offers its understanding of this new field of research (I.), sketches the relevant principles (II.), and discusses their interrelationship (III.)

* Armin von Bogdandy [sekreavb@mpil.de] is Director at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (MPIL), Heidelberg, Professor of Law at the Goethe University, Frankfurt. I would like to thank Christoph Krenn, Michael Ioannidis, Frauke Sauerwein and Dana Schmalz for their valuable help in completing this contribution. Translated by Marc Jacobs and Blake Emerson. A first German version has been published in Josef Isensee and Paul Kirchhof (eds), Handbuch des Staatsrechts vol 11 (3rd edn). This text is part of a research project on international public authority <http://www.mpil.de/ww/de/pub/forschung/forschung_im_detail/projekte/voelkerrecht/ipa.cfm> accessed 25 June 2013.
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A. The Contemporary Field of Research Regarding Basic Principles

I. Emergence of a New Public Law

Not long ago, the basic structure of public law and authority in most countries was defined by the principles of their respective constitutions. Nowadays, supranational and international institutions impinge markedly on everyday life in many societies, in particular in those which form part of the European legal area.¹ In addition, there is a new openness towards the sovereign acts of other states. These developments pose the question of how the basic structures of public law are to be understood.

The basic structures that constitute the entirety of effective public authority in Germany are the topic of this contribution. Why this particular German focus? It is due in part to the origins of this piece, which was written for a German audience.² But there is also a deeper justification. The complexity of the issue suggests addressing it from a specific location and perspective, as the issue might appear differently from another place. The world looks different from Beijing, Cairo, or Quito, but also, within the European legal space, from Coimbra, Heidelberg, or Oxford, not least because different constitutions apply. Therefore, this article does not make categorical claims as to truth, nor does it consider alternative constructions to be false. Given the political, cultural and ideological diversity, any contribution that purports to be conceived as universal should be viewed with suspicion. Nevertheless, this piece claims to be scientific, because of its internal coherence, the circumspection with which the legal material is presented, and the analytical potential of the concepts it offers for the understanding and the development of public law.

What is to be expected? Little. The contribution cannot, given the current state of understanding, offer a detailed and assured account of the pertinent law. A systematic, instructive and above all principled doctrine of the law of humanity,³ cosmopolitan law,⁴

¹ However, similar developments can be seen beyond the ‘global North’, see José María Serna de la Garza, Impacto e implicaciones de la globalización en el sistema jurídico mexicano (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México 2012) 111-311.
² To have such a piece in the state centered Handbuch des Staatsrechts gave rise to an article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, see Max Steinbeis, ‘Man kann nicht dauernd die halbe Welt für verfassungswidrig erklären’ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt am Main, 7 May 2013) 25. The article provides an excellent idea of the essence of traditional Staatsrecht.
³ Clarence Wilfred Jenks, The Common Law of Mankind (Stevens 1958); Christian Tomuschat, International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century: General Course on
global law, universal law, universal internal law, transnational law, even public international law or public law in the European legal space, i.e. something roughly comparable to a public law doctrine as we know it from many countries, seems beyond what is possible, at least at the current state of play. We are at a new beginning, well shown by the terminological cacophony mentioned above.

To be sure, this is not due to insufficient scientific interest. With regards to Germany, scholars of German public law (Staatsrecht) have always concerned themselves with embedding Germany into larger context. The theme has been very much en vogue since the turn of the century and excellent studies have been published. It seems fair to say that the principles of human rights and the rule of law, even of democracy, are now recognised among most scholars from most places, at least in the European legal area, as somehow relevant for all forms of exercising public authority. Yet, this is only a first starting point. There is no doctrine, i.e. a systematic


7 Jost Delbrück, ‘Perspektiven für ein Weltinnenrecht’? Rechtsentwicklungen in einem sich wandelnden internationalen System’ in Joachim Jickeli, Peter Kreutz and Dieter Reuter (eds), Gedächtnisschrift für Jürgen Sonnenschein (De Gruyter 2003) 793; Jürgen Habermas, Der gespaltene Westen: Kleine politische Schriften (Suhrkamp 2004) 143, 150ff.
9 Now, monumentally in ten volumes: Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP 2012) <http://www.mpepil.com> accessed 2 July 2013, but encyclopaedic and sprawling over 11,724 pages with 1,618 entries and more than 800 authors – hardly ‘systematic’.
10 Stimuli in this direction come from the Societas Iuris Publici Europaei (SIPE) or the European Public Law Association. On the constitutional-historical roots see Dieter Gosewinkel and Johannes Masing (eds), Die Verfassungen in Europa 1789-1949 (CH Beck 2006).
11 Recall only the many pertinent events of the Vereinigung der deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer (the Association of German Constitutional Law Professors) and the contributions in the Handbuch des Staatsrecht (Handbook of State Law).
12 Three excellent examples from recent PhD theses: Heiko Sauer, Jurisdiktionkonflikte in Mehrebenensystemen (Springer 2008); Mehrdad Payandeh, Internationales Gemeinschaftsrecht (Springer 2010); Thomas Kleinlein, Konstitutionalisierung im Völkerrecht (Springer 2012).
13 This was rather different only 20 years ago. Albrecht Randelzhofer, ‘Zum behaupteten Demokratiedefizit der Europäischen Gemeinschaft’ in Peter Hommelhoff and Paul Kirchhof (eds), Der
body of thought meant and fit to guide practice, that unfolds this and instructs the practice of law, and for good reason: It is too early, not least given the effects of these constructions on the constitution of reality.\textsuperscript{14} It will take much time and effort to flesh out the somehow.

Against this backdrop the present contribution offers its understanding of this new field of research (I.), grounds the relevant principles in positive law and sketches their purported application (II.), and discusses their interrelationship in order to shed some light on the entire constellation (III.). The analysis relies on certain assumptions grounded in earlier studies on the new public law.\textsuperscript{15} These are, in brief:

In the course of the Europeanisation and internationalisation of Germany, the public law applicable on German territory is no longer capable of being comprehended solely by recourse to national public law (\textit{Staatsrecht})\textsuperscript{16} evolving from the Basic Law, i.e. the German Constitution. Rather, it must take into account EU law, public international law and comparative legal insights, especially from other EU Members.\textsuperscript{17} In other words, public law is to be reconceived as a public law \textit{tout court}, fed from international, supranational and domestic sources and institutions. This modifies the scope of application of the fundamental principles of the domestic constitution and affects their importance. Their interpretation and development is to be embedded in a supranational, international and comparative dimension.

\textit{Staatenverbund der Europäischen Union} (CF Müller 1994) 39, 40. Outside Europe, things may be different: on the role of the Shahri’ah in the constitutional law of Islamic states see Abou El Fadl, ‘The Centrality of Shari’ah to Government and Constitutionalism in Islam’ in Rainer Grote and Tilmann Röder (eds), \textit{Constitutionalism in Islamic Countries: Between Upheaval and Continuity} (OUP 2012) 35.

\textsuperscript{14} ‘[I]st erst das Reich der Vorstellungen revolutioniert, so hält die Wirklichkeit nicht aus’ [If the realm of ideas is revolutionised, the reality will not stand it]: Georg WF Hegel, ‘Brief an Niethammer vom 28.10.1808’ in Johannes Hoffmeister (ed), \textit{Briefe von und an Hegel}, vol 1 (Meiner 1952) 253; Jean L Cohen, ‘Constitutionalism Beyond the State: Myth or Necessity? (A Pluralist Approach)’ (2011) 2 Humanity 127, 128.


\textsuperscript{16} The concept \textit{Staatsrecht} (law of the state) states well this presumed necessary link. On the ideology behind the concept and the pertinent debates see Christoph Möllers, \textit{Der vemisste Leviathan} (Suhrkamp 2008) 15-17, 53-56. Germany is not alone with this terminology, see the identical Dutch concept \textit{Staatsrecht} or the Swedish \textit{statsrätt}.

The German, supranational and international institutions are not to be seen as organs of an all-comprising joint (con)federation, as are the federation and the individual states in Canada, Germany or the United States of America.\textsuperscript{18} Nevertheless, the authorities vested with national, supranational and international authority are so closely interlinked on account of the Europeanisation and internationalisation of Germany that the legitimisation of the exercise of public authority in Germany can only be ascertained in this broader context. Problems of legitimacy for one public authority negatively affect the decisions of other authorities. Fidelity to principles becomes a matter of joint interest.

The benchmark for such legitimacy is a stock of common basic principles, at least for those supranational and international institutions that touch upon everyday social life. Particularly relevant among these are principles such as human rights, the rule of law and democracy, not only as concerns doctrinal constructions, but also with respect to legitimacy. These shared fundamental principles are, however, not identical, but best understood as belonging to different legal orders, which in turn can lead to different nuances of meaning between similarly sounding principles. These principles are, thus, on the one hand reference points for overarching discourses on legal doctrine and legitimacy, but can on the other hand also justify why the institutions of a particular legal order resist the claim to validity of an act of a different legal order. Principles are of immense importance for the interaction of different legal orders.

II. The Exercise of Public Authority as a Research Topic

1. The Transformation of the Principle of Sovereignty
The starting point for this contribution is an account of transformation. While up until the 1990s, German public law (\textit{Staatsrecht}), especially by means of the principles of the Basic Law, covered essentially all public law in Germany,\textsuperscript{19} supranational and

\textsuperscript{18} Just very few scholars argue that a European or world state is emerging, but see Mathias Albert, ‘Einleitung: Weltstaat und Weltstaatlichkeit: Neubestimmungen des Politischen in der Weltgesellschaft’ in Mathias Albert and Rudolf Stichweh (eds), \textit{Weltstaat und Weltstaatlichkeit: Beobachtungen globaler politischer Strukturbildung} (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2007) 9.

\textsuperscript{19} Josef Isensee and Paul Kirchhof, ‘Vorwort zur ersten Auflage’ in Josef Isensee and Paul Kirchhof (eds), \textit{Handbuch des Staatsrechts}, vol 1 (3rd eds, CF Müller 2003) IX; Klaus Stern, \textit{Das Staatsrecht der}
international institutions, rooted in other legal orders, now notably and formatively impact social interaction in Germany. The domestic constitutional principles do not affect the making of regulations in the European Union, the sanction mechanisms of the UN Security Council or the adjudication of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the same way as they guide the exercise of public authority through German institutions. The principle of sovereignty presents a key to better comprehension of this transformation of public law foundations.

According to the received understanding of the relationships between state and international order, of domestic public law and public international law, the whole constellation can be developed from the principle of sovereignty, with regard both to legal doctrine and legitimacy. According to Georg Jellinek, in 1888 everything could be explained “through sovereignty and from sovereignty”.20 It allowed for a remarkably clear and coherent construction that certainly provides a benchmark for new basic conceptualisations. Despite all of the problems that abstract conceptualisations tend to engender, the classic principle of sovereignty had colossal analytical and normative force. Sovereignty, understood in the sense of Staatsrecht, grounds the validity of all law in the will of the state (Staatswillen) and defines the superior authority and power of the state, assumed to be the unity of all actions of a plethora of diverse institutions, vis-à-vis all other spheres of society.21 Sovereignty, conceived as popular sovereignty, justifies such authority and law as a crystallisation of the democratic principle.22 From without, state sovereignty appears as a “suit of armour” that protects the predefined constellation23 and anchors the validity of public international law, same as Staatsrecht, in the will of the state. Briefly put: On account of the principle of sovereignty, the state and its legal order form a normative universe.

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23 On this concept see Albert Bleckmann, Begriff und Kriterien der innerstaatlichen Anwendbarkeit völkerrechtlicher Verträge (Duncker & Humblot 1970) 166.
This principle of sovereignty has fundamentally shaped both the configuration of domestic public law (Staatsrecht) and that of public international law, but in diametrically opposed directions: Staatsrecht has an unmistakably commandeering structure, whereas public international law has a manifestly cooperative one. Because of this conceptual background, legal bases in positive law for common principles of domestic public law and international public law, e.g. Art. 38(1)(c) ICJ Statute, Art. 25 German Basic Law, Art. 10 of the Italian, Art. 29 of the Irish or Art. 153 of the Slovenian Constitution, have given rise to few principles beyond sovereignty. The commonly recognised principles of law in the sense of Art. 38(1)(c) ICJ Statute are rooted above all in private law constructs; think only of pacta sunt servanda, bona fides and the obligation to make reparations. Even human rights are very difficult to fit into this. But it is not only between the national and international legal orders that shared principles are lacking: The traditional principle of sovereignty permits vastly dissimilar conceptions of order between states, ergo, radical pluralism.

Undeniably, the classic principle of sovereignty finds less pronounced support within the German constitution as in several other constitutional legal orders. It has, moreover, always been a matter of contention whether sovereignty can at all be understood as outlined here. The detractors can point to the Basic Law, which, unlike other constitutions, does not cast this concept in stringent positive terms and also displays a remarkable degree of openness in its Preamble and Arts. 23 to 26, comparatively speaking. But be that as it may, German Staatslehre and the associated doctrine have largely operated within the internal logic of the principle of sovereignty: Rainer Wahl has keenly depicted how the constitutionalisation of the legal order was the

24 Classic: Hersch Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (Longmans 1927).
26 Think only of the fundamental importance of the concept of parliamentary supremacy in the United Kingdom.
27 Foundational Hugo Preuß, ‘Selbstverwaltung, Gemeinde, Staat, Souveränität’ in Festschrift für Paul Laband (Mohr 1908) 199, 233ff; in detail see Christoph Möllers, Staat als Argument (2nd edn, CH Beck 2011) 291ff.
28 Cf arts 3 and 4 of the French constitution; art 126 of the Polish constitution; art 1(1) of the Czech constitution; art 11 of the Italian constitution.
29 Seminal Klaus Vogel, Die Verfassungsentscheidung des Grundgesetzes für eine internationale Zusammenarbeit (Mohr 1964).
great normative project of the first 40 years of the Federal Republic of Germany.\textsuperscript{30} The predominant understanding of the general rules of public international law under Art. 25 Basic Law,\textsuperscript{31} the for a long time rather marginal attention paid to ECtHR judgments\textsuperscript{32} or the peripheral importance of comparative law for the adjudication of the highest courts\textsuperscript{33} all point in that same direction. In the Lisbon decision of 2009, the principle of sovereignty was even endowed with a new quality giving rise to immediate legal consequences.\textsuperscript{34} At the same time, the judgment shows the transformation of the principle: It only protects the most essential of the most essential, the absolutely inalienable, that, which can under no circumstances be transferred to a non-German authority; however, it no longer constitutes the foundation of the entire construct of doctrine or legitimacy. Most importantly, it is there to serve other principles. Whereas the traditional concept of sovereignty, as expressed by Georg Jellinek, provided a founding concept, a point of closure where legal thinking could stop, today it serves some higher principle, such as self-determination or human rights. It is being reduced to a functional concept; it is ever less a founding one.

2. Public Authority of Supra- and International Institutions
Nevertheless, the principle of sovereignty continues to be important for public law, international law and theories of legitimacy.\textsuperscript{35} Because of a series of developments it is, however, no longer the key to the basic structure of public law.\textsuperscript{36} The Europeanisation

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{34} Hermann Heller, \textit{Die Souveränität: Ein Beitrag zur Theorie des Staats- und Völkerrechts} (De Gruyter 1927) 70ff; Uwe Volkmann, 'Setzt Demokratie den Staat voraus?' (2002) 127 Archiv des Öffentlichen Rechts 575, 577 and 582.
\bibitem{36} The internal metamorphosis of the state concept is not dealt with here. On this see Jean-Bernard Auby, ‘Die Transformation der Verwaltung und des Verwaltungsrechts’ in Armin von Bogdandy, Sabino Cassese and Peter M Huber (eds), \textit{Handbuch Ius Publicum Europaeum}, vol 3 (CF Müller 2010) § 56. Note: It is not argued that the sovereignty principle no longer has a role to play. That would be untenable. See only
\end{thebibliography}
and internationalisation of everyday life (i.e. of the Lebenswelten) undermine the famous premise of the classic principle of sovereignty, according to which states are “independent communities”.37 To use a graphic image of Eyal Benvenisti’s: The old sovereignty is akin to ownership of a free-standing villa on large grounds, whereas the new sovereignty resembles ownership of a high-rise with 200 different owners.38

This is the framework for the phenomenon that is immediately relevant here: supra- and international organisations affect social interaction in Germany to such an extent and with such autonomy, that the three-faced sovereignty cannot shoulder the entire construct, be it from the vantage point of doctrine or legitimacy.39 To the contrary, the actual clout of such institutions makes their classification as individual public authorities appear more feasible. Put differently: the exercise of public authority is the foundational structural characteristic that state institutions nowadays share with supra- and international institutions.

This qualification is an essential step on the road to common principles for national, supranational and international institutions, given that common principles only make sense where there is reasonable comparability. It allows this step without problematic notions such as global constitutionalism40 or global administrative law.41 All the same, concepts such as “supranational public authority” and even more so

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37 A classic exposition is The Case of the SS Lotus, France v Turkey, PCIJ Rep Series A No 10, 18.
40 This does not detract from the accomplishments of that approach; see especially Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law (OUP 2009); on the principles Kleinlein (n 12); on the problems Jan Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism Lite’ (2004) 1 Intl Org L Rev 31; Joseph HH Weiler, ‘Dialogical Epilogue’ in Grainne de Burca and Joseph HH Weiler (eds), The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (CUP 2011) 262ff.
“international public authority” are by no means self-evident, but instead require considerable conceptual innovation.42

The traditional understanding of public authority rests on the concept of state authority, which in turn characterises the state’s monopoly of force and sovereign territorial authority. Since neither supranational nor international authorities are endowed with this, authority has to be defined more broadly than this,43 should one hope to bring such institutions within the scope of application of those principles which the Basic Law considers to inform the structures of public authority. It is submitted that public authority should hence be understood as the legally grounded capacity to actually or legally restrict other actors in their freedom or to similarly determine its use.44 This can firstly happen by way of obligatory legal acts, which is the least demanding constellation from a conceptual point of view. An act is legally obligatory whenever it modifies the legal situation of a subject of law, in particular when an action, which runs contrary thereto, is illegal.45 In light of the modus operandi of many international institutions the concept of public authority should, however, extend beyond legal obligations. Notable effects are also occasioned by international courts and their case law: Although there is no doctrine of stare decisis in public international law, over the last 20 years many international courts have played an important role in the development of international law, especially regarding intra-statal matters such as human rights, criminal law, commercial law or environmental law.46 The same applies

43 ‘Definition’ is understood here as the development of sufficient conceptual elements that can accommodate the most important constellation. This is not an attempt at a totalising definition. See Hans-Joachim Koch and Helmut Rüßmann, Juristische Begründungslehre (CH Beck 1982) 75.
44 Similarly Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, ‘Power in Global Governance’ in Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (eds), Power in Global Governance (CUP 2005) 1, 8; the traditional approach is narrower, see eg Christoph Möllers, Gewaltengliederung: Legitimation und Dogmatik im nationalen und internationalen Rechtsvergleich (Mohr Siebeck 2005) 81ff.
45 An example for such legal determination is a decision regarding refugee status by the UNHCR, see Maja Smrkolj, ‘International Institutions and Individualized Decision-Making: An Example of UNHCR’s Refuge Status Determination’ (2008) 9 German L J 1779.
46 On the problems concerning lawmaking by international courts see contributions in Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke (eds), ‘Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as Lawmakers’
to non-legally binding acts of international institutions; they too can limit the freedom of other legal subjects or determine its use similarly. This happens whenever pressure is generated which other subjects can only withstand with a degree of difficulty.\textsuperscript{47} Such an exercise of international public authority occurs regularly through the setting of nonbinding standards, which have to be followed, \textit{inter alia}, because the advantages of their compliance outweighs the costs of noncompliance (e.g. as with the OECD Guidelines on double taxation) or because they have implementation mechanisms whereby positive or negative sanctions can be imposed (e.g. as in the case of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries).\textsuperscript{48} In addition to that, legal subjects can be conditioned via acts that do not have any kind of deontic quality (e.g. the statistical Data of the PISA reports), which, however, engender communicative power that the addressee can only avoid at a certain price, be it through a loss of reputation or financial means. This expansion of the authority concept can above all be grounded in theories of communicative action.\textsuperscript{49} Nevertheless, such an act must exceed a certain threshold. That will especially be the case where it is connected to a specific mechanism which effectively demands consideration by the addressee. There are many of these: international organisations have proved to be remarkably inventive in this respect.\textsuperscript{50}

This broad concept of authority rests on the empirical insight that nowadays many acts of supranational and international institutions can in the end effectively curtail personal freedom and collective self-determination in the same way as legally binding acts of state organs. The legal obligation to comply with a binding act of a supranational or international institution goes, in many cases, beyond the rights and duties of the citizens of the respective state (\textit{public international law}). However, the pressure of the demands of the international organisation may lead to a situation in which such acts of international institutions have the same effect as those of the state. This is a particular problem when dealing with human rights. For instance, international and supranational institutions have repeatedly pointed out that states are required to ensure a high standard of living for their citizens, which can often lead to actions that breach certain human rights. As a result, human rights can be indirectly violated through international law. Hence, the following points should be considered:

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{47} Most illuminating is the discussion concerning the law of the Catholic Church in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century, Thomas Duve, ‘Katholisches Kirchenrecht und Moraltheologie im 16. Jahrhundert: Eine globale normative Ordnung im Schatten schwacher Staatlichkeit’ in Stefan Kadelbach, Klaus Günther (eds), \textit{Recht ohne Staat? Zur Normativität nichtstaatlicher Rechtsetzung} (Campus 2011) 147, 159-166.
\item\textsuperscript{50} For example see Armin von Bogdandy and others (eds), \textit{The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institution Advancing International Institutional Law} (Springer 2010).
\end{itemize}
or international institution can be derived from the Basic Law’s provision of legality,\textsuperscript{51} it is, however, also frequently flanked by external sanctioning mechanisms. The legal freedom not to follow a merely conditioning act is often a mere fiction.\textsuperscript{52} There is also a principled consideration buttressing this broad conceptualisation of authority: Whenever public law is considered, in line with its liberal and democratic tradition, as an order securing personal freedom and enabling collective self-determination, every act that affects these values, no matter whether binding or nonbinding, must be considered within this definition, inasmuch as its effects are important enough to give rise to reasonable doubts as to its legitimacy. It is to be stressed that qualifying an act as an exercise of public authority does not imply its legitimacy. Unlike authors such as Joseph Raz or Myres McDougal, we distinguish the two concepts.\textsuperscript{53}

Notice that this conceptual broadening, being a definition, is of course not indisputable. It remains possible to explain the phenomena from the point of view of the traditional principle of sovereignty; to put the will of the state centre stage and to conceive public authority solely as national authority. The idea of the state imposing the application of supranational and international acts is central to this. Any corresponding doctrine, however, neglects the extent to which other legal orders impact social interaction in everyday life and runs the risk of being blind and deaf to such weighty phenomena.

Of concern to freedom, in particular in light of this wide concept of authority, are also the acts of private entities. Consider, for example, classifications by rating agencies, decisions of big corporations on structure and location or parental measures vis-à-vis children. When is the exercise of authority a phenomenon of public authority? Supranational and international public authority is any authority that rests on a competence, which was itself afforded by joint action of public actors – usually states – ,

\textsuperscript{51} See the Görgülü decision of 14 October 2004 by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany on the jurisdiction of the ECtHR: BVerfGE 111, 307 and BVerfGE 22, 293 concerning the law of the then EEC.
\textsuperscript{53} Joseph Raz, \textit{The Authority of Law} (Clarendon 1979) 28ff; Myres McDougal and Harold Laswell, ‘The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order’ (1959) 53 AJIL 1, 9; in detail Goldmann and Venzke (n 49).
in order to fulfil a public function that was permissibly defined as such by those actors.\(^{54}\) The public nature of the exercise of “authority” thus depends on the *legal basis*. The institutions analysed thus exercise public authority which has been granted them through political communities on the basis of legal acts (be they binding or nonbinding). The fundamental concept here is action (*Handeln*), which is from a legal point of view to be understood as an expression of individual freedom and, therefore, does not demand further justification.\(^{55}\)

This definition of *public authority* combines many insights of legal scholarship (*Rechtswissenschaft*). Supranational public authority is exercised in the adoption of legal acts of the European Union, the administrative acts of the Union and the decision-making of the European judiciary.\(^{56}\) That the EU exercises public authority appears now to be largely undisputed, even if the pertinent discussion is usually conducted under the more technical term of competences. But the authority of institutions of “global governance”\(^{57}\) is also increasingly brought into the fold of this logic, as evinced by newly coined terms such as “lawmaking” by international institutions,\(^{58}\) an “international” or “global” administrative law\(^{59}\) or an international judiciary, in particular regarding criminal courts.\(^{60}\)

Needless to say, this definition of “publicness” is rather formalistic and does not exhaust the meaning that the term has acquired in the tradition of western administration and administrative law. In liberal and democratic states this is closely connected to the duty of public institutions to serve the public interest and to comply

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\(^{54}\) Some centre on the fulfilment of public function. See Matthias Ruffert, *Perspektiven des Internationalen Verwaltungsrechts* in Möllers, Voßkuhle and Walter (eds) (n 484) 395, 402.


\(^{56}\) Stephan Bitter, *Die Sanktion im Recht der Europäischen Union* (Springer 2011).


\(^{59}\) See Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart (n 41).

with fundamental principles, \textsuperscript{61} and, hence, unlike a band of robbers, to be legitimate. Such expectations should, however, not be anchored in the concept of public authority, but rather in individual principles (below A.III.). \textsuperscript{62}

This concept of public authority as a common foundational concept for national, supranational and international institutions does not assert their identity in every respect. To the contrary, it forms the starting point to grasp their respective specificity. Accordingly, a state’s public authority is typically characterised by the competence to originate and define competences (Kompetenz-Kompetenz), i.e. original public authority, as well as the means to effect physical compulsion. Moreover, most developed states can rely on social resources such as state-related collective identity and developed solidarity. \textsuperscript{63} Supranational institutions normally differ from international institutions in that their acts regularly and directly shape social interaction in the legal spaces of states. These differences, which can only be alluded to here, will be of great importance in the concretisation of basic principles.

3. Public Authority of Other States
The domestic legal spaces of EU members have not only opened up toward “the top” but also “sideways”, so that they can now be considered part of the European legal space. \textsuperscript{64}

Evidently, this aperture is not entirely new. Probably the oldest aspect thereof can be found in so-called private international law, which obliges state courts to apply the private law of other states. \textsuperscript{65} This opening has, however, gained in importance in the course of Europeanisation and internationalisation. To begin with, the respective state law was largely harmonised through the “Rome I” and “Rome II” Regulations, \textsuperscript{66} as well


\textsuperscript{63} BVerfGE 89, 155; BVerfGE 123, 267 (Federal Constitutional Court of Germany).

\textsuperscript{64} Rainer Wahl, ‘Europäisierung: Die miteinander verbundenen Entwicklungen von Rechtsordnungen als ganzen’ in Trute and others (eds) (n 4141) 869, 897.

\textsuperscript{65} Bernd von Hoffmann and Karsten Thorn, \textit{Internationales Privatrecht} (10th edn, CH Beck 2012) 47.

as the “Brussels I” Regulation.67 This not only implies a considerable opening up within the EU vis-à-vis the private law of other Member States. The domestic legal space is also agape with respect to third countries, given that the rules of the Regulations also foresee the application of non-EU Member State law pursuant to requirements that are less stringent than those of the former German law.68

A new moment of “lateral openness” can be encountered in administrative law. According to established law, the territorial principle applies to administrative acts; only a handful of administrative acts, e.g. driving permits, were recognised as valid across borders on account of international treaties.69 But more recently transnational administrative acts have become constant and regular features of administrative law, to the extent that measures of other states are valid in Germany and even enforced by German authorities.70 In many areas this is prescribed by EU law71 and public international law.72

Another aperture that is of particular relevance for basic principles can be witnessed in comparative law. National courts draw upon judgments of other national courts, thereby developing in tandem legal constructions and furthering a transnational judicial interaction, even dialogue.73 Principles are further developed in this transnational discourse. References to judicial pronouncements originating in other states have become more prominent in the adjudication of the German Federal

68 art 2 Rome I Reg and art 3 Rome II Reg.
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Constitutional Court (*Bundesverfassungsgericht*).\(^{74}\) So far these are largely affirmative in nature and—with the exception of the judgments of the ECtHR—have no authoritative effect.\(^{75}\) It is, however, open to question whether the decisions of other highest courts should have such effect in this context of the German legal space embedding itself into the European legal space. One might especially consider whether deviation from another court’s solution should demand argumentation. Arguably, questions of shared interest should in the framework of the European legal space be conferred in a common dialogue that demands reasoned argumentation particularly in case of disagreement.\(^{76}\) Of course, this engenders further challenging questions, as the example of the critical consideration of a judgment of the *Bundesverfassungsgericht* by the Czech Constitutional Court demonstrates.\(^{77}\)

### III. Principles

The search for principles is a routine way for legal scholarship to reveal basic structures. Yet, “principle” is a difficult and contentious term.\(^{78}\) This contribution is based on an understanding of principles as particularly important norms which provide orientation. As *basic* or *founding* it understands those principles which allow for closure, i.e. where legal arguments stop.\(^{79}\) Moreover, the term “principle” has attributive character. It dignifies a norm with special significance. In this respect, this contribution understands principles differently than *Alexy*, who considers principles in contradistinction to rules

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\(^{74}\) Sauer (n 12).

\(^{75}\) On the level of authority of decisions of the ECtHR according to the German Federal Constitutional Court see its Görgülü decision (n 51) 317, 323 and BVerfGE 128, 326 (368ff) concerning preventive detention.


\(^{77}\) See the judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court of 3 November 2009, Pl ÚS 29/09 (Treaty of Lisbon II) especially paras 110ff, 137ff.


\(^{79}\) See above for the principle of sovereignty, A.II.2. at the end.
as optimisation commands capable of being balanced.\textsuperscript{80} His underlying categorical
distinction between rules and principles is not very convincing.\textsuperscript{81}

Principles are typically characterised by their abstraction and vagueness, which
enables ample room for interpretation, but also for connection to general normative
discourses in society. Basic principles in the tradition of western liberal democracies\textsuperscript{82}
are those norms which justify and legitimise the exercise of public authority.\textsuperscript{83} This
material conception of basic principles comprises only a few norms, which in national
constititutional law are not only referred to as basic principles (\textit{Grundprinzipien}), but
also as structural principles (\textit{Strukturprinzipien}).\textsuperscript{84}

A norm that is a principle can also be contained in types of action (\textit{Handlungsformen}) belonging to “soft law”; this accords with the concept of public
authority developed above.\textsuperscript{85} Not least for that reason there is no homogenous legal
status of principles. A norm that has been identified as a principle can confine itself to
simply enabling a reconstruction of the available legal materials, being simply a
doctrinal principle relating to structure or order. A norm could further be a guiding
principle, which seeks to have an effect on subsequent political or administrative
processes. Consensual decisions requiring further elaboration are often effected in such
form in supra- and international spheres.\textsuperscript{86} Moreover, principles can as legal principles
weigh in on interpretation and in some cases even independently produce legal
consequences. It follows that the mere qualification of a norm as containing a principle
does not entail specific legal consequences. It bears emphasis that principles are
endowed with different degrees of normativity in different legal orders; a high degree of

\textsuperscript{80} In detail: Alexy (n 78) 47ff.
\textsuperscript{81} András Jakab, ‘Re-Defining Principles as Important Rules – A Critique of Robert Alexy’ in Martin
\textsuperscript{82} On the question of Eurocentrism Armin von Bogdandy, ‘The European Lesson for International
Democracy: The Significance of Articles 9-12 EU Treaty for International Organizations’ (2012) 23 \textit{EJIL}
315.
\textsuperscript{83} Concerning the expression of ‘principe fondateur’ Joël Molinier (ed), \textit{Les principes fondateurs de
l’Union européenne} (Presses Universitaires de France 2005) 24; similar Dworkin (n 78) 22.
\textsuperscript{84} Horst Dreier in: Horst Dreier (ed), \textit{Grundgesetz-Kommentar}, vol 2 (2nd edn, Mohr Siebeck 2006, art
20 (Einführung) paras 5, 8; Reimer (n 78) 26ff.
\textsuperscript{85} The reasons for this ample legal concept comply with those for the ample concept of public authority,
see above A.II.2.
\textsuperscript{86} Cf UNGA Res 60/1. 2005 World Summit Outcome (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1 para 119:
‘they [Rule of Law, democracy, human rights] belong to the universal and indivisible core values and
principles of the United Nations’
normativity, as is typical in the German constitutional order, is not the standard.\textsuperscript{87} The focus in the present contribution lies on presenting overarching basic principles as structural or guiding principles in order to elucidate the broader context and to underline the potential and the promise of a multilevel discourse within legal scholarship.

Accordingly, the three principles of the rule of law, democracy and the protection of human rights will be central in what follows. This does not deny the existence and importance of other principles, such as those of social welfare, sustainability or subsidiarity. However, these principles can be deduced from those three, and parsimony is a principle of scholarly construction.

\textbf{B. Individual Basic Principles and Their Legal Foundations}

The question how the principles of democracy, rule of law and the protection of human rights are to be conceived and respected in this new broader constellation does not only occupy legal scholarship, but also other disciplines,\textsuperscript{88} such as political theory and legal philosophy.\textsuperscript{89} The relationship of legal scholarship to these is as fluid as it is fraught with difficulty. Any difference cannot lie in the principles \textit{per se}. Democracy, the rule of law and human rights are a focal point there as they are here. The distinction is rather that a theoretical or philosophical discourse can proceed purely by deduction, whereas juridical analysis has to be informed by the governing law, i.e. by positive provisions and judicial decisions. The first task of a contribution of legal scholarship to this unbounded and often public debate is to state the results thereof that have been consolidated into law. This occurs by explicating how the positive law grounds these principles and sketching their purported scope of applicability.

\textsuperscript{87} Niklas Luhmann and Klaus A Ziegert (tr), \textit{Law as a Social System} (OUP 2004) 490 even regard this as an European anomaly in decline.

\textsuperscript{88} Hereby, the Cluster of Excellence ‘The Formation of Normative Orders’ at Frankfurt/Main University is a focal point in international scholarship. See Rainer Forst and Klaus Günther, ‘Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen. Zur Idee eines interdisziplinären Forschungsprogramms’ in Rainer Forst and Klaus Günther (eds), \textit{Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen} (Campus-Verlag 2011) 11.

\textsuperscript{89} John Rawls, \textit{A Theory of Justice} (Clarendon Press 1972) 60ff; Dworkin (n 78), 22ff; Habermas (n 78), 132, 168ff, 197.
Where to start? The provisions of the Basic Law apply within German territory as acts of the constituent power and, thus, constitute original public authority.\(^90\) This commends them as a starting point. An exposition of the basic principles of EU constitutional law and public international law follows.

I. Basic Principles of the Basic Law

1. Parameters for German Public Authority

The Basic Law lays down numerous principles for all German institutions exercising public authority. A particular group of these are to be found in Arts. 1 and 20, namely human dignity and the fundamental core of inalienable human rights as well as democracy, federalism, the rule of law (precisely: \textit{Rechtsstaatlichkeit}) and solidarity (precisely: \textit{Sozialstaatlichkeit}). Comparative constitutional study reveals that these principles are within the European and international mainstream,\(^91\) but that they are particularly dense on account of singularly intensive constitutional adjudication.\(^92\) The central principles of respect for human dignity, democracy and the rule of law are all specified in the Basic Law itself: Respect for human rights and the democracy principle are rendered more concrete in particular through the catalogue of fundamental rights and the provisions on fair elections (Art. 38), whereas the rule of law principle is specified by way of Arts. 19(4), 97 to 104 or jurisdictional rules reflecting the separation of powers. The attendant constitutionalisation of the legal order and incorporation of any German public authority are likely the most important development within the legal order of the Federal Republic in the first forty years of its existence.\(^93\) Although it remains unclear whether this depth of constitutionalisation should be seen as

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\(^{90}\) On the relevance of this constitutional legal concept Tobias Herbst, \textit{Legitimation durch Verfassungsgebung} (Nomos 2003).

\(^{91}\) Pedro Cruz Villalón, ‘Grundlagen und Grundzüge staatlichen Verfassungsrechts: Vergleich’ in von Bogdandy, Pedro Cruz Villalón and Huber (eds) (n 36) 729.

\(^{92}\) On the reasons Christoph Schönberger, ‘Anmerkungen zu Karlsruhe’ in Matthias Jestaedt and others, \textit{Das entgrenzte Gericht} (Suhrkamp 2011) 9, 27. This activism is even commented by the Supreme Court of the United States, see Antonin Scalia’s Dissenting Opinion in \textit{United State v Windsor} [2013] <http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/12-307> accessed 26 July 2013.

\(^{93}\) Wahl (n 30), see also Gunnar Folke Schuppert and Christian Bumke, \textit{Die Konstitutionalisierung der Rechtsordnung} (Nomos 2000).
idiosyncratic or internationally exemplary, it is beyond dispute that it has been an integral part of what has overall been a rather successful development.94

2. Parameters for Supra- and International Public Authorities
The Basic Law not only imposes principles for German public authority, but also for supra- and international public authority. Although it opens up the German legal space remarkably vis-à-vis international and European law95 – only very few constitutions contain similarly far-reaching provisions96 – it at the same time also contains in Art. 23(1) a series of prerequisites for the European Union. The latter needs to be “committed to democratic, social and federal principles, to the rule of law and to the principle of subsidiarity” and provide “a level of protection of basic rights essentially comparable to that afforded by [the] Basic Law”. The Basic Law is rather unique in this respect. The parameters contained in the constitutions of most other EU Member States are much vaguer.97 They have, however, been developed by the respective national constitutional courts, often by taking a page out of the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s book, albeit in less detailed fashion.98

Parameters for international organisations are contained in Arts. 24 and 59 Basic Law. While Art. 59(2) is, comparatively speaking, more or less within the state-centric median,99 Art. 24 belongs to those provisions that are particularly receptive to supra-national authority.100 Its less demanding parameters in comparison to Art. 23(1) reflect the state of the debate at the time Art. 24 was revised in the early 1990s. Courts and legal scholarship have on this basis carefully developed a few principle-oriented

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94 See only the contributions in Michael Stolleis (ed), Herzkammern der Republik. Die Deutschen und das Bundesverfassungsgericht (CH Beck 2011).
95 Seminal Vogel (n 29); from the newer literature Wendel (n 73).
96 See the Dutch constitution which provides in art 90 that the government shall promote the development of the international legal order. Far-reaching is also art 193(4) of the Suisse constitution.
97 Certain requirements are also to be found in art 8(4) of the Portuguese constitution (‘with respect for the fundamental principles of a democratic state based on the rule of law’).
98 Eg in Sweden, Hungary and the Czech Republic; cf Wendel (n 73), 449ff; summarising Peter M Huber, ‘Offene Staatlichkeit: Vergleich’ in Armin von Bogdandy, Pedro Cruz Villalón and Peter M Huber (eds), Handbuch Ius Publicum Europaeum vol 2 (CF Müller 2008) 433; Christoph Grabenwarter, ‘National Constitutional Law Relating to the European Union’ in von Bogdandy and Bast (eds) (n 15) 83, 85ff; Franz C Mayer, ‘Multilevel Constitutional Jurisdiction’ in ibid, 399.
99 Similar requirements may be found in art 53 of the French constitution, art 89 of the Polish constitution and art 3a of the Slovenian constitution.
100 Ingolf Pernice in Horst Dreier (ed) (n 84) art 24 para 14; but cautious authorisations for the transfer of public authority can also be found in art 34 of the Belgian constitution, art 90(1) of the Polish constitution, art 3a of the Slovenian constitution and art 10a of the Czech constitution.
demands. An international organisation may not, for instance, exceed its democratically legitimised mandate.\textsuperscript{101} This affords pride of place to the doctrine of competences. In addition to that, no transfer of competences may impinge upon the basic structure of the constitution.\textsuperscript{102} This results in certain structural requirements for international organisations, in particular as concerns the principles relating to the protection of human rights and the rule of law.\textsuperscript{103} The democratic principle underlies the principle of positive legality contained in Art. 24 and Art. 59 in conjunction with the principle of limited attribution of competences. Therefore, the relevance of the principle of democracy for international public authority should be beyond question.

\textbf{3. Parameters for Other States}

The Basic Law does not contain any particular norms that specify prerequisites for the influence of acts of other states. There are, nonetheless, demands placed on the application of foreign private law and the recognition of foreign judgments in civil matters by German institutions within the limits of the so called “ordre public” (i.e. public policy). According to Art. 6 sentence 1 of the Introductory Act to the Civil Code (Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, EGBGB), “a provision of the law of another country shall not be applied where its application would lead to a result which is manifestly incompatible with the fundamental principles of German law”.\textsuperscript{104} Concerning the recognition of foreign judgments similar provisions are found in Art. 34 no. 1 Brussels I reg and § 328(1) no. 4 Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung, ZPO). These fundamental principles flow today from the principles of the Basic Law.\textsuperscript{105} Furthermore, principles of public international law play a role in the interpretation of Art. 6 of the Introductory Act to the Civil Code via Art. 25 of the Basic Law. The German “ordre public” is internationalised.\textsuperscript{106} The public policy exception only restricts, however, the recognition and effect of foreign judgments where foreign proceedings

\textsuperscript{101} The decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany of 22 November 2001 on the new strategic concept of the NATO, BVerfGE 104, 151.

\textsuperscript{102} Pernice (n 100) para 32.


\textsuperscript{104} Correspondent provisions in the European Union law in art 21 Rom I reg, art 10 Rom II reg.

\textsuperscript{105} Art 6(2) EGBGB (Introductory Act to the German Civil Code) which underlines the compatibility with fundamental rights as a condition.

have flouted minimal rule of law requirements or where the result of recognition would contradict essential values of the Basic Law.\textsuperscript{107} Parameters addressed to the public authority of other states hence only exist indirectly and within narrow confines; what is not demanded is a general configuration in line with democracy or the rule of law.

The fundamental principles of the protection of human rights, the rule of law and democracy are quintessentially relevant for all forms of public authority that have an impact within German territory. The degree of specificity, however, oscillates notably. It ranges from the rich doctrine and mass of judicial pronouncements on German public authority, to hazier demands placed on supranational authority wielded by the EU, down to essentially minimal restrictions on the effects of acts of other states. There is logic to this: The parameters for German public authority are not, without more, transferable to other institutions of public authority because that would impede the international embedding of Germany, which is in itself a constitutional objective.

**II. Basic Principles of EU Law**

**1. Parameters for Public Authority of the European Union**

EU law stipulates the basic principles of public authority in Art. 2 sentence 1 Treaty on European Union (TEU), namely “respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights”. Many provisions of EU primary law concretise these with a view to the exercise of public authority by the Union, in particular Arts. 9 to 12 TEU for the principle of democracy or the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU) for fundamental rights and the rule of law principle. The detailed rules laying down EU competences, i.e. Arts. 1(1), 4 and 5 TEU together with Arts. 2 to 6 TFEU, are also of heightened importance for the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Slowly an EU-specific understanding of these principles is developing, thereby concretising its “sui generis” nature.\textsuperscript{108} These principles and attendant doctrines have to be inspired by the national discourses on

\textsuperscript{107} Peter Gottwald in Thomas Rauscher, Peter Wax and Joachim Wenzel (eds), \textit{Münchner Kommentar zur ZPO} (4th edn, CH Beck 2013) vol 1, § 328, paras 116ff.

\textsuperscript{108} Molinier (n 83); Stelio Mangiameli (ed), \textit{L’ordinamento Europeo: I principi dell’Unione} (Giufrè 2006); Hartmut Bauer and Christian Calliess (eds), \textit{Verfassungsprinzipien in Europa} (Sakkoulas 2008); Claudio Franzius, \textit{Europäisches Verfassungsrechtsdenken} (Mohr Siebeck 2010), 87ff; Bengt Beutler, ‘Die Werte der Europäischen Union und ihr Wert’ in Ivo Appel, Georg Hermes and Christoph Schönberger (ed), \textit{Öffentliches Recht im offenen Staat: Festschrift für Rainer Wahl zum 70. Geburtstag} (Duncker & Humblot 2011) 635.
fundamental principles, but cannot follow these blindly. For example, the German constitutional acquis cannot be the role model, since there are simply too many missing prerequisites at the European level, including the traumatic background, the special role of the German Federal Constitutional Court, but also the specific role of legal scholarship. Of course, there has been a constitutionalisation of Community law, 109 but this is a very different phenomenon than the constitutionalisation of the German legal order.

2. Parameters for States

The principles of Art. 2 TEU are not only prerequisites for the authority of the European Union, but also for national public authority. One has to distinguish at this point between EU Member States and third countries. The relevance of these principles for Member States emerges from Arts. 7 and 49 TEU. They apply to every exercise of public authority by a Member State, even if this exercise falls outside of the scope of application of Art. 51 CFREU. 110 The precise content and, in particular, “thickness” of these principles for Member States is, however, controversial. 111 The diversity of Member State constitutions and Art. 4(2) TEU militate against a stringent principle of homogeneity such as that found in the constitutions of federal states, e.g. Art. IV(4) of the Constitution of the United States of America, Art. 28(1) Basic Law or Art. 51 Suisse constitution. The EU is too diverse for such homogeneity: there are republics and monarchies; parliamentary and semi-presidential systems; strong and weak parliaments; competing and consociational democracies; states with weak and strong party structures; weak and strong societal institutions; unitary and federal orders; strong, weak and missing constitutional courts; as well as a remarkable divergence

110 Meinhard Hilf and Frank Schorkopf in Eberhard Grabitz, Meinhard Hilf and Martin Nettesheim (eds), Das Recht der Europäischen Union, vol 1, art 2 EUV para 18 (July 2010); Matthias Ruffert in Christian Calliess and Matthias Ruffert (eds), EUV/AEUV 4th edn, CH Beck 2011 art 7 EU, para 4; Amaryllis Verhoeven, ‘How Democratic Need European Union Members Be?’ (1998) 23 EL Rev 217, 222-224, 234; Praesidium of the Convention, ‘Draft of Articles 1 to 16 of the Constitutional Treaty’ (Note) CONV 528/03, 6 February 2003, 11.
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coloring income and the level of protection afforded by fundamental rights. It is an important challenge for legal scholarship to develop adequate and meaningful European parameters against this backdrop.

Regarding third countries, EU law also makes explicit demands, although it is again necessary to differentiate, this time between candidate countries and other states. Candidate countries have to comply with the basic principles of Art. 2 TEU pursuant to Art. 49 TEU. This has in the past often been a catalyst for liberal-democratic reform. Beyond that EU law requires EU institutions to work towards liberal-democratic developments in third states, as emerges from Arts. 3(5) and 21(1) TEU. It appears that the drafters of the EU treaties see the Union as a standard bearer for democratic freedom. In actual practice, however, these principles hardly affect Union policy: Discussions on the application of these norms are up until now few and far between and there is little to no jurisprudence.

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112 Cruz Villalón (n 91).
119 Art 3(5) and art 21(1) EUT have mainly been used to underline the binding effect of international law for the EU. Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America and Others v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change (CJEU 21 December 2011) para 101; T-85/09, Kadi v Commission (Kadi II) [2010] ECR II-5177 para 115.
3. Parameters for International Organisations

The EU treaties impose no explicit requirements regarding the reception of acts from international institutions. But it is possible to read the objectives stated in Arts. 3(5) and 21(1) TEU in the sense that the Union should strive for the liberal-democratic development of international organisations, too.120 This aim is also reflected in the pertinent empowering norms.121

Judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) do not, however, articulate these principles for international organisations. Its decisions rather aim at the protection of the EU’s autonomy and the CJEU’s adjudicatory competence.122 Particularly important in this context is the so-called Kadi jurisprudence. According to widespread but by no means general opinion, the CJEU missed the opportunity to apply a Solange-formula, which would make the reception of international acts dependent on a reasonable respect for the basic principles by the relevant international institutions.123

III. Basic Public Law Principles of Public International Law

1. Parameters of General International Law and Constitutionalism

Public international law lacks a foundational legal act comparable to the German Basic Law or the EU treaties that would provide principles relating to the protection of human rights, the rule of law or democracy for all authority under international law. There have, of course, been plenty of political or scholarly attempts to overcome what is considered a defect by many; these have intensified in recent years.124 Among the

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121 References in art 207 TFEU (common commercial policy); art 208(1) TFEU (development cooperation); art 212(1) TFEU (economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries) and art 214(1) TFEU (humanitarian aid).


124 Recently even the interdisciplinary journal ‘Global Constitutionalism’ was founded, see the editorial of the first issue Antje Wiener and others ‘Global Constitutionalism: Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law’ (2012) 1 Global Constitutionalism 1.
contributions of legal scholarship, international constitutionalism is particularly noteworthy.\footnote{On the development as well as an overview see Kleinlein (n 12).}

Constitutionalism sees and develops basic international legal norms in light of liberal constitutions.\footnote{Anne Peters, ‘Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms and Structures’ (2006) 19 Leiden J of Intl L 579; Stefan Kadelbach and Thomas Kleinlein, ‘Überstaatliches Verfassungsrecht’ (2006) 44 Archiv des Völkerrechts 235.} Occasionally it was suggested that certain international principles might be \textit{jus cogens}, prevailing not only vis-à-vis the remainder of public international law, but over all law.\footnote{Eg the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia declared in its Furundžija judgment that the prohibition of torture has the status of \textit{jus cogens} which prohibits different national provisions and renders them void. \textit{Prosecutor v Furundžija} (Judgment) ICTY-95-17/1-T (10 December 1998) paras 144ff.} Such a take, however, stretches the \textit{jus cogens} concept too far.\footnote{Declarations like in the World Summit Outcome Document (n 86) that the rule of law, democracy and human rights ‘belong to the universal and indivisible core values and principles of the United Nations’ cannot recognise \textit{jus cogens}; Stefan Kadelbach, ‘Jus Cogens, Obligations Erga Omnes and Other Rules: The Identification of Fundamental Norms’ in Jean-Marc Thouvenin and Christian Tomuschat (eds), \textit{The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order} (Nijhoff 2006) 30.} A more measured approach unfolds the UN Charter in light of basic constitutional principles.\footnote{Alfred Verdross and Bruno Simma, \textit{Universelles Völkerrecht} (3rd edn, Duncker & Humblot 1984) 69ff; Bardo Fassbender, \textit{The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International Community} (Nijhoff 2009).} Another one utilizes a material concept of constitutional law and identifies particularly important norms of public international law as constitutional.\footnote{See Anne Peters, ‘Rechtsordnungen und Konstitutionalisierung: Zur Neubestimmung der Verhältnisse’ (2010) 65 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 3.} It is possible to reach similar results via administrative law angles.\footnote{Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart (n 41) 15.} The public law approach pursued here is also dedicated to ensuring and promoting liberal-democratic authority, but it operates by way of a different conceptual foundation, which avoids the problems of those approaches by focusing, both doctrinally and from a legitimacy perspective, on the exercise of public authority.

\section*{2. Parameters for States}

The requirement that all states abide by the public international law principle of the protection of human rights is well enshrined. Most states are parties to the universal human rights pacts.\footnote{As an authorative voice from the ‘new world’ see Flávia Piovesan, \textit{Direitos Humanos e o Direito Constitucional Internacional} (13th edn, Editora Saraiva 2012) 227.} Their specific constitutional function is expressly recognised in
numerous newer constitutions. Not quite as patent is the obligation concerning states that are not contracting parties. Yet, a plethora of doctrinal offerings makes a convincing case for obligations at least as concerns fundamental human rights. These rights include above all the right to life, the prohibition of torture, slavery and arbitrary imprisonment.

What is problematic with respect to the principle of human rights is not so much the legal basis as its implementation, as many reports convincingly (and depressingly) testify. This leads to the rule of law. This principle, sometimes also called Rechtsstaatlichkeit or prééminence du droit, has many facets. Probably its most important component for the time being are procedures that enforce the normativity of law and accordingly of human rights against the exercise of public authority.

Numerous international treaties contain rule of law requirements for national administrations or courts. To name but a few: Arts. 9(3)-(4), 14, 15 ICCPR, Art. X GATT or Art. 88 ICJ Statute. These demands are, however, largely sector-specifically and often do not reach the minimum requirements of developed national legal orders. Nevertheless, important authors see the robust development of this dimension of public international law and even claim that the emergence of general public international law principle of global due process can be observed. Sabino Cassese, for instance, has

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133 From the European judicial area see only section 10 of the Spanish constitution; art 20 of the Rumanian constitution; art 11 of the Slovakian constitution; similar especially new provisions in the Latin American constitutions, eg section 75, 22 of the Argentinian constitution; art 6 of the Uruguayan constitution; see Christina Binder, 'The Prohibition of Amnesties by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights' (2011) 11 German L J 1203.


135 Kadelbach (n 128) 29.

136 Regarding a compilation of relevant provisions see Sabino Cassese, 'A Global Due Process of Law?' in Gordon Anthony and others (eds), Values in Global Administrative Law (Hart 2011) 17, 21ff; on the regional European level these provisions are complemented by the guarantees of the ECHR especially arts 6 and 13.

137 Cassese (n 136); Sérvulo Correia, 'Administrative Due or Fair Process: Different Paths in the Evolutionary Formation of a Global Principle and of a Global Right' in Gordon Anthony and others (eds) (n 136) 313; Gianluigi Palombella, 'The rule of law beyond the state: Failures, promises, theory' (2009) 7 ICON 442.
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seminally described such a trajectory.\textsuperscript{138} International courts play a vital role in this development.\textsuperscript{139}

It is more difficult to ascertain with confidence a principle of democracy. The Charter of the UN demands from the Member States only that they are “peace-loving” (Art. 4(1) sentence 1 UNC). The self-determination precept, assured through many ways in public international law, points in the same direction, but it does not lay down the democratic principle in its generality.\textsuperscript{140} Public international law indubitably reinforces through a series of provisions important aspects of democratic order, in particularly via norms that protect human rights and minorities. In addition to that, Art. 25 ICCPR prescribes free elections.\textsuperscript{141} Beyond that, it is a matter of debate whether public international law imposes further democratic elements.\textsuperscript{142} A string of authors perceives a tendency towards the development of a universal legal principle of democracy, which does not, however, yet exist in that form. It is, however, already established as a structural and guiding principle.\textsuperscript{143} Moreover, all the developments described in this chapter confirm the transformation of the international sovereignty of a state. In domestic as in international law, state sovereignty is ever more seen as a functional concept to serve the basic principles described above.

3. Parameters for International Organisations

The public law principles of public international law are traditionally directed towards confining \textit{domestic} public authority. The law of international organisations has long

\textsuperscript{138} Cassese (n 136) 51.
\textsuperscript{140} Anne Peters, \textit{Das Gebietsreferendum im Völkerrecht} (Nomos 1995) 387ff; Daniel Thürer and Thomas Burri observe in their article ‘Self-Determination’ [2008] in Wolfrum (ed) (n 9) certain developments in the right to self-determination, but this should not be equated with a right to democracy; Steven Wheatley, \textit{The Democratic Legitimacy of International Law} (Hart 2010) 213 on the right to self-determination as \textit{jus cogens} and as an \textit{erga omnes} obligation, but also without equating it with a right to democracy.
\textsuperscript{141} Manfred Nowak, \textit{U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary} (2nd edn, Engel 2005) art 25 paras 1, 18. Its normativity is damaged by the constitutional practice of states such as China or Russia, but it is not destroyed.
\textsuperscript{143}In detail see Petersen (n 142).
been considered in functionalistic terms, i.e. not with a view to curtailing their power, but to strengthen it. Since they are in this day and age of globalisation veritable agents of public authority, the question arises whether those principles should also be applied to them. The debate started with respect to the then European Community, but now, given the increasing impact of other institutions, is becoming ever more general.

The most discussed query is to what extent international organisations are bound by human rights. Even if directly effective acts are only rarely passed by international organisations, the relevance of their practices vis-à-vis human rights is plain to see nowadays – be it in “smart sanctions” of the UN Security Council, the allocation of financial means by the World Bank or the recognition of refugee status by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

Since these institutions are not contracting parties to the human rights pacts, obliging them requires doctrinal constructs that in the meantime are as common as they are convincing. There is likely not a single international entity today that in principle denies the relevance of human rights for its actions. Evidently, heavy legitimacy costs would otherwise ensue that might threaten the organisation.

The situation is similar with respect to the various elements of the rule of law. Many international organisations possess complex institutional and procedural rules, which, however, hardly operate in the sense of a developed rule of law principle. General statements are difficult to make because the legal situation differs from organisation to organisation. There is in particular a dearth of clear provisions requiring and affording legal remedies in the face of actions of supra- and international institutions. Be that as it may, human rights are increasingly understood as demanding at least

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functionally-equivalent procedures that grant legal recourse,\textsuperscript{150} the Inspections Panels of the World Bank and the Ombudsperson in the context of the UN Security Council’s smart sanctions are emblematic.\textsuperscript{151} A big and as of yet unresolved question mark hangs over the issue to what extent national courts can compensate for deficiency at the international level.\textsuperscript{152}

Even more difficult is the question of whether and to what extent a democratic principle exists for supranational and international organisations within public international law. While the EU treaty anchors the mandatory character of the democratic principle for the EU, an analogous provision is absent from the statutes of international organisations. It would, however, be too positivistic to banish democracy within international organisations from the sphere of legal thought and consign it solely to the realms of political theory. In view of these difficulties many authors conversely prefer to discuss this feedback loop of legitimation under the term \textit{accountability}.\textsuperscript{153} Ultimately, however, democracy remains the paramount principle in theory and law when questions arise as to how international institutions can be linked to the values, interests and convictions of the affected citizens and be responsible to them.

The debate covers a variety of issues, connected by the tradition of democratic thought. It is a basic implication of the democratic principle that international organisations are bound by their underlying legal acts.\textsuperscript{154} Further sign posts are the transparency of international institutions and the involving of international parliamentary assemblies as well as non-governmental organisations.\textsuperscript{155} As multifarious

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{152} August Reinisch (ed), \textit{Challenging Acts of International Organisations before National Courts} (OUP 2010).
\item \textsuperscript{155} von Bogdandy (n 82).
\end{itemize}
and uncertain as the individual insights of this debate may be, nonetheless the general concept of democracy can serve today in the context of international organisations as a vanishing point for the constructions of legal scholarship (e.g. the doctrine of competences) and as a lens for its criticism.

**C. Questions of Elaboration**

**I. Potentials and Problems**
Principles relating to the protection of human rights, the rule of law, and, albeit to a limited extent, democracy can be identified in German law, EU law and public international law. Moreover, they apply not only to the institutions of their own legal order but also to those of interacting ones. For that reason, they form the vertices of an overarching discourse about legal foundations. This consonance has considerable potential to develop overarching and general frameworks. Even so, the fact that the norms of German, EU and international law set principled parameters for one another leads to difficult questions regarding their relative priority. The classic mode of solving such conflicts and ordering debates on principles can be found in Art. IV(4) of the Constitution of the United States of America and in the Fourteenth Amendment, roughly equivalent to Art. 28(1) and Art. 31 of the German Basic Law. According to the German provision, the structural principles of the Länder have to align themselves to the structural principles of the Federation.

A similarly unequivocal rule is missing in these novel contexts of conflict and interpretation. Reliance must be placed on doctrinal constructions that negotiate truly fundamental issues: The mode of reciprocal allocation of statal, supranational and international provisions as well as the question regarding the meaning of comparative legal insights. This leads to a series of different, albeit interconnected questions. For acts of public international law what is at issue is their validity, rank and effect in the territorial scope of application of EU law and national law, i.e. how the EU or German institutions have to cope with these acts. Another issue is whether EU and national institutions can assent

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156 But see art VI of the US Constitution; from the European legal area eg art 1 and 25 Basic Law, art 10 of the Italian constitution, art 55 of the French constitution, art 216(2) TFEU.
to international legal acts. Given that principles normally do not lead to direct conflicts, the question then arises how the different understandings and peculiarities of the principles, as they were developed in the positive law, jurisprudence and legal scholarship of the respective legal orders, relate to each one another; the same question can be posed with respect to the insights of comparative law.

II. Pluralism of Principles

Pondering the relationship between principles of different legal orders suffers from the defect of being spellbound by two theoretical offerings of the early 20th century: monism and dualism.\textsuperscript{157} It is not possible to develop any plausible understanding from these. The current legal and political landscape differs fundamentally from that of a century ago, the German case is emblematic. At that time, Germany was a rather authoritarian and belligerent state. It has since become a liberal democracy, which no longer seeks to rival its neighbours for colonies or superpower status, but rather has become embedded together with them in a dense fabric of supra- and international organisations, exactly in order to overcome such rivalry. But monism is also not persuasive, neither as a doctrinal nor as a theoretical offering: Whenever questions relating to validity, rank, effect and legitimacy are to be resolved, the act in question first has to be situated in a specific legal order; legal practice hence evidently does not proceed from an amalgam of legal orders. All essential questions are always answered by reference to a specific legal order. Both monism and dualism are no longer useful as specific doctrinal constructs, since they cannot offer plausible solutions to any of the relevant legal questions. They also lead into a dead end from the point of view of theories designed to capture the entire legal constellation, both analytically and normatively. Dualism ultimately shares the fate of the traditional principle of sovereignty. Monism with public international law at its apex shares the weaknesses of world constitutionalism as a paradigm to grasp the existing law.

In constitutional law one can encounter monism that puts the state on top, for instance when principles of national constitutional law form the centre of the normative

universe; examples might include A. Scalia’s discussions of comparative law\textsuperscript{158} or those authors that consider public international law to be foreign relations law, external \textit{Staatsrecht}.\textsuperscript{159} But such conceptualisations are even susceptible to challenge with respect to the US Constitution, given that its founders were concerned with the integration of American institutions in a universal project of reason.\textsuperscript{160} For Germany conceptualisations like those of Scalia’s are hardly convincing given the unambiguous basic decision in favour of open statehood.

There have been many conceptual attempts to capture the larger setting which is the object of this contribution. In the German-speaking context, the terms “multilevel” system, “network” and in particular “composite” order have received particular prominence (in German: \textit{Mehrebenensystem, Netzwerk, Verbund}).\textsuperscript{161} One can conceive these proposals as part of an international debate on legal pluralism.\textsuperscript{162} The core insight of pluralistic positions is that the diverse principles that lay down requirements for social interaction as part of public international law, EU law and national law are not conceived of as parts of a unitary legal order. Moreover, they reject the paradigm of hierarchy as the symbol of the overall order, in the sense of ultimate authority, or a “last say”.\textsuperscript{163}

There are two camps of pluralists. The more radical approach starts from the premise of conflict and reads the interaction as a struggle for power. On this view,
juridical rationality masks the underlying antagonism.\textsuperscript{164} By contrast, the dialogic approach starts from the observation that the diverse legal regimes and institutions regularly manage to build stable legal relations despite maintaining their own normative independence, in particular in the European legal area. Fundamental conflicts have been the big exception, whereas intensive and oftentimes fruitful collaboration have been the norm. Of course, the concept of dialogue has so far not been deeply elaborated and can be misread as supposing a friendly or even cosy relationship between institutions. This contribution does not suggest this, but rather distinguishes institutional dialogue from a relationship which is mere interaction, as one could see between the US American courts and the International Court of Justice in the LaGrand case.\textsuperscript{165} The difference between mere interaction and dialogue is that dialogue occurs in a setting where the legal orders and institutions accept a common responsibility for all legal normativity.\textsuperscript{166} Dialogic pluralism is the natural choice for those who prefer Hegel’s insistence on the normal case as the starting point for scientific thought rather than Carl Schmitt’s exceptionalism.

This dialogical pluralism has so far mostly been applied to the relationship between institutions of the various legal orders, but it can be extended to that of the founding principles themselves. European Union law shows one possibility with its protection of “national identity” under Art. 4(2) TEU.\textsuperscript{167} The meaning of this EU concept is shaped by the basic principles on the European as well as on the domestic level: While the EU framework prescribes some common elements, the specific meaning is determined in light of the basic constitutive principles of the Member State in question. Along similar lines international sovereignty could be reconstructed with a


\textsuperscript{166} In more detail Daniel Halberstam, ‘Systems Pluralism and Institutional Pluralism in Constitutional Law: National, Supranational and Global Governance’ in Matej Avbelj and Jan Komárek (eds), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart 2012) 85.

\textsuperscript{167} For detail see Armin von Bogdandy and Stephan Schill, ‘Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity under the Lisbon Treaty’ (2011) 48 CMLRev 1417.
composite legal status, responding to the constitutional self-understanding a country has of its place in the regional and global order; sovereignty becomes a relative concept.168 Accordingly, international sovereignty could be informed by the respective constitutional openness towards common projects and willingness to recognise shared responsibility. Since the constitutional orders of Argentina, China, or Germany enshrine deeply different understandings of the international order and the country’s place therein, depending on the role each constitution attributes to international law in general and human rights in particular as well as supranational integration. A reconstructive proposal should take those differences into account. Of course, the emerging international sovereignty will be far more nuanced and variegated. But for this very reason, such a concept of sovereignty fits better with the pluralistic world order while furthering the basic principles discussed here where political communities are disposed to advance on that path.

**III. The Principles of Principles**

Despite all the potential difficulties, the basic principles can provide a beacon for political action and legal reconstruction in this novel constellation, both for what is in common and for what should remain different. In order to advance, scholarly core competencies such as abstraction, specification, comparison, transfer and conflict resolution are demanded in light of dialogic pluralism.169 A melding of diverse discourses on principles is as unlikely as is a merger of diverse legal orders. Nevertheless, under the premise of dialogic pluralism, linking them is as probable as it is necessary, since this furthers the principles of principles, viz. the protection of the core of human rights,170 the stabilisation of normative expectations171 as well as the

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171 Habermas (n 78) 427; Luhmann (n 87) 196-203.
connection to the values, interests and convictions of those affected; in other words, the inclusion of the citizens in the exercise of public authority.\textsuperscript{172}

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\textsuperscript{172} Jürgen Habermas, \textit{Zur Verfassung Europas: Ein Essay} (Suhrkamp 2011) 54; see also Amartya Sen, \textit{The Idea of Justice} (Lane 2009) 117.